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Abstract 
 
 
 
This thesis proposes an intellectual biography of Raoul Vaneigem (1934-Present). Vaneigem 
was a member of the Situationist International (SI) between 1961 and 1970. Today the SI is 
widely recognised as one of the significant avant-garde groups to have contributed to the 
historical events that shook France in May 1968. Most people will have come to Vaneigem 
through his Traité de savoir-vivre à l’usage des jeunes générations (1967), which he wrote as 
a member of the SI and was published just months before the largest wildcat strike in French 
history. Vaneigem is therefore of interest from a cultural history or history of ideas 
perspective because his work embodies both a political moment and because it emerged out of 
debates that are still informing contemporary theory. Moreover, Vaneigem is something of an 
anomaly in that he has always worked outside and against intellectual and political 
institutions, he comes from a working-class background and he has lived the great majority of 
his life in the province of Hainaut, the old industrial heartland of Belgium, where he was born. 
This makes Vaneigem an outsider in a world that has ostensibly been dominated by the 
Parisian intellectual elite. 
 More often than not Vaneigem has been dismissed, even vilified, by academics 
interested in the Situationist International. This is all the more surprising given that his 
Situationist comrade Guy Debord (1931-1994) has become a cause célèbre among the 
intellectual left since his death, igniting a veritable publishing industry in France and the 
English-speaking world. The intention of this thesis is not an attempt to earn Vaneigem the 
dubious acclaim that has feted Guy Debord these past decades. Rather, it endeavours to 
contextualise, clarify and bring out the complexity of the life and work of Raoul Vaneigem, 
making him the focus of a critical commentary that will reassess his place in the field. 
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Introduction. The Life and Work of Raoul Vaneigem in Critical Perspective 
 
This introduction covers four main areas. First, the choice of Raoul Vaneigem (1934-) 
as the focus of the current work will be justified and the problematic will be 
identified. Secondly, the relationship between Raoul Vaneigem and Guy Debord 
(1931-1994) will be examined in order to contextualise this problematic. Thirdly, a 
critical survey of the extant literature will be provided so as to position the current 
work within the context of the wider critical field. Fourthly, the methodological 
approach upon which the argument of the current work rests will be established in 
order to create a logical progression for the argument to follow. 
 
Who is Raoul Vaneigem? 
 
Raoul Vaneigem was a member of the Situationist International between 1961 and 
1970. Today the SI is widely recognised as one of the significant avant-garde groups 
to have contributed to the social upheaval that shook France in May 1968.1 In this 
context, Vaneigem is largely known as the author of Traité de savoir-vivre à l’usage 
des jeunes générations (usually translated as The Revolution of Everyday Life in 
English), which was published in 1967 just months before these events took place.2 
                                                
1 Pascal Dumontier, Les Situationnistes et Mai 1968: théorie et pratique de la révolution (1966-1972) 
[1990] (Paris: Lebovici, 1995), was the first critic to properly assess the historical evidence on the 
Situationist involvement in May ’68. He argues that, although there were other points of reference for 
those involved, the Situationists were the source of some of the most extreme and original ideas in the 
movement, Dumontier, pp. 217-218. He notes that the use of scandal, previously the realm of the arts, 
was also fairly original, as was the Situationist notion of revolution as ‘une vaste fête’, Dumontier, p. 
218. In the latter respect, the Strasbourg scandal of 1966, orchestrated by the SI, was an important 
factor in the radicalisation of the student movement and, he notes, Situationists, as well as pro-situs, 
were present in a number of the key universities, Dumontier, p. 218. As such, Dumontier argues, the SI 
played an important role, among other far-left groups, in the acceleration of ‘le processus de 
radicalisation’, Dumontier, p. 218. 
2 Raoul Vaneigem, Traité de savoir-vivre à l’usage des jeunes générations (Paris: Gallimard, 1967). 
The second edition published in Paris by Gallimard in 1992 is used throughout the current work as the 
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Traité was arguably the most widely read Situationist text of the period. In this book 
Vaneigem provides a theoretical critique of capitalist society that embodies a full 
frontal attack on the forms of modern life, from work and the state to culture and mass 
consumption. Vaneigem condemns a mode of being that reduces mankind to a 
pseudo-animal state of mere survival that proliferates boredom, isolation and 
suffering. Most of all, Vaneigem critiques the traditional left, which, he argues, is 
completely complicit in the reproduction and modernisation of commodity society. In 
contrast, Vaneigem offers the possibility of a new civilisation founded upon the 
pleasure of consciously realising our individual and collective needs and desires 
beyond commodity fetishism. 
  Raoul Vaneigem has remained an underexamined figure in critical literature 
on the Situationist International despite his obvious contribution to the group. His 
erstwhile comrade Guy Debord, however, has undergone a radical reappraisal to 
emerge as one of the major French thinkers of the twentieth century. Andrew Hussey 
remarks that since the death of Guy Debord in 1994 a ‘veritable academic industry’ 
has developed around his work.3 There is an ever-growing collection of editions of his 
writing, alongside myriad biographies, critical commentaries and articles. A few years 
ago, Debord’s entire archive was even purchased by the French state in an effort to 
preserve a ‘trésor national’.4 As part of this, the BnF recently staged a highly 
publicised exhibition of this archive on site. While much of this is not the kind of 
attention that Debord himself would have welcomed, this effort at ‘recuperation’ has 
                                                                                                                                      
most commonly available and for containing the additions of a preface ‘Quotidienne éternité de la vie’ 
(written especially for this edition) and postface ‘Toast aux ouvriers révolutionnaires’ (written in 
1972). A new edition of the English translation of Traité has been published recently: trans. Donald 
Nicholson-Smith, The Revolution of Everyday Life (Oakland, CA: PM Press, 2012). 
 3 Andrew Hussey, The Game of War, The Life and Death of Guy Debord (London: Johnathan Cape, 
2001), p. 396. 
4 ‘‘Ce classement comme trésor national s’interprète comme une reconnaissance par l’Etat de ce que 
représente Debord dans la vie intellectuelle et artistique du siècle écoulé’, souligne Bruno Racine, 
président de la Bibliothèque nationale de France (BNF), qui a largement œuvré pour que les archives 
restent en France’, Frédérique Roussel, ‘Debord, un trésor’, Libération, 16 February 2009. 
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also developed in tandem with more genuine attempts to improve our understanding 
of Debord and the SI.5 Yet serious consideration of Raoul Vaneigem in these studies 
has been strangely lacking. This is a problem for our comprehension of both Guy 
Debord and the Situationist International. Debord did not develop his critical theory in 
a vacuum. He was inarguably the most important figure in the group but the 
Situationist International was not the work of one man. It was a collective project. 
The theories, books and films of Guy Debord were the product of years of social 
activity and theoretical debate. Raoul Vaneigem, the only other author of the SI to 
publish a book-length work of theory at this time, was an important figure in this 
matrix of relationships. It is therefore essential that the contribution of Raoul 
Vaneigem to the Situationist International be assessed as part of a wider process in the 
critical field of developing a more complex and accurate understanding of the group. 
 Vaneigem greatly impacted debates within the SI, which occurred between 
1961 and 1963, that clarified the ontological basis of the group’s critique. 6 At the 
Fifth Conference of the group that took place in Gothenburg in August 1961 his 
statement that ‘Il n’y a pas […] d’œuvre d’art situationniste’ was a turning point in 
the history of the organisation.7 It marked the beginning of a stage in the development 
of the Situationist International that focused more resolutely on the creation of a 
coherent critical social theory and its realisation in practice. In the same speech 
Vaneigem set out the notion of revolutionary praxis, the ‘volonté de changer l’emploi 
de la vie’, as the basis for this new direction, defining it as ‘le seul contexte où les 
                                                
5 ‘Récupération’ was a term used by the Situationists to describe the process whereby radical 
movements and critiques of capitalist society are incorporated safely into it through cultural, economic 
and political appropriation over time. 
6 In traditional philosophy, ontology refers to that branch of metaphysics that deals with issues of being 
and reality. In the context of the Situationists, however, reality is socio-historical as well as equally 
subjective and objective (because mediated by or, rather, created by human praxis). As such, the way in 
which I use the term ontology and the ontological in the context of this thesis refers to the Situationists’ 
practical understanding of what constitutes reality and human being, the basic assumptions on which 
they can critically act. The details of these assumptions are discussed in Chapter 1 of the current work. 
7 Internationale situationniste, 7 (April 1962), pp. 26-27. 
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situationnistes puissent parler de liberté d’action’.8 These positions were developed in 
a number of contributions, most notably, his first extensive text for the SI, ‘Banalités 
de base’, published in the group’s journal Internationale situationniste between 1962 
and 1963.9 Vaneigem was then elected as a member of the Central Council of the SI 
from 1961 onwards. In tandem with Guy Debord and Attila Kotányi, he played a 
crucial role in the exclusion of the artists from the group in 1962. Moreover, not only 
the publication of ‘Banalités de base’ but also the circulation of the manuscript of 
Traité from early 1965 onwards also had a major impact on the group. In 1966 
Vaneigem became a mediating figure between students and the SI during the so-
called Strasbourg Scandal that brought the group to international attention. Vaneigem 
then travelled to the United States in 1967 to attempt the creation of an American 
Section of the SI. The following year Vaneigem was on the ground in Paris during the 
events of May ’68. Finally, his part in the so-called ‘orientation debate’ that hampered 
the SI in the post-68 period was arguably pivotal in the eventual dissolution of the 
group. These are just some of the more prominent moments in Vaneigem’s decade of 
participation in the collective project of the Situationist International. 
 Since his resignation from the SI, Raoul Vaneigem has also proved to be a 
prolific author, producing no less than 34 published books, as well as a large 
                                                
8 Internationale situationniste, 7 (April 1962), p. 27. The term ‘praxis’ here refers to the consciously 
creative dimension of human practice as defined by Karl Marx in his famous ‘Theses on 
Feuerbach’ (1845):  
 
The main defect of all hitherto-existing materialism – that of Feuerbach included – is that the 
Object [der Gegenstand], actuality, sensuousness, are conceived only in the form of the object 
[Objekts] or of contemplation [Anschauung], but not as human sensuous activity, practice 
[Praxis], not subjectively. [Karl Marx, trans. Cyril Smith, ‘Theses on Feuerbach’, Marxist 
Internet Archive (2002).] 
 
 This is the critique Marx makes of bourgeois thought: that it cannot grasp humanity is part of 
reality, that objectivity is in fact a creation of human beings through their subjective activity (thought, 
emotion, imagination, observation, labour etc.) in real historical circumstances. These assumptions, it 
will be argued, are the basis of ontology in Vaneigem. Praxis is defined in more detail on pages 67-69 
of the current work. 
9 See Raoul Vaneigem, ‘Banalités de base’ in Internationale situationniste, 7 (April 1962), pp. 32-34; 
‘Banalités de base (II)’ in Internationale situationniste, 8 (January 1963), pp. 34-37. 
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collection of articles, editions, encyclopaedia entries, prefaces and unpublished 
manuscripts. While these texts have gone largely unexamined, the pre- and post-
Situationist work of Guy Debord has become the subject of a great deal of critical 
interest and are generally considered legitimate continuations of the Situationist 
project. 10 The lack of research on equivalent material by Vaneigem is a problem for a 
number of reasons. Without knowledge of the pre-Situationist writing of Vaneigem, 
many have tended to assume he developed the essence of his thought when he joined 
the SI. As such, it has been all too easy to believe that he owes most of his intellectual 
development to Guy Debord, rather than having developed as a thinker in his own 
right before this relationship began. Further, the post-Situationist work of Raoul 
Vaneigem covers a wide range of critical issues and subjects that were not often, if 
ever, treated from a Situationist perspective in the 1960s. His later work now places 
issues of gender and ecology at the forefront of his thought. Vaneigem has also 
produced a series of works on religion, even earning something of a reputation as a 
medieval scholar for his research on Christian heresy. These new developments in the 
work of Raoul Vaneigem are substantial contributions to the Situationist project and, 
for this reason, are just as worthy of our critical consideration as the later work of Guy 
Debord. 
 It has become unfashionable today to speak of Raoul Vaneigem as a serious 
anti-capitalist theorist in the same breath as Debord. However, it should be noted that 
both men shared the same fundamental critique of capitalist society and that this 
critique was developed together over a period of many years. Moreover, the critical 
theory of Raoul Vaneigem is still relevant to us today. His rejection of a world in 
                                                
10 For discussion of the later work of Guy Debord see Vincent Kaufmann, Guy Debord, La Révolution 
au service de la poésie (Paris: Fayard, 2001) and Len Bracken, Guy Debord, A Critical Biography 
(Venice CA: Feral House, 1997). Philippe Sollers’ review in Le Monde of Panégyrique, Tome 1 (1989) 
was instrumental in bringing this later work of Guy Debord to a wider public, see Philippe Sollers, 
‘Guy Debord, vous connaissez?’, Le Monde, 2 Oct 1989. 
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which every person is forced to sacrifice their concrete existence to the demands of 
abstract economic necessity is as prescient now as it was in the 1960s. His totalising 
demand for the abolition of the forms of this abstraction—the commodity, labour, 
exchange, the state and culture—still shines in comparison to the great majority of 
‘radical’ theory. In the extant literature, however, there is a great deal of confusion 
and misunderstanding of what the critical theory of Raoul Vaneigem actually says. 
Key terms such as ‘volonté de vivre’, ‘mal de survie’ and ‘subjectivité radicale’ are 
constantly subject to myriad misinterpretations, while the Reichian developments of 
his later work, such as ‘la peur de jouissance’ and the centrality of the body, are 
simply ignored. It is crucial for our knowledge of the SI and the history of radical 
thought in the twentieth century that this body of theory be brought to light. The aim 
of this thesis is therefore to provide a systematic exposition and analysis of Raoul 
Vaneigem’s critical theory and his historical contribution to the SI in order to address 
these major lacunae in our understanding of the Situationist International and one of 
the most important anti-capitalist theorists of the twentieth century. 
 
Debord: Pro Et Contra Vaneigem 
 
Guy Debord is such an important figure in our understanding of the Situationist 
International that it is necessary to give an overview of his relationship with Raoul 
Vaneigem in order to understand the full critical context of the current work. Debord 
was born in Paris in 1931 but spent most of his childhood in the south of France. He 
enters the history of the European avant-garde in the early 1950s when he moved 
back to Paris and became a member of the Lettrist movement. The Lettrists were then 
dominated by a charismatic leader, the Romanian-born poet Isidore Isou (1925-
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2007).11 In 1952, after disagreements with Isou, Debord and other members of the 
Lettrist group broke away to form the Lettrist International (LI) that was more 
orientated around notions of Marxist revolution and published a journal, Potlatch, 
which ran from 1954 to 1957.12 The Lettrist International developed a number of key 
theories and practices at this time that would later lay the basis for future Situationist 
praxis, all of which would also be adopted by Vaneigem when he joined the group in 
1961. These were détournement, psychogéographie, dérive and urbanisme unitaire. 
 Détournement is the practice of employing pre-existing cultural artefacts—
film, literature, photography, painting—in the creation of a new critical meaning.13 
Debord, for example, uses footage taken from television and cinema in order to create 
his own films. He places this found footage in new contexts that radically change their 
meaning, such as detailing the barbarism of capitalist society or the alienating nature 
of leftist institutions. The Situationists would also take a literary phrase, change a 
word or employ other techniques such as chiasmus in order to both critique the 
original sentence and also improve on it by transforming its message. As such, 
détournement is also meant as a critique of the cultural sphere in general, including 
copyright, which was rejected in all group publications, because it implies all of the 
cultural works of the past can be improved upon. For Vaneigem, as is discussed in the 
following chapter of the current work, détournement could also be used as a more 
general metaphor for a liberated form of human creativity.14 
                                                
11 For an overview of Isou, see Andrew Hussey, ‘‘La Divinité d'Isou’: The Making of a Name and a 
Messiah’, Forum for Modern Language Studies, 36.2 (2000), pp. 132-142. In 2002 Isou published a 
collection of rather bizarre critiques against the Situationist International, see Isidore Isou, Contre 
l'Internationale Situationniste, 1960-2000 (Paris: HC-D’Arts, 2001). 
12 See Lettrist International, Potlatch 1954-1957 (Paris: Allia, 1996). 
13 See Guy Debord, ‘Mode d’emploi du détournement’ in Les Lèvres nues, 8 (May 1956). 
14 See page 113 of the current work. 
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The dérive emerged out of the drunken and collective walks that Guy Debord 
and his friends enjoyed in Paris during the mid-1950s.15 It had its historical roots in 
the practice of flanêrie and the Surrealist notion of discovering the marvellous in the 
everyday city, as described in André Breton’s Nadja.16 Unlike its forebears, however, 
the dérive had a political dimension in that it attempts to undermine the alienated 
organisation of the city for the needs of capital by rediscovering it as a site of 
adventure. It reveals the structures of alienation that define social space through a 
sensual awareness of its ambiance. It therefore offers a means of discovering what 
aspects of the external environment must be transformed in order to realise one’s 
desires in a revolutionary society. Psychogéographie was the term used by the SI to 
define the approach to urban space that arises out of the practice of the dérive, which 
seeks to understand the city in subjective terms. Equally, urbanisme unitaire is the 
utopian critique of the modern city that emerges from these theories and practices. In 
opposition to an urban space organised around the fragmentation of life into the daily 
routine of work and consumption, the Situationists evoked the possibility of a city 
space united with subjective desires for pleasure, play and adventure. In this vein, and 
in contrast to the functionalist city of modernists such as Le Corbusier, the SI 
celebrated the most fantastic products of the imagination such as Le Palais Idéal and 
Neuschwanstein Castle, which, were they to form the basis for social space, would be 
impractical from the point of view of capital.17 
In 1957 the LI merged with several other small artistic avant-garde groups—
including The London Psychogeographical Committee and The International 
                                                
15 See Guy Debord, ‘Théorie de la dérive’ in Les Lèvres nues, 9 (Nov 1956). 
16 See Patrick ffrench [sic], ‘Dérive: the détournement of the flâneur’ in The Hacienda must be built: 
On the Legacy of Situationist revolt (England: Aura, 1996), pp. 41-53. 
17 The most famous Situationist project to emerge out urbanisme unitaire was Constant’s New 
Babylon, see below. For a detail discussion of this dimension of Situationist theory and practice, see  
Simon Sadler, The Situationist City (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1999). 
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Movement for an Imaginist Bauhaus—to form the Situationist International on the 
basis of a text written by Debord, ‘Rapport sur la construction des situations’.18 From 
this point on, Debord acted as the key figure in the history of the SI both at the level 
of theory and personal relationships. He was the director of the group’s journal and 
published his major work of critical theory, La Société du Spectacle, in 1967. He also 
directed a number of films based on Situationist ideas, among them Critique de la 
séparation (1961), La Société du Spectacle (1973) and In girum imus nocte et 
consumimur igni (1978).19  In 1972 Debord released La Véritable scission dans 
l’Internationale, a text which effectively dissolved the SI.20 
The most crucial contribution of Guy Debord to the Situationist International 
was his theory of the ‘Spectacle’. As Anselm Jappe notes, the Spectacle is often 
thought to refer exclusively to the media but, in fact, it refers to an entire social 
structure.21 It should therefore be understood as a totalising theory of modern society. 
Debord defines the Spectacle as a social relationship where lived experience has been 
replaced by representation.22 For Debord, the entirety of social activity is captured by 
the Spectacle in order to produce the continuous justification of contemporary life and 
the mode of production on which it is based.23 As such, images replace reality in all 
realms of existence, from politics to everyday life.24 In this way the theory of the 
Spectacle describes the fetishistic nature of capitalist society: all human life is 
subsumed beneath the social reproduction of capitalist forms that obey a dynamic 
logic of their own, one which is essentially beyond our conscious control. In such a 
                                                
18 ‘Rapport sur la construction des situations et sur les conditions de l’organisation et de l’action de la 
tendance situationniste internationale’ [1957] (Paris: Éditions Mille et une nuits, 2000). 
19 See Guy Debord, Œuvres cinématographiques complètes (Paris: Gaumont, 2008). 
20 Situationist International, La Véritable scission dans l’Internationale (Paris: Champs Libre, 1972). 
21Anselm Jappe, Guy Debord [1993] (Paris: Éditions Denoël, 2001), pp. 21-22. 
22 ‘Tout ce qui était directement vécu s’est éloigné dans une représentation’, Guy Debord, Œuvres 
(Paris: Gallimard, 2006), p. 766. Henceforth, rather than refer to individual volumes the current work 
will refer to this collection of his works. 
23 Jappe, Guy Debord, pp. 23-24. 
24 Ibid., p. 24. 
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world concrete needs and desires are at the mercy of the process of economic 
production. Debord therefore defines the Spectacle as the negation of life.25 The 
revolutionary conclusion for Debord is that the economy itself must be abolished.26 
This idea distinguishes Debord and the other Situationists from the traditional 
workers’ movement, which, at root, sought only to modernise the economy and to 
place ‘political’ controls on it. For Debord, the left is ‘spectacular’ in this sense. 
Leftism claims to offer a critique of capitalism but it is essentially only concerned 
with its reproduction.27 The Spectacle can therefore be thought of as the general 
pervasiveness of passivity or spectatorship inherent to capitalist social life,28 where 
even apparent forms of intervention only obey the need to reproduce the economy. 
For the Situationists it was therefore the role of the proletariat to abolish the economy 
and its accompanying material forms—the commodity, exchange, culture, work, the 
state etc.—in order to free humanity from their fetishistic hold. The destruction of the 
economy would thereby open up the possibility of a conscious and passionate 
existence beyond abstract economic necessities. It was an idea that would have a 
major impact on radical theory both within and outside the SI. 
It is important to recognise, however, that Debord did not develop the theory 
of the Spectacle in isolation. It is an idea that emerged over time through the practical 
activity and theoretical debates that happened within the SI. Raoul Vaneigem would 
adopt the theory of the Spectacle but equally he had been part of the debate in which 
                                                
25 Debord, Œuvres, p. 768. 
26 ‘S’émanciper des bases matérielles de la vérité inversée, voilà en quoi consiste l’auto-émancipation 
de notre époque’, Debord, Œuvres, p. 859. 
27 ‘[L’ex-ouvrier Ebert] se montra bon précurseur de la représentation socialiste qui devait peu après 
s’opposer en ennemi absolu au prolétariat de Russie et d’ailleurs, en formulant l’exact programme de 
cette nouvelle aliénation: ‘Le socialisme veut dire travailler beaucoup’’, Debord, ibid, p. 805. The fact 
that Debord is the author of the now famous piece of graffiti, ‘Ne travaillez jamais’, scrawled on the 
walls of the Rue de Seine in Paris in the early 1950s, gives an immediate sense of his absolute 
opposition to leftism, see ibid., p. 89. 
28 ‘Il est facile de voir à quel point est attaché à l’aliénation du vieux monde le principe même du 
spectacle: la non-intervention’, ibid., p. 325. 
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it had been formed. Moreover, at the same time as Debord was in the process of 
developing the theory of the Spectacle, Vaneigem was himself making essentially the 
same argument in ‘Banalités de base’ and Traité, albeit in slightly different, though 
complementary, terms. It is crucial therefore to see the critical theories of both men in 
the context of their decade long relationship that in many ways defined much of what 
the SI was in this period. Until relatively recently the only easily accessible source of 
primary information about this relationship was the ‘Communiqué de l’I.S. à propos 
de Raoul Vaneigem’, a highly critical text written by Guy Debord in the aftermath of 
Vaneigem’s resignation in 1970. It was later published by Guy Debord in La 
Veritable scission dans l’Internationale and has since served for many as the final 
word on the subject. With the publication of the correspondence of Guy Debord and a 
number of comments made by Raoul Vaneigem in recent years, however, it is now 
possible to develop a more complete picture of this relationship and its trajectory. 
 
The key figure who was to act as an initial point of contact between Raoul Vaneigem 
and Guy Debord was Henri Lefebvre (1901-1991). Lefebvre was a French 
philosopher and sociologist who began his career in the 1920s as a devotee of 
Surrealism and, in particular, its call for everyday life to be radically transformed into 
a poetic experience.29 For Lefebvre this goal merged with his interest in the so-called 
‘early Marx’, who critiqued capitalism from the point of view of subjective 
experience as much as from the perspective of material poverty.30 His seminal 
sociological work, Critique de la vie quotidienne, which had always ‘séduit’ 
                                                
29 Hussey, Game of War, p. 139. 
30 The idea of an ‘early’ and ‘mature Marx’ was posited by the orthodox Marxist theorist Louis 
Althusser.  The notion was that there was some kind of intellectual break between the earlier writing of 
Marx, in particular the ‘Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts’, and the later work embodied in 
Capital. Althusser’s oversimplification made it easier to reject the earlier writing in order to support the 
orthodox viewpoint. Embracing the ‘early Marx’ therefore amounted to moving away from the 
traditional interpretation of Marx originally adopted by the Second and Third Internationals. 
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Vaneigem,31 was a critical examination of the social production of everyday life as 
the point of departure for a critique of capitalist society at large.  
In 1958 Henri Lefebvre, recently expelled from the French Communist Party 
(PCF) for his opposition to its new hard-line Stalinism, had begun a close friendship 
with Guy Debord. Both men shared a mutual desire to realise the Surrealist goal of a 
transformation of everyday life but within a more rigorous, unorthodox Marxian 
analysis of how such social change was possible. Although he was never a member of 
the Situationist International, Lefebvre and Debord discussed the problem closely and 
the former was fascinated by the Situationist notion of merging art and life in 
situations.32 During this time he was also composing La Somme et le reste, which 
described how subjectively experienced ‘moments’ in everyday life exposed everyone 
to the need and possibility of social transformation.33 
 It was after the publication of La Somme et le reste in 1960 that Lefebvre was 
to become the original mediator between Vaneigem and Debord. On the 18th of July 
1960 Raoul Vaneigem wrote a letter to Lefebvre, attaching a document entitled 
‘Fragments pour une poétique’ and a collection of poems. Apparently no copy of this 
original document exists but in an interview in 2009 Vaneigem described its contents: 
‘je tentais d’unifier formules radicales, langage lettriste, musique, images de films en 
les créditant candidement de la vertu de colérer le peuple’.34 Vaneigem was attracted 
to Lefebvre’s critique of the everyday as it spoke to his own experiences of alienation 
as a teacher of literature at a lycée in the small, steel-working town of Nivelles, just 
                                                
31 Raoul Vaneigem, interviewed by Hans Obrist, Conversation (Paris: Manuella, 2009), p. 8. 
32 Hussey, Game of War, p. 140. 
33 Ibid., p. 139. 
34 Conversation, p. 8. 
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south of Brussels.35 Lefebvre was interested enough in the letter addressed to him by 
Vaneigem to later pass it on to Guy Debord. 
 Although Lefebvre was important in establishing contact between the two, it 
does seem as though Vaneigem was already aware of the SI and even in contact with 
at least one other member of the group before he wrote directly to Debord. The reason 
for this is that Debord states in his first letter to Vaneigem: ‘Peu avant Lefebvre un 
situationniste de Belgique (Kotányi, peut-être?) nous avait déjà fait noter votre 
adresse, pour les services de presse de la revue’.36 Vaneigem had probably therefore 
read some Situationist material before writing to Lefebvre and was known in avant-
garde and far-left circles in Brussels. 
 The strikes that hit Belgium in the Winter of 1960 provided another indirect 
point of contact between Vaneigem and Debord in the form of Pierre Guillaume 
(1941-). 37  Guillaume was a member of Pouvoir ouvrier (PO) an offshoot of 
Socialisme ou Barbarie (SoB), a group of ex-Trotskyists who had moved towards 
council communism.38 Guy Debord had effectively become a member of the group 
and originally imagined a merger of PO and the SI.39 SoB argued for workers’ self-
management, without the mediation of official institutions, as the key to a liberating 
                                                
35 ‘si je n'avais pataugé dans l'ennui quotidien et la dissipation qui l'exorcise, si je n'avais vécu 
l'écœurement de jours inlassablement répétés et la rage de les foutre en l'air, me serais-je pris de 
passion pour la Critique de la vie quotidienne au point d'écrire à son auteur […]?’ Raoul Vaneigem, 
L’État n’est plus rien, soyons tout (Paris: Rue des Cascades, 2010), p. 35. 
36 Guy Debord, letter to Raoul Vaneigem, 31 Jan 1961. For all of the letters by Debord referred to in 
the current work, see Guy Debord, Correspondence 1951-1994, 8 vols (Paris: Librairie Arthème 
Fayard, 1999-2010). 
37 Pierre Guillaume has had a bizarre and disturbing trajectory since this association. He later emerged 
as a Holocaust denier and publisher of anti-Semitic literature, see Hussey, Game of War, pp. 164-165. 
Sollers terms him ‘a Neo-Nazi anarchist traitor’, cited in ibid., p. 164. On this Vaneigem and Debord 
would no doubt agree with Sollers. Indeed, Vaneigem invokes the inhumanity of the Holocaust in a 
number of his texts as a historical event. In his examination of the history of heresy he also critiques 
the anti-Semitism that, he argues, is key to the emergence of Christianity. See in particular the chapter 
‘Diaspora et Antisémitisme’ in Raoul Vaneigem, La Résistance au christianisme, Les Hérésies des 
origines au XVIIIe siècle (Paris: Fayard, 1993). 
38 See Socialisme ou barbarie, Anthologie (La Bussière: Acratie, 2007). 
39 Such a merger ultimately proved impossible due to the lack of interest of members of PO in the 
Situationists’ concern with the politics of creativity. 
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revolution. As such, they were highly critical of the role of unions and parties in class 
struggles. The fact that Hiver ’60 was characterised by a reaction against these 
mediating structures was seen by SoB as a perfect example of theory in practice. The 
group planned a special edition of its journal on Hiver ’60 and, on the 31st of 
December, Guy Debord asked Pierre Guillaume to meet with Vaneigem on a fact-
finding mission about the strikes.40 
 On the 24th of January 1961 Raoul Vaneigem wrote directly to Guy Debord 
for the first time. In his letter he referred to his appreciation for Debord’s 
‘Préliminaires pour une définition de l’unité du programme révolutionnaire’ but also 
remarked that he could not ‘en retrouver le ton ni la résolution dans le n° 5 de 
Situationnisme qui, à mon sens, donne trop dans le ‘bulletin intérieur’ et pas assez 
dans l’action violente contre l’idéologie et l’art bourgeois’.41 Debord replied amicably 
on the 31st of January, thanking him for his letter and regretting that they could not 
meet before due to events in Belgium: ‘mais tout de même, la grève était mieux’.42 He 
states that Lefebvre had only passed on the manuscript last December but that it had 
greatly interested him. However, Debord was evidently unimpressed by Vaneigem’s 
verse. He ends the letter by stating that he will soon be visiting Brussels and hopes to 
meet Vaneigem there. 
 Debord and Vaneigem became friends as a result of this visit and the latter 
was made a member of the SI soon after. The correspondence is very sparse on the 
start of this friendship as it was mostly conducted in person. Vaneigem does, 
however, devote a few lines to these meetings in the early 1960s, ‘nos beuveries dans 
les bistrots de Beersel’, that suggest Hiver ’60 was an important context for the 
                                                
40 Laurent Six, Raoul Vaneigem, l'éloge de la vie affinée (Belgium: Éditions Luce Wilquin, 2004), pp. 
33-34. 
41 Raoul Vaneigem, letter to Guy Debord, 24 January 1961, cited in Debord, Correspondence, vol. 2, p. 
66. 
42 Debord, Guy, letter to Raoul Vaneigem, 31 January 1961. 
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beginning of their partnership. 43  The first collaborative efforts centred on the 
Internationale situationniste, the group’s journal, to which only members of the SI 
could contribute. 
 In the summer of 1961 Vaneigem travelled to Gothenburg with Debord and 
Attila Kotányi to take part in the Fifth Conference of the SI. Events at the conference 
confirmed the importance of this new relationship for the group. Vaneigem, Debord, 
and Kotányi had clearly developed a platform together on which a confrontation with 
the ‘artists’ in the SI was to take place. At the start of the meeting Vaneigem took the 
lead in attempting to resolve this ‘art’ question.44 Kotányi and Debord then followed 
with their own statements to this effect: the former argued that any art produced by 
members of the SI be termed ‘anti-situationnistes’ and the latter claimed to have never 
made a situationist film.45 The majority of the SI agreed with these positions, electing 
both Vaneigem and Debord to its Central Council.46 The success of the conference led 
to further and closer collaboration between the two. In particular a number of 
important texts that would help to reorient the SI on a more resolutely ‘political’ 
trajectory.47 
 Although this position on art is essentially present in the SI before he joined 
the group, Vaneigem played a key role here, in collaboration with Debord and 
Kotányi, in reconstituting it more coherently and forcefully in both theory and 
practice. Indeed, it was a critical moment that ultimately led to the exclusion of the 
                                                
43 Raoul Vaneigem, Le Chevalier, la Dame, le Diable et la mort [2003] (Paris: Le Cherche Midi, 
2005), p. 182, 177. See also page 127 of the current work. 
44 Internationale situationniste, 7 (April 1962), pp. 26-27. 
45 Ibid., p. 27.  
46 The organisational form of the SI is discussed on pages 165-166 of the current work. 
47 See Raoul Vaneigem, Guy Debord and Attila Kotányi, ‘Sur la Commune’ [16 March 1962], 
Internationale situationniste, 12 (Sept 1969), 109-111; see also Guy Debord, ‘Les thèses de Hambourg 
en septembre 1961’ in Internationale situationniste, édition augmentée (Paris: Librairie Arthème 
Fayard), pp. 703-704. The ‘thèses de Hambourg’ were never written down and were instead memorised 
by the authors; the latter reference is to Debord’s account of its contents. These texts and their 
importance for the later period of the SI are discussed in Chapter 3 of the current work. 
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‘artists’ from the SI in early 1962 for failing to respond to these demands. Vaneigem 
and Debord, both now on the Central Council, made the resolution together. Between 
February 1961 and June 1963 the correspondence that followed between Debord and 
Vaneigem focuses on the organisation of a new review, Der Deutsche Gedanke, to be 
released by the SI in German to replace that of the excluded artists.48 Kotányi was to 
be responsible for the review, probably due to his German language skills. Vaneigem, 
however, was named as director because the immigration status of Kotányi put him 
and his family in danger of being deported by Belgian authorities. Later, Debord 
asked Vaneigem to take on more responsibility for the review due to the inactivity of 
Uwe Lausen and Attila Kotányi. The impression this exchange gives is that Debord 
sees Vaneigem as central to the organisation of activity in the Belgian section of the 
SI. 
 The most important communication in this period for the purpose of 
understanding what Debord thought of Vaneigem occurs in early 1965 when Guy 
Debord read the manuscript of Traité de savoir-vivre à l’usage des jeunes générations 
for the first time. On the 4th of March 1965 Debord sent a telegram to Vaneigem: 
‘MOITIÉ DÉJÀ LU MAGNIFIQUE – STOP – CE QU’IL NOUS FALLAIT – 
STOP’.49 A long letter followed four days later. Debord praised the book effusively: 
‘le Traité est une réussite, qui va au-delà de nos légitimes espérances’, ‘le début de 
cette lecture (que la suite confirmait) a été pour moi une des plus grandes joies de la 
période actuelle’.50 Debord notes that the book is: ‘très accessible à quelqu’un qui 
                                                
48 Situationist International, Der Deutsche Gedanke (Brussels: April 1963). The first and only issue of 
Der Deutsche Gedanke was finally released in April 1963. It contained German translations of key 
texts from the SI review, including the first German translation of ‘Banalités de base’. The exclusion of 
Attila Kotányi in 1963 is most likely why there were no further issues.  
49 Guy Debord, telegram to Raoul Vaneigem, 4 March 1965. 
50 Guy Debord, letter to Raoul Vaneigem, 8 March 1965. 
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ignore beaucoup de nos bases’ and ‘En même temps, c’est au plus haut niveau’.51 
Evidently, Debord was immensely pleased with the work that Raoul Vaneigem had 
achieved in Traité and believed it would play a critical role in the communication of 
Situationist ideas in the coming years. Indeed, he goes on to say that Traité marks ‘la 
fin de la ‘préhistoire de l’I.S.’’.52 In other words, Traité was a qualitative leap from 
the Situationist writing that had come before. 
 As for the contents of the book itself, Guy Debord focuses primarily on how 
Vaneigem resets the ground for what it would take to transform society and, also, on 
grasping the ‘subjective’ aspect of the problem:  
 
C’est peut-être la première réapparition, en livre, du ton, du niveau de critique, 
des révolutionnaires dits ‘utopiques’, c’est-à-dire des propositions de base 
pour le renversement de l’ensemble d’une société: ce qui précède forcément 
l’organisation pratique, qui s’est appelée assez malencontreusement 
‘scientifique’ au siècle dernier. 
 Je suis particulièrement ravi par la réussite du ton. Tout à fait dans la 
ligne que tu cherchais. Le passage du subjectif extrême à la théorie, qui n’est 
plus ‘sereine’. Il y a du Nietzsche, du Fourier, l’héritage légitime de la 
philosophie, au meilleur sens.53 
 
 
The historic role that Guy Debord assigns to Traité here, the reappearance of utopian 
revolution, is an important one as it emphasises that Vaneigem attempts to look at the 
very basis of social being. The issues that Vaneigem raises in Traité are about the 
fundamental building blocks of everyday life in contemporary society and what it 
would take to bring about a transformation. Arguably, the praise Debord gives 
Vaneigem here is the reversal of the critique he later aims at traditional Marxism in 
thesis 95 of La Société du Spectacle: Vaneigem has its beneficial aspect, ‘confiance 
en la démonstration pédagogique qui avait caractérisé le socialisme utopique’, but, 
more significantly, rediscovered ‘la dimension hégélienne’ and, the reference to 
                                                
51 Ibid. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Ibid. 
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Fourier in the letter is significant in this respect, ‘l’image immobile de la totalité 
présente dans la critique utopiste (au plus haut degree, chez Fourier)’.54  
 Further, Debord is evidently aware of the difference between his own work, 
La Société du Spectacle, which was not yet complete, and that of Raoul Vaneigem. 
Where the work of Debord laid emphasis on the categories of social relationships as 
an objective structure, Vaneigem emphasised the subjective content of these social 
forms. That Debord refers to Nietzsche is also important, as it shows Debord is aware 
that the inventor of la volonté de puissance is an important influence on how Raoul 
Vaneigem treats subjectivity in his own work.55 Debord is not, however, displeased 
by these differences between his writing and that of Vaneigem. On the contrary, in 
this letter Debord sees them as beneficial: 
 
Une autre bonne chose: nos deux ouvrages, traitant évidemment du même 
problème, confluant dans la même perspective, vont passer sur ce terrain sans 
se confondre; mais en s’y croisant de nombreuses fois, et se soutenant 
toujours. Comme des arcs-boutants dans la construction ogivale, en quelque 
sorte? Coup de chance, tout de même, pour deux textes si peu concertés dans 
le détail.56 
 
 
The architectural simile used by Debord here obviously suggests that Traité and La 
Société du Spectacle are not rival theories but rather, at base, largely the same 
fundamental theory treated from different angles. Raoul Vaneigem gave a similar 
comparison of the two works in a recent interview: 
 
                                                
54 Debord, Œuvres, p. 804. In thesis 95 of La Société du Spectacle Debord defines utopian socialism as 
pedagogical and Hegelian as well as utopian. The implication is that Traité therefore shares these 
qualities and this is what makes it both original and different, at the very least in terms of degree or 
intensity, from earlier Situationist writing. 
55 The relationship between Nietzsche and Vaneigem is discussed in detail on pages 97-98 of the 
current work. 
56 Guy Debord, letter to Raoul Vaneigem, 8 March 1965. 
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La convergence entre La Société du spectacle et le Traité de savoir-vivre 
corrobora le fait que se rejoignaient par deux voies différentes l'analyse 
objective de Debord et la mienne, axée davantage sur la subjectivité.57 
 
Vaneigem recognises here that his Traité centred more on the ‘subjective’ aspects of 
the problem of capitalist society than Debord’s book. However, he is also clear that 
this is a matter of degree, or emphasis, rather than a fundamental difference between 
the two works. Indeed, the theory of praxis that both Vaneigem and Debord hold to 
excludes any such unmediated division of object and subject. At the same time, 
Debord’s statement that these texts are ‘si peu concertés dans le détail’ also supports 
Vaneigem’s assertion that they were ‘écrits sans confrontations ni connivences’.58 
That is to say, Vaneigem and Debord worked separately on their first major books, 
without a great deal of collaboration in this case. Though obviously both texts 
emerged out of earlier debates. The completion of Traité and La Société du Spectacle, 
not least their eventual publication and influence on May ’68, arguably marked the 
apex of the friendship between Raoul Vaneigem and Guy Debord.59 
 It is difficult to trace within the historical record exactly how the relationship 
turned sour in the years that followed. Debord, however, is very clear as to what 
happened and the reasons why. 60  For Debord, the years after May ’68 were 
characterised by a dramatic fall in the practical activity of the SI. Fewer and fewer 
members chose to take part in group decisions and the production of texts. These 
‘camarades contemplatifs’, Debord felt, needed to be excluded or change their 
behaviour in order for the SI to move forward.61 The French section chose to bring the 
issue to a head. On the 11th of November 1970 a ‘Déclaration’ was sent out to the 
                                                
57 Vaneigem, L’État, p. 37. 
58 Vaneigem, Le Chevalier, p. 180. 
59 The influence of these texts on May ’68 is discussed in more detail on pages 186-187 of the current 
work. 
60 Debord gives his version of events in La Véritable scission. 
61 Debord, Œuvres, p. 1172, 1141. 
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other sections of the SI.62 The text stated that a split was about to take place and 
implied that any member who disagreed with the move would be excluded.63 
 Vaneigem did not accept the ‘Déclaration’ and describes it as ‘la dernière 
abstraction à pouvoir se formuler dans, pour et au nom de l’I.S’.64 Moreover, he 
claims that the confrontation was a signal that the SI had transformed into a simple 
‘malaise d’être ensemble’.65 On the 14th of November 1970 Vaneigem tendered his 
resignation. In contrast to Debord, he identifies the ‘peu de pénétration de la théorie 
situationniste en milieu ouvrier et du peu de pénétration ouvrière en milieu 
situationniste’ as the primary cause behind the crisis that had gripped the SI.66 He also 
accuses the French section of foul play.67 His resignation was definitive and ended his 
friendship with Debord. 
 In early December, Debord and René Vienet penned a lengthy response and 
repudiation of Vaneigem and the accusations he had made in his letter of 
resignation.68 Debord is explicit that Vaneigem had been one of the ‘camarades 
contemplatifs’ and accuses him of having agreed with everything right up to the point 
of his resignation.69 Debord therefore dismisses his accusation of underhand tactics 
because, he states, Vaneigem had never raised the issue before.70 Further, he disagrees 
with Vaneigem’s notion that the real problem within the SI was the lack of integration 
with the worker milieu, claiming it amounted to saying that ‘aucun des situationnistes 
                                                
62 Ibid., p. 1142. 
63 Ibid. 
64 Raoul Vaneigem, ‘Lettre de démission de Raoul Vaneigem’ [signed 14 Nov 1970], reprinted in 
Debord, Œuvres, p. 1170. All future references are to this reproduction. 
65 Ibid., p. 1170. 
66 Ibid. 
67 Ibid. 
68 Debord, ‘Communiqué de l’I.S. à propos de Vaneigem’, Œuvres, pp. 1171-1184. 
69 Ibid., p. 1172. 
70 Ibid., p. 1173. 
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ne travaille dans une usine’. 71  The real problem, Debord argues, was ‘sous-
participation (quantitative et surtout qualitative)’.72 
 Debord also attacks the critical perspectives of Raoul Vaneigem. He accuses 
him of having forgotten dialectical thought and of thinking in a purely idealist manner 
that excludes all practical considerations of direct action: ‘la justice historique, tout 
autant que l’action réelle dans l’histoire, est étrangère aux préoccupations de 
Vaneigem’.73 Debord goes on to attack the personal life of Vaneigem, claiming that 
he was both incapable and strangely timid, a fact he consoled himself with by way of 
‘un certain nombre de déplaisirs’ and ‘petites insolences enfantines’.74 Worst of all, 
Debord claims Vaneigem had gone on holiday at the start of May ’68, learning of 
events ‘par les mass media’ and returning only to have missed some of the most 
decisive moments.75 The ‘mystique’ of Vaneigem, Debord asserts, ‘se dégrade en 
bluff’.76 
 Certain critics, Dumontier and Bourseiller for example,77 have been content to 
focus entirely on these highly critical sections of the piece on Vaneigem. What is 
never cited, however, and perhaps most remarkable is the section where Debord 
insists on the centrality of the contribution of Raoul Vaneigem to the Situationist 
International even in the midst of his attack. This passage is worth quoting at length 
because it provides the best evidence that Raoul Vaneigem was seen as a crucial 
contributor to the SI by Guy Debord: 
 
Vaneigem a occupé dans l’histoire de l’I.S. une place importante et 
inoubliable. […] Vaneigem a apporté à l’I.S. une très remarquable 
                                                
71 Ibid., p. 1174. 
72 Ibid., p. 1172. 
73 Ibid., p. 1175. 
74 Ibid., p. 1182. 
75 Ibid., pp. 1182-1183. 
76 Ibid., p. 1175. 
77 Christophe Bourseiller, Vie et et mort de Guy Debord [1999] (Paris: PLON, 2002). 
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contribution: il avait beaucoup d’intelligence et de culture, une grande 
hardiesse dans les idées, et tout cela était dominée par la plus vraie colère à 
l’encontre des conditions existantes. Vaneigem avait alors du génie, parce 
qu’il savait parfaitement aller à l’extrême en tout ce qu’il savait faire. Et tout 
ce qu’il ne savait pas faire, il n’avait simplement pas encore eu l’occasion de 
l’affronter personnellement. Il brûlait de commencer. L’I.S. des années 1961-
1964, et c’est une période importante pour l’I.S. comme pour les idées de la 
révolution moderne, a été fortement marquée par Vaneigem, plus peut-être 
que par tout autre. C’est dans cette période qu’il a non seulement écrit Traité 
et d’autres textes qu’il a signés dans la revue I.S. (Banalités de base, etc.) mais 
aussi participé grandement aux textes collectifs anonymes des numéros 6 à 9 
de cette revue, et très créativement à toutes les discussions.78 
  
While Debord’s ‘Communiqué’ has in the past served implicitly as a justification for 
the marginalisation of Raoul Vaneigem, I feel that these comments actually encourage 
us to place him at the centre of the Situationist story. Debord is not simply attacking 
Vaneigem. He is being even-handed. The current trend to downgrade Vaneigem as a 
member of the SI and as a critical theorist has therefore misread not only his work but 
also the work of Guy Debord. For Debord, the problem with Vaneigem is not the 
nature of his earlier contribution, but rather, what he sees, in the years after May ’68, 
as a failure to contribute at all. That is to say, even in the late 1970s Debord likes 
what is said in Traité, but does not see it in the behaviour of Vaneigem: 
 
le Traité de savoir-vivre est entré dans un courant d’agitation dont on n’a pas 
fini d’entendre parler, et d’un même mouvement son auteur en est sorti. Il a 
parlé pour ne pas être. Cependant l’importance de ce livre ne devrait échapper 
à personne, car personne, pas même Vaneigem, avec le temps, n’aura échappé 
à ses conclusions.79 
 
 
There is an obvious element of sarcasm in these words but Debord is not saying that 
the theoretical conclusions of Traité are at fault. Rather, Debord claims that 
Vaneigem, on a personal level, is not up to them. Indeed, in his own critique of 
Vaneigem, at this time, Debord does not seek to marginalise him. He makes him the 
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subject of one of the lengthiest texts on a resignation or exclusion in the record and, 
even amidst his criticism, he does not dismiss the contribution of Raoul Vaneigem but 
instead suggests it is absolutely key to understanding the direction the SI took in its 
later period. The marginalisation of Raoul Vaneigem from the critical reception of the 
SI is therefore in response to how that reception has been shaped in the decades after 
the dissolution of the group rather than an accurate representation of how members of 
the organisation understood their own history at the time. In other words, it is Debord 
himself who tells us that his comrade ‘avait alors du génie’ and that the SI, between 
1961-1964, ‘a été fortement marquée par Vaneigem, plus, peut-être que par tout 
autre’.80 It is the aim of the current work to explain exactly how Vaneigem is 
important in these respects. 
 
The critique that Debord developed of Raoul Vaneigem, however, did not end in 
December 1970. Debord in part helped to shape the negative external perception of 
Raoul Vaneigem through the publication of La Véritable Scission dans 
l’Internationale in 1972, the book that dissolved the SI. It contained his critique of 
Vaneigem from December 1970 and added further personal attacks of the same sort.81 
Moreover, Debord had the publishing connections to put forward his version of 
events, commissioning, for example, some of the first histories of the SI: Jean-
François Martos (1989) and Pascal Dumontier (1990).82 These texts tended to focus 
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82 See Jean-François Martos, Histoire de l’Internationale Situationniste [1989] (Paris: Ivrea, 1995); 
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only on the negative aspects of Debord’s account of Vaneigem who in turn 
increasingly occupied a merely anecdotal presence in Situationist history. 
In his future correspondence with others Debord would treat Vaneigem with 
scorn, referring to him derogatively as ‘Ratgeb’.83 Debord is from this point on the 
inveterate enemy of Vaneigem and his letters in this later period contain numerous 
insulting remarks about his erstwhile comrade. Vaneigem is ‘le chien le plus fidèle 
[…] qui n’ose jamais gronder’ and a conformist, ‘bon fils, bon conscrit, bon 
professeur, bon mari’.84 More importantly, the letters of Debord, in this period after 
the dissolution of the SI, dismiss the post-Situationist work of Raoul Vaneigem. In 
1971, for example, Vaneigem published a text critiquing the manner in which a strike 
took place in Kiruna, Sweden.85 Debord states that he has no respect for ‘la pensée, et 
le bluff, de Vaneigem’ and claims that he has adopted ‘ce ton supérieur d’un 
intellectuel touriste qui donne des leçons aux ouvriers’.86 That same year his critique 
extended to problems with Vaneigem’s critical perspective: 
 
il [Vaneigem] mettait trop l’accent sur le côté personnel, dans les luttes qui 
allaient recommencer et, dans ce côté personnel même, bien trop l’accent sur 
le pur sollen, et donc même vite sur le bluff qui est le contraire de l’illusion: 
l’illusionnisme délibéré.87 
   
In contrast to his position in 1967, Debord now opposes his own apparently more 
impersonal considerations against the emphasis on personal subjectivity of Vaneigem 
in a negative light. Here Debord starts to distance himself intellectually from 
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Vaneigem. This stance increases as Vaneigem also begins to develop his own 
intellectual positions away from Debord in new publications: 
 
Il est maintenant redevenu pro-situ. Il dit qu’il approuve toujours ‘le projet 
situationniste’. Quant à l’I.S., il n’a plus pour elle, depuis novembre 1970, que 
de ‘l’indifférence’! Et son texte est un véritable pastiche du style Vaneigem, 
dans une perspective théorique qui apparaît bien clairement décomposée.88 
  
Debord was also a reader of the later work of Raoul Vaneigem. On the publication of 
Le Livre des plaisirs in 1979, Debord wrote to Paolo Salvadori with a long critique of 
the book and of Raoul Vaneigem.89 He notes that the first positive review of the book 
was from the Right and finds the text laughable. For Debord, Vaneigem has lost all 
negativity in his work and posits only the positivity of the commodity economy: 
 
sa conception du gratuit ne s’oppose à la marchandise que par lointain 
souvenir de sa jeunesse. En fait, il s’oppose, avec une terreur bien 
compréhensible, à tout jugement de valeur sur quelqu’un ou sur quelque 
chose, comme au dialogue ou à la moindre réciprocité. Et ce monde du 
‘gratuit’, au sens néo-vaneigemiste, est justement le pur monde de la 
marchandise moderne, qu’il a rallié quoique sans faire fortune : il n’y a pas de 
choix, et rien ne vaut rien. De sorte qu’en effet, aucun spectateur ne juge plus, 
ni un restaurant, ni un livre, ni la mort de Baader ni celle de Moro.90 
 
 
For Debord the move of Vaneigem away from the Marxian language of Traité to the 
more Reichian discourse of Le Livre des plaisirs marks a decomposition of the critical 
style of his old comrade. As we shall see in chapter 4 of the current work, however, it 
is clear that Debord is wrong to see this discussion of gratuity as a rejection of all 
judgement. On the contrary, it is meant as a point from which to judge for oneself. 
Perhaps, what is most significant about this passage is that it is Debord who was to 
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develop a language of ‘vaneigemisme’, ‘néo-vaneigemiste’ and the ‘vaneigemistes’.91 
These terms developed by Debord are meant to make the later work of Raoul 
Vaneigem appear as ideology and, perhaps, also meant as an implicit contrast with a 
‘Debordism’ that the author himself would never acknowledge. It is Debord who has 
created the notion of an intellectual confrontation between himself and Vaneigem 
more so than the critics. Given that Debord had so much influence on the early 
reception of the SI, both through his many international contacts and his publishing 
connections, it is no surprise that many of the negative portrayals of Vaneigem, as 
well as the interpretation of this relationship, in the critical literature reflect the views 
of Guy Debord. However, his critique only applied to the later work. The fact that it 
has since been projected onto our understanding of their entire relationship, including 
the 1960s, is rather the fault of critics misreading what Debord actually says on the 
matter. 
 
A Critical Survey 
 
Regardless of how he might have viewed his posthumous recognition, the status of 
Guy Debord as a major French thinker has made it difficult for those who worked 
with him, and who were arguably his intellectual equals, to emerge out of his shadow. 
Most critical works written about the Situationists have focused exclusively on Guy 
Debord and the French context, side-lining the role of his European partners such as 
Constant Nieuwenhuys (1920-2005), Asger Jorn (1914-1973) and, of course, Raoul 
Vaneigem.92 These figures are mainly considered in relation to Debord and are rarely 
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understood to have contributed anything essential to the Situationist story. There are a 
number of points, however, that suggest this should not be the case. Constant, for 
example, may have invented the term ‘situationniste’,93 and Asger Jorn’s work on 
value-form and gender were singular additions to the Situationist project in its early 
years.94 
A survey of the extant literature on the Situationist International supports the 
view that, despite being a constant presence, the contribution of Raoul Vaneigem to 
the organisation has largely been considered only in relation to the life and work of 
Guy Debord. Raoul Vaneigem has never been the focus of rigorous, critical analysis 
and embodies an extensive gap in our knowledge of the Situationist International. For 
some the contribution of Raoul Vaneigem is essential, for others his work excites 
polemical attacks that are far less even-handed than those developed by Guy Debord. 
Where his contribution is discussed, his own critical theory is often subsumed within 
that of Debord or reduced to the development of the concept of la vie quotidienne. An 
overview of the critical field highlights the problematic marginalisation of Raoul 
Vaneigem and the misunderstandings his work has suffered as a result. 
  
                                                                                                                                      
Wigley Mark Wigley, Constant’s New Babylon, The Hyper-Architecture of Desire (Amsertdam: OIO, 
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In order to contextualise how Raoul Vaneigem has been received in the more recent 
literature on the SI, it is important to consider how he was originally perceived in the 
1960s. The critical reception of Raoul Vaneigem by a wider public began with the 
publication of Traité de savoir-vivre à l’usage des jeunes générations by Éditions 
Gallimard in 1967. The context in which Traité was released is crucial as it was the 
notoriety the Situationists had earned as a result of the Strasbourg Scandal that created 
enough public interest to get the book such a prestigious publisher. In 1966 several 
students of the University of Strasbourg approached the SI after six of their number 
were elected to the student union by an anti-bureaucratic and disinterested base. Not 
sure what to do with this unexpected state of affairs, the students asked the SI to help 
them work out what the most subversive course of action could be in this situation. 
The Situationists immediately suggested that the union's funds be used to publish a 
critique of the university milieu: De la misère en milieu étudiant. In the run up to the 
text's publication, students threw tomatoes at Professor Abraham Moles during his 
inaugural class. A subversive advertising poster followed: ‘Le retour de la colonne 
Durruti’. The text was finally distributed to, among others, university notables during 
the rentrée and the elected students called for a vote on the immediate dissolution of 
their own bureau. The whole event was immediately taken up by the international 
press.95 Equally important was the coordinated publication of Guy Debord’s La 
Société du Spectacle by Buchet-Chastel in the winter of 1967. Both books were 
reviewed side by side as representative of the Situationists, who were in turn 
associated with the provo movement and the radical wings of the student movement. 
Such was the interest in the SI that the books had lengthy reviews in the French 
national media. 
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 Historians of the SI have previously overlooked a review of Traité and La 
Société du Spectacle that took place on Le Masque et la plume, a literary radio 
programme on France Inter that was hosted by François-Régis Bastide in front of a 
live studio audience.96 On the panel were four literary critics that included Robert 
Kanters and Pierre-Henri Simon. Kanters had already written a review of the books 
for Le Figaro Littéraire and Simon was to write one several weeks later for Le 
Monde, both discussed below. Perhaps surprisingly, it is not La Société du Spectacle 
but rather Traité that was given the focus of discussion on the programme. What is 
also striking is that the Situationists’ critique is given far greater praise and historical 
significance than it was given in the written reviews. 
 Vaneigem is described variously as ‘un écrivain très rémarquable’, ‘un 
penseur’, ‘un philosophe’, who writes ‘des choses très belles, très utiles et très 
intéressantes’ and whose writing embodies ‘une pensée riche, complexe, virulente’; at 
one point he is even compared to the young Marx by age (as though Traité were the 
preface to a Capital that was to come at a later date).97 Further, Vaneigem receives 
much attention as an homme de lettres: ‘c’est un homme qui écrit brillamment’ with a 
‘violence polémique et déstructice’ and a ‘brio des formules’.98 It is worth noting that 
almost nothing is said of Guy Debord in these respects, which suggests Traité was 
seen at the time to be a remarkable achievement of style, if not always content. 
 The arguments put forward by the SI are treated with some confusion by 
Bastide who describes Traité as a ‘genre du négativisme absolu’ and is in turn 
interrupted, presumably by Kanters, to be told the Situationists are in fact ‘des provos 
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qui pensent’. 99  The reviewers proceed to explain the critical theory of the 
Situationists, as presented in Traité and Spectacle, and touch on a number of 
important points. It is noted that Vaneigem is clearly influenced by Henri Lefebvre’s 
Critique de la vie quotidienne, but also by Dada, Surrealism and the young Marx. The 
reviewers cite the totalising nature of Situationist critique, which is described as ‘très 
intelligente et très efficace’.100 Commensurately, the fact that the Situationists were 
attempting to think beyond contemporary political divisions is highlighted. The 
weakest aspect of the writing of Vaneigem in Traité is identified as the final section 
of the book that sets out the positivity of the Situationist project, the conception of a 
radically different society beyond capitalism. Moreover, the commentators baulk at 
the notion of abolishing philosophy, one member of the panel claiming, erroneously, 
that this is not an aim of the Situationists. Once the discussion is briefly opened up to 
the floor, a member of the audience states that he thought the Situationists were 
concerned with resolving the problem of human suffering: ‘Le situationniste a trouvé 
un moyen, et je crois que c’est un moyen qui se defend de toute manière, puisque, la 
théorie en elle-même se défend’.101 That Raoul Vaneigem was being discussed in 
these terms on a national level, and not only by the media but also members of the 
public is not something that features in histories of the SI. In fact, it gives weight to 
anecdotal evidence elsewhere that Traité was possibly more influential during May 
’68 than Spectacle. 
 Jean-Michel Mension, for example, a friend of Debord in the 1950s and later a 
Parisian soixante-huitard, suggests that Raoul Vaneigem was the most widely read of 
the Situationists during the Movement of Occupations:  
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I am even convinced that Vaneigem was better known [to the kids of May ‘68] 
than Guy, no doubt because there were ideas in Vaneigem that had an appeal 
for some of them, which was not true of Debord. Debord was simply 
unfathomable, and they didn’t understand a word.102 
 
 
These statements by Mension are also reflected in the account of Patrick Negroni who 
claims Vaneigem had far more influence on the younger members of the SI and the 
hangers-on after May ’68 than Guy Debord: 
 
Debord n’était pas un personnage central au niveau des relations. La démarche 
était collective, presque générationnelle. Vaneigem avait autant d’influence, si 
ce n’est plus, sur les jeunes.103 
 
 
Taken together, this evidence strongly suggests that the ideas of Raoul Vaneigem had 
at least as much, if not more, influence on the world exterior to the SI as Guy Debord. 
As such, his later marginalisation comes into much sharper relief against the backdrop 
of this moment when Situationist ideas were actually being adopted by a mass social 
movement. It demonstrates that the fact that Vaneigem has fallen into the shadows of 
Guy Debord in the critical reception of the Situationist International was by no means 
inevitable but is a more recent development. 
 Through the course of the winter of 1967-1968 Traité and Spectacle were 
reviewed together within the national press. Robert Kanters, in Le Figaro Littéraire, 
is doubtful that the Situationists would constitute an important intellectual or political 
movement as Existentialism and Surrealism had previously. 104  On the part of 
Vaneigem he notes a nostalgia for feudal society and contrasts this with Debord who 
places his confidence in workers’ councils. Moreover, Kanters says that the hostility 
of Vaneigem towards cybernetics is ineffective but his iconolasm against a society of 
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images is well justified. In his conclusion Kanters argues that the SI should be 
understood as a kind of modern apocalyptical religious group: ‘semblable aux sectes 
idéologiques des dernier temps du monde antique ou groupes hérétiques du Moyen 
Age chrétien auxquels l’auteur du Traité de savoir-vivre pense souvent’.105 
 In Le Nouvel Observateur, François Châtelet describes the books as ‘bibles 
terroristes’ alongside images of provos, the nineteenth-century anarcho-terrorist 
Ravachol and the French illegalist Bonnot.106 Other critics had already offered faint 
praise for the SI but Châtelet is absolutely hostile towards the Situationists, calling 
them writers only in the most ‘banal’ sense of the term and seeing them as a symptom 
of the times, whose theories embodied a reactionary and purely abstract negation.107 
Spectacle is described as drier and more dogmatic than Traité, which he claims is 
more literary and nuanced.108 This is perhaps a surprising comment to find given that 
today Debord is often considered the more subtle and literary writer of the two. 
Indeed, it would appear that the quality of Debord’s writing seems to have completely 
escaped the reviewer. Châtelet sums up his estimation of the Situationists in general 
as pure nonsense that is itself the product of the Spectacle and he concludes by stating 
that ‘situationnisme’ is  ‘sans concept’.109 
 Pierre-Henri Simon (1968) in Le Monde develops an extremely reactionary 
critique of the Situationists: ‘il faut garder quelque sentiment de la nature sociale de 
l’homme, et ne pas voir le mal en soi dans ‘l’organisation sociale hiérarchisée’’.110 As 
such Simon places himself in absolute opposition to any idea of a society without a 
state, regardless of the specific arguments put forward by the SI: ‘comme si la 
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soumission du faible au fort n'était pas plus à craindre dans l'absence des lois’.111 
Indeed, Simon evokes a number of traditional conservative positions: the fear of 
dying of hunger without consumer society, the inevitability of the emergence of a 
state and the necessity of technocratic means for organising distribution. Simon, 
therefore, offers a straightforward liberal critique of the Situationists, reserving 
particular disdain for Vaneigem who, he claims, ‘patauge dans les sottises dont il est 
juste de dire que Debord se garde beaucoup mieux’.112 
 In summary, the critical reception of Raoul Vaneigem and Guy Debord in the 
late 1960s held no hint that either one would later come to dominate all discussion of 
the Situationist International. Both figures were treated fairly equally and, at times, 
Vaneigem was considered of much greater critical interest and influence than Guy 
Debord. Whether such opinions were justified is not the argument at stake here, but 
rather the fact that our current notions of what is important about the SI developed 
many years after 1968. Moreover, at the time, both figures were read side by side as 
the avatars of a unified Situationist project. 
 
The 1970s were, properly speaking, the period in which the primary material on the 
SI would be produced for wider consumption. In 1974 Christopher Gray, an ex-
member of the English section of the SI, published a translation of selected texts from 
the SI review and in 1975 Debord released the first anthology of Internationale 
situationniste. Since the publication of Traité and Spectacle in 1967, as well as May 
’68, Situationist texts had made inroads into the campuses and underground scene in 
the United States. Vaneigem was known to English-speaking audiences through a 
number of editions. In 1966 ‘Banalités’ was translated by Christopher Gray under the 
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title Totality for Kids. In 1972 Traité was translated by John Fullerton and Paul 
Sieveking as The Revolution of Everyday Life.  
 Unlike in France, these texts were not distributed by large publishers and 
excited no official critical attention. Traité therefore knew a largely underground 
existence in the US. On the level of relationships, Vaneigem had far more influence in 
the US than Guy Debord. Vaneigem had travelled to the US in 1966 precisely in an 
attempt to expand Situationist interests there and he was in regular correspondence 
with the American members of the SI.113 After the dissolution of the SI in 1972 a 
number of Situationist-inspired groups developed in the US: in New York, Diversion, 
by John Horelick, and Create Situations, by Tony Verlaan (both ex-members of the 
SI); in Berkeley, Contradictions, Perspectives and the Council for the Eruption of the 
Marvellous, with much infighting over who was the legitimate inheritor of the SI.114 
 A final important factor in the future critical reception of the Situationists was 
the cultural continuation of certain of their ideas in the punk movement and the 
British New Wave music scene. Malcolm McLaren (1946-2010), manager of the Sex 
Pistols, and Tony Wilson (1950-2007), founder of Factory Records in Manchester, 
were avid readers of Situationist literature and encouraged its application, albeit 
superficially, in the musical practices of their associates. Equally, the old English 
section of the SI, based in London, produced a journal, King Mob, which acted as the 
organ for Situationist ideas in the UK. 
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The 1980s saw the development of a more extensive critical reception of the 
Situationist International. This was made possible due to the availability of more 
easily accessible material in English and French needed for primary research. In 1977 
Bandini published a study in Italian on the notion of political aesthetics between 
CoBrA and the SI.115 His study focused on the period preceding the foundation of the 
Situationist International and, for this reason, Vaneigem is not an important presence. 
In Holland, René Sanders did a series of programmes on national radio about the 
Situationists for which he interviewed Dutch ex-members: Constant, Armando and 
Jacqueline de Jong.116 Spectacle was first published in Dutch in 1976 and Traité 
followed in 1978. In 1987 Sanders completed a thesis on the Situationists in Dutch, 
which remains unpublished. He was particularly taken with Debord and saw his 
critical theory behind many cultural and philosophical developments after the 1960s. 
 In France, Bertrand published the first critical examination of Situationist 
ideas that focused primarily on the work of Guy Debord.117 Bertrand was interested in 
the Situationists from the perspective of the abolition of art and understood Debord to 
be the key figure in the development of these positions within the SI. Also in France, 
Martos produced the first history of the Situationist International. Hussey describes 
this book as ‘an orthodox and Debord-controlled history of the SI’.118 Indeed, there is 
no evidence that Martos spoke to anyone other than Debord or those of his circle in 
the writing of the book. Though he provides a short summary of ‘Banalités de base’, 
Martos passes quickly over Traité and focuses on Spectacle, repeating the oft-echoed 
opposition between the two works: ‘Là où Vaneigem part de l’homme, du subjectif, 
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Debord énonce sa critique du spectacle du froid point de vue de l’histoire’.119 
Similarly, another highly Debordian history of the SI was published by Pascal 
Dumontier in 1990. Despite marking Banalités as the start of the later period of the 
SI, Dumontier also used only La Véritable Scission for his historical account of 
Vaneigem. 
 In 1984 accusations were made against Guy Debord over the assassination of 
his friend Gérard Lebovici. Henceforth Debord earned a reputation as a mysterious 
and secretive figure on the fringes of Parisian society. Debord traces the development 
of his notoriety in the French press in a book entitled Cette Mauvaise Reputation 
(1993). Increasingly, Debord developed public recognition as a figure of interest in 
his own right; that is to say, not only associated with his place in the SI. 
 By far the most influential critical text on the SI from this period was Lipstick 
Traces published by Greil Marcus in 1989.120 Marcus was concerned with tracing the 
cultural roots of the Sex Pistols through the history of the Parisian avant-garde. As his 
focus was primarily cultural, his work turns mostly on the early period of the 
Situationist International, as well as the movements from which it emerged: Dada, 
Surrealism and Lettrism. Vaneigem actually features very little in the work of 
Marcus, no doubt because he did not take part in this earlier ‘artistic’ phase of the SI 
and was more important to the development of the later ‘political’ period that led up 
to May ’68. Even so, Vaneigem is described by Marcus as a kind of prophet of May 
’68, who ‘was writing a how-to manual on revolution in modern society’. 121 Speaking 
of Traité, Marcus notes that its ‘lines […] would be copied on to the walls of Paris, 
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then across France, and then […] around the world’.122 In summary, by the time of 
Lipstick Traces the Situationists had come to be seen primarily through a cultural lens 
and Debord had become the dominant figure in the international reception of the 
organisation, with Vaneigem an increasingly marginal one. 
 
The 1990s were arguably the most important period in which the contemporary 
reception of the Situationists was shaped. The early nineties saw the publication of 
two ideas-driven studies, Plant in the US and Jappe in Italy.123 Plant reads Debord and 
Vaneigem on a relatively equal basis though remarking on the different approaches of 
the two authors.124 As with earlier contrasts made between the two authors, there is 
the implication that where Debord develops an objective analysis, Vaneigem is more 
of a lyrical revolutionary for whom reality as it actually stands is of little concern. At 
the same time, there is a sense that Traité provides a more obviously subjective 
element that is perhaps lacking in Spectacle: 
 
Vaneigem’s radical subject negates the seductive glamour of the spectacle 
with demands for active participation; it responds to the mediations of 
spectacular life with forms of immediate communication and direct control; it 
challenges the spectacle’s claim to circumscribe reality with actions and 
gestures which allow for forms of self-realisation in another, broader, chosen 
context.125 
 
Plant is right in her description of the general thrust of Traité, however, her use of 
terminology such as the ‘radical subject’ is never backed up by the kind of theoretical 
exposition needed to understand the specificity of such language in Vaneigem. For 
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Plant the radical subject is simply a general abstraction used to designate the emphasis 
placed on subjectivity in Traité and not a specific term in the detailed development of 
the Marxian notion of praxis Vaneigem actually lays out in his work. Although Plant 
explores the notions of everyday, revolution as festival, play and spontaneity in 
Vaneigem’s writing, these ideas are not presented as though situated within a coherent 
intellectual framework. Rather, they appear as largely discursive forms of literary 
practice. The primary reason for this is that the methodology of Plant was firmly 
rooted in Postmodernism. Plant is not concerned with ‘objectively’ developing a 
definition of these ideas from within the texts themselves. Instead, her work seeks to 
situate Traité and Spectacle as forerunners to Postmodernism, in particular to 
Baudrillard. As a result any exposition of the actual critical theory of Raoul Vaneigem 
gives way in her study to a very different discourse than that for which his ideas were 
originally intended. 
 The most important critical text of the early 1990s, and for the field as a 
whole, was written by the German-born critic Anselm Jappe in Italian in 1993. Jappe 
was the first to focus a study on Guy Debord exclusively. Methodologically speaking, 
Jappe is also highly innovative. He provides an intellectual biography on the work of 
Guy Debord that clarifies his key ideas through a systematic analysis and exposition 
of his critical theory. Most importantly, Jappe grasps that these theories could only be 
properly understood in relation to his appropriation of the theory of praxis from 
Lukàcs.126 Indeed, Jappe is hostile to approaches to Debord that examine aspects of 
his critical thinking in isolation—focusing on la vie quotidienne or the critique of the 
                                                
126 György Lukàcs, in History and Class Consciousness (1920), was the first Marxist theorist to see the 
theory of praxis as essential to understanding Marx. Lukàcs argued that capitalism had to be 
understood as a totality where the consciousness of subjects was ‘reified’ (social forms seem wholly 
objective and trans-historical). The proletariat, he posited, were the first social class capable of 
developing a consciousness of these reified social relations and, therefore, able to abolish them. Lukàcs 
therefore reintroduced the possibility of human agency into revolution, where traditional Marxism had 
understood communist society to be the inevitable outcome of natural laws beyond human control. 
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media—and stresses that his thought is aimed at capitalist society as a totality.127 
Jappe therefore adopts a particularly suitable methodology for examining the work of 
the Situationists by providing insight into their theories based on their own terms. In 
this sense his study is far more ‘objective’ than more ideological approaches, such as 
that attempted by Plant, or cultural ones, such as the PhD of Bacigalupi completed in 
1993 that reiterated the Situationist heritage of punk and neo-Expressionism.128 
 Jappe, however, in his focus on Debord is dismissive of Vaneigem and his 
reading is clearly coloured by La Véritable Scission. Vaneigem features only as an 
anecdotal presence in his study, far less, for example, than in Plant, and his work is 
dismissed as mysticism in a footnote: 
 
Dans le Traité de Vaneigem, on peut effectivement déceler le désir d’une 
totale correspondance entre soi et le monde, qui semble parfois confiner au 
mysticisme – tendance apparue à diverses reprises dans les rangs des lettristes 
et des situationnistes.129 
 
 
As I argue in chapters 1 and 5 of the current work, this accusation is erroneous as 
Vaneigem makes it very clear that the relationship between subject and object is a 
                                                
127 ‘Totality’ is a key category of thought that Marx adopts from Hegel. In the philosophy of Hegel, 
totality [Totalität] ‘stresses […] the completeness of the whole, that nothing is left out’, Michael 
Inwood, A Hegel Dictionary (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999), p. 310. In contrast to the ‘whole’ [das Ganze], 
which can be a fragment and therefore part of a larger whole, a totality cannot be part of a larger 
totality, ibid.. For Hegel, ‘Each part of such a totality is itself the whole’, ibid.. Crucially, Hegel 
applied the category of totality to the whole of historical society, which he saw as a self-developing 
system, see Felton Shorthall, The Incomplete Marx (England: Avebury, 1994), pp. 90-93. 
  Marx embraces the notion of society and, indeed, ‘reality’ as a totality, Shortall, ibid., p. 93. 
But where Hegel posits an immediate, rational system, Marx sees the mediation of human praxis (see 
above) and therefore the mediating social relationships that make up this total reality because praxis 
does not occur in isolation, ibid., pp. 98-100. For this reason, Marx sees no fundamentally meaningful 
distinction between the different schools of thought – economics, history, philosophy, art etc. – rather, 
these are all abstractions from the whole, ibid., p. 84. Equally, as was suggested above, there is no 
distinction for Marx between the different realms of philosophy such as ontology and epistemology. 
Moreover, each of these fragments of the totality, including their fragmentary nature, is a reflection of 
the society as a whole. A society, in the case of capitalism, divided into social classes, roles containing 
real individuals performing conscious material practices (including philosophers, historians and 
economists). These practices can only be understood ‘concretely’ once considered as expressions of the 
totality of which they are a part. 
128 See Donald Bacigalupi, ‘Pretty Vacant, Neo-Expressionist Painting, Situationist Theory and Punk 
Rock’ (unpublished doctoral thesis, University of Texas, Austin, 1993). 
129 Jappe, Guy Debord, p. 243. 
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mediated one. The references to mysticism are always of a poetic quality that is a 
metaphorical way of conveying the unity of subject and object in mediation. 
Notwithstanding, the methodological approach of Jappe towards Guy Debord, which 
could be termed intellectual biography, combining insights about his life and theory, 
is well suited to the subject. 
 In 1994 the suicide of Guy Debord became an event that would define the 
critical reception of the Situationists in later years. The legacy of Debord became a 
heated subject in the national media and a large number of biographies emerged in 
quick succession.130 Many of these texts are now the major secondary sources on the 
Situationists in the critical field; in particular, Bourseiller, Kaufmann and Hussey. 
Where previous studies, save for Jappe, had tended to examine the Situationists as a 
whole, it became standard to focus primarily on Guy Debord and the French 
context.131 
 In Bourseiller, a work that has a tendency to diminish the ‘political’ aspects of 
the SI in favour of its earlier ‘artistic’ period, Vaneigem is very much an anecdotal 
presence who appears in the story of Debord with little explanation of the 
relationship. Bourseiller notes that ‘Banalités’ is an important text that embodies ‘une 
bonne photographie de la pensée situationniste en 1962’.132 Strangely he emphasises a 
contrast between the direction of Debord and Vaneigem and SoB: ‘Tandis que la 
tendance regroupée autour de Cornelius Castoriades entame […] une révision radicale 
                                                
130 Beyond the critical texts the suicide of Debord was something of a media event with obituaries in 
the major newspapers. In 1996 Paris FM 93.5 broadcast a documentary in four episodes about Debord, 
including interviews with those who knew him, that was over five hours long. See Nuits Magnétiques: 
L’Internationale situationniste (London: Chronos Publications), 4 Cassettes. 
131 There are many obvious reasons and advantages for critics in focusing on Guy Debord. It is a fact 
that Guy Debord was the driving force behind much of what the SI was. He, more than any other, 
contributed the original impetus and key texts. He was a member of the original Lettrist group around 
Isidore Isou. His life and work incorporate the entire evolution of the Situationist International, from 
the LI and the SI’s early and later periods, until its dissolution. There is no doubt that Guy Debord is 
absolutely central to our understanding of the SI and the radical history of the twentieth century. 
132 Bourseiller, p. 247. 
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du marxisme, Debord et Vaneigem élaborent une critique de la vie quotidienne’.133 
Bourseiller therefore ignores that ‘Banalités’ was actually the text in which Vaneigem 
most clearly states the Situationist position on praxis and therefore its total opposition 
to orthodox Marxism. Moreover, this text has very little to say about la vie 
quotidienne. 
 Hussey calls the break with Vaneigem ‘the most crucial point in the slow 
break-up of the SI’.134 For Hussey, ‘Vaneigem was also a threat to Debord and one of 
the few remaining Situationists who could intellectually match Debord step for 
step’.135 Hussey also notes the fact that Traité was arguably more popular than 
Spectacle.136 Despite keeping Vaneigem at the margins of the discussion, many 
critical studies of Debord, including Hussey’s, see his work as essential to the 
Situationist project. Kaufmann, for example, is deeply suspicious of the idea that 
Lefebvre is all that important for understanding the entrance of Vaneigem into the SI, 
though he does not develop the point.137 He notes that the arguments developed in 
Vaneigem’s later work are not all that different from those he gave in Traité.138 For 
this reason, Kaufmann argues, the later works embody a continuation of the 
Situationist project.139 Indeed, Kaufmann sees Vaneigem as an important aspect of the 
Situationist story and French literature that has been overlooked by the critical field. 
In fact, Kaufmann describes the work of Vaneigem as ‘une des pages les plus 
méconnues de l’histoire de la poésie française’.140 
                                                
133 Ibid. 
134 Hussey, Game of War, p. 264. 
135 Ibid. 
136 ‘This language of Vaneigem’s book, poetic, fiery, imperious, had an immediate appeal for members 
of the European and American underground movements for whom ‘Situationism’ had so far been no 
more than a buzz-word with the same currency as hippie, beatnik, provo, mod or rocker. However, this 
was not the case with Debord’s book’, ibid., p. 215. 
137 Kaufmann, p. 244. 
138 Ibid., p. 323. 
139 Ibid. 
140 Ibid., p. 244. 
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 There are problems, however, with the approach of Kaufmann towards the 
Situationists in that his interpretation of Debord is a decidedly literary one. Where 
Jappe had demonstrated the importance of Debord as a thinker in the Marxian sense 
of developing the theory of praxis, Kaufmann presents the SI as a largely aesthetic 
and literary practice. This is a methodological tendency common to many studies of 
Debord and the SI. It is problematic because it tends to overlook the more 
fundamental innovations of the Situationists by adopting the very non-totalising 
approaches the Situationists were struggling against. 
 Sadler, for example, offers a reading of the SI that positions the group in terms 
of innovators in the architectural sphere, rather than, the much more complicated 
position, as a movement to abolish architecture and urban planning as social 
separations.141 Joyce describes the SI in terms of ‘cultural politics’, as though the 
Situationists themselves really did embody the practices of their punk and post-
modern recuperation. 142  White and Goaman both offer PhDs that examine the 
adoption of Situationist ideas in movements and cultural practices that would have 
been critiqued by the group itself.143 These cultural or history of art approaches to the 
Situationists continue to dominate much discourse on the SI. 
 In 1997 two ex-Situationists turned art historian and translator, Timothy Clark 
and Donald Nicholson-Smith, produced an article, for a special edition of the journal 
October on the SI, attacking these critical trends that had developed towards Debord 
and the SI in the 1990s.144 Clark and Nicholson-Smith argue that four general trends 
                                                
141 See Sadler, op. cit. 
142 See Mary Joyce, ‘The Limits of Cultural Politics: The Situationist International, 1957-1971’, 
(unpublished doctoral thesis, University of California, Berkeley, 1997). 
143 See Graham White, ‘The Drama of Everyday Life: Situationist Theory in the Theatre of Counter-
culture’ (unpublished doctoral thesis, University of Sussex, East Sussex, 1995); Karen Goaman, ‘The 
Old World is behind you: the Situationists and beyond in contemporary anarchist currents’ 
(unpublished PhD thesis, University College London, 2002). 
144 Timothy Clark and Donald Nicholson-Smith, ‘Why Art Can’t Kill the Situationist International’, 
October (Winter 1997), pp. 15-31. 
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had developed in the critical reception of the SI designed to recuperate the movement. 
First, the SI is portrayed as an art organisation that only entered into politics later 
on.145 Secondly, a position adopted by many of its admirers, the SI is an ‘art-political 
sect’ that did not concern itself with external political events because it was obsessed 
with maintaining an internal political purity.146 Thirdly, Situationist politics is pure 
subjectivism that calls for a politics of everyday life, which amounts to nothing more 
than sloganeering.147 Fourthly, Situationist theory itself is overly young-Hegelian and 
rhetorical in character with a ‘metaphysical hostility to mere appearances’.148 
 Clark and Nicholson-Smith were essentially pointing out that the artistic 
interpretation of the SI, or the idea of a Situationist story conveniently divided into an 
‘artistic’ and ‘political’ period was a gross oversimplification that meant avoiding the 
important ideas developed by the group over the issue of human creativity. By 
interpreting the Situationists as artists the group could be dismissed as revolutionary 
theorists. By reading them as an art-political sect one sidelined or reduced the essence 
of their theory to a naïve cultural politics. It is significant that Clark also wrote the 
preface to the English translation of Jappe, thereby supporting the more intellectual 
methodology of his study that had begun from reading Debord from the totalising 
perspective of human praxis, the creatively conscious dimension of human practice. 
The advantage of this approach is that each aspect of the Situationists can be 
interpreted as an extension of one essential problematic of alienation of human 
creativity. 
 
                                                
145 Ibid., p. 19. 
146 Ibid. 
147 Ibid. 
148 Ibid. 
	   	  51 
The past decade has seen studies that largely reiterate the complex reception of the 
Situationists in the 1990s. A good number of studies on the Situationists focus on the 
work of Guy Debord, France and on giving an art history interpretation of their 
work.149 There have, however, been others that are properly concerned with the 
intellectual aspect of the Situationists, that is, closer examination of the core 
revolutionary ideas they put forward. Barnard, for example, is concerned with what 
the Situationists contributed, or were attempting to contribute, to contemporary 
revolutionary thought, rather than as an art enterprise.150 
 Barnard has a methodological approach similar to Jappe that builds upon his 
work. Barnard describes the SI as ‘one of the most misinterpreted, misread and 
misrepresented political ‘organisations’ of the post-war period’.151 In contrast to many 
cultural studies, Barnard seeks to provide a reading of the SI that places their political 
theory at the heart of their project.152 Moreover, the theoretical exposition undertaken 
by Barnard explicitly takes both Traité and Spectacle as equally representative of 
Situationist theory: ‘An introduction to the thought of the SI must be an introduction 
to their collective work, not just the central figure’.153 Barnard therefore offers by far 
the most extensive critical reading of Vaneigem in the literature. 
 Like Jappe, Barnard sees praxis and therefore alienation as a fundamental, and 
under-examined, aspect of Situationist thought and practice.154 Barnard notes that 
concepts of isolation, alienation and reification are as clear or developed in the work 
                                                
149 See, for example, Antoine Copolla, Introduction au cinema de Guy Debord et de l’avant-garde 
situationniste (Arles: Sulliver, 2006); Danesi, Fabien, Le mythe brisé de l’Internationale situationniste: 
L’aventure d’une avant-garde au coeur de la culture de masse (1945-2008) (Paris: Les Presses du réel, 
2008); Frances Stracey, ‘Pursuit of the Situationist Subject’, (unpublished doctoral thesis, University 
College London, London, 2001). 
150 Barnard, op. cit. 
151 Ibid., p. 10. 
152 Ibid. 
153 Ibid., p. 33. 
154 Ibid., pp. 84-85. 
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of Debord as they are in the work of Vaneigem.155 Barnard gives a reading of the 
concept of alienation through Traité. As in previous studies, Barnard emphasis that 
Vaneigem provides a subjective critique, while Debord presents the more objective 
side of Spectacular society.156 However, Barnard is ultimately highly critical of 
Vaneigem and makes explicit a general critique of him that is usually only implied in 
the critical field. Barnard states that the work of Vaneigem does not contain the 
‘intellectual rigour’ of Debord and is instead defined more by a ‘Light 
Romanticism’.157 He states that Vaneigem poses an ‘essentialist’ and ‘romantic’ idea 
of the pre-industrial past.158 As such, Barnard states that Vaneigem is a ‘reactionary’ 
because he is not ‘forward-thinking’ and ‘utopian’ but ‘retrospective’.159 Moreover, 
he states that Vaneigem’s ideas about pleasure lack a totalising perspective.160 
Barnard concludes that Vaneigem is therefore lacking in the political insight provided 
by Debord.161 Here Barnard demonstrates unfortunately poor scholarship in his 
approach to Vaneigem. Firstly, Barnard claims to offer a reading that incorporates 
both Vaneigem and Debord but he does not recognise that most of his secondary 
sources have focused exclusively on Debord. That is to say, a lot more work needs to 
be done on Vaneigem before he and Debord can be read on an equal basis in a study 
of this type. Secondly, Barnard evidently has only read English translations of 
Vaneigem and shows no awareness of the extensive literature by him that would 
provide a more complex picture of his arguments.  
 Thirdly, although Barnard provides an exposition of the critical theory of 
Vaneigem he does not do so on precisely those concepts such as totality and praxis on 
                                                
155 Ibid., p. 113. 
156 Ibid., p. 122. 
157 Ibid., p. 124. 
158 Ibid. 
159 Ibid. 
160 Ibid. 
161 Ibid. 
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the basis of which he critiques him for Romanticism. Rather, Barnard examines only 
the most superficial considerations of Vaneigem and fails to develop his critical 
thinking as a distinct entity from Debord, and even as an influence on Debord. In 
other words, he closely reads a concept such as ‘survivalism’ but not the more 
essential notion of ‘praxis’ through Vaneigem. Fourthly, Barnard provides an 
excellent account of the socio-economic changes in France in which the French 
section of the SI developed. However, he completely sidelines such considerations for 
other European countries, including Belgium where one of the two main subjects of 
his thesis comes from. Barnard and Jappe therefore both have a very useful 
methodological approach in relation to Debord but there is very little scholarly 
research by them into the work of Raoul Vaneigem. As such, we are left with two 
excellent works on Guy Debord that, however, provide very little insight into the 
work of Raoul Vaneigem even where this is the intention, as in the case of Barnard. 
The implication is always that Debord is the only coherent Marxian thinker within the 
SI and that Vaneigem is, if anything, an interesting but lesser pupil. 
 In 2004 Laurent Six produced the only lengthy book devoted to Raoul 
Vaneigem to date. Six does not attempt to create a critical commentary on the work of 
Raoul Vaneigem but rather presents a sort of annotated bibliography that, nonetheless, 
massively expanded our knowledge of just how extensive his writing is. Six 
researched the first lengthy bibliography of the work of Vaneigem and creates a short 
biographical section that is the first of its kind. Six stresses that Vaneigem is not the 
author of Traité alone.162 For Six, Vaneigem is a ‘baroque moderne. Il ne cesse de 
faire des plis. Il n’invente rien mais déplie, de livre en livre, une idée dont la 
                                                
162 Ibid., p. 172. 
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connaissance est première’.163 Six was obviously not attempting any kind of serious 
critical study of Vaneigem but his work is important in that it is the first to focus on 
the author alone and encourages the reader to think of him as a writer in his own right. 
 The only work since Barnard to specifically attempt to deviate from the 
Debordian history of the SI has been by McKenzie Wark (2011): ‘Even when the 
Situationists are treated as a movement, the supposedly minor figures often drop out 
of the story, or become mere props to the great men among them’.164 Wark is right in 
this respect but bizarrely he totally sidelines Vaneigem as though he had already been 
the subject of biography and detailed critical discussion as much as Debord. Evidently 
this is not the case. Indeed, one might object that good critical commentaries on 
Debord are also few and far between. 
 Wark is correct, however, that the critical field has focused primarily on Guy 
Debord to the exclusion of other members. The recent study of Marcolini, for 
example, which claims to be an intellectual history of the Situationists is also another 
highly Derbordian take on the group that provides very little new insight into a body 
of theory and practice that is still hardly understood.165 In Marcolini also, Vaneigem is 
a largely anecdotal presence and, despite the ‘intellectual’ methodology, Marcolini 
provides no new definitions and close reading of the key terms through his work, 
relying heavily on previous studies such as Jappe. Indeed, as Anselm Jappe writes in 
in the preface to the second French edition of his study: ‘Sur les milliers de pages 
consacrées ces derniers temps à Debord, l’analyse théorique est largement absente’.166 
This statement is even truer of Raoul Vaneigem. 
                                                
163 Ibid. 
164 McKenzie Wark, The Beach Beneath the Street. The Everyday Life and Glorious Times of the 
Situationist International (London: Verso, 2011), p. 3. 
165  Patrick Marcolini, Le Mouvement situationniste: Une histoire intellectuelle (Paris: Éditions 
L’échappée, 2012) 
166 Jappe, Guy Debord, p. 12. 
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In summary, Vaneigem has been a constant presence in the extant literature on the 
Situationist International. But as I have demonstrated in this critical survey he has 
become a marginal figure. Since the 1960s, discussion of Guy Debord has 
increasingly come to dominate all studies of the Situationist International. Even those 
that have sought to provide insight on both his work and that of Guy Debord have 
tended to fail to do so in practice. This has led to a great number of misunderstandings 
both about the nature of the critical theory of Raoul Vaneigem and its place within the 
history of the Situationist International. It is this gap in the critical field that concerns 
us in the current work. 
 
 
Methodology: Intellectual Biography 
 
The above discussion has established the central aim and originality of this thesis: to 
provide the first extensive exposition and analysis of the theory of Raoul Vaneigem 
and his historical contribution to the Situationist International in order to revise our 
understanding of his life and work and the position it should occupy in the critical 
field. As the title of the current work states, the approach of ‘intellectual biography’ 
has been chosen to realise this goal. Intellectual biography is a genre of critical 
writing that makes reference to aspects of an author’s life in order to assess the 
development, character and impact of their ideas. In this sense intellectual biography 
offers a totalising perspective from which to understand a given body of work. It 
details the intellectual connections between its subject and other important figures of 
the period. It traces the evolution of their approach to a problematic over time. It 
defines the essence of the subject’s contribution to their historical moment. 
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Intellectual biography therefore allows one to combine the life and the work in order 
to reconsider the standing of the author in intellectual history. There are already a 
number of precedents for this approach in this specific field. Anselm Jappe’s seminal 
Guy Debord, discussed above, is perhaps the most prominent example. The reason 
why this combination of the analysis of a life and of the theory it produced is so 
necessary in the case of Raoul Vaneigem is that in many ways the life and the theory 
are self-conscious reflections of one another. Subjective experience, everyday life, the 
anecdotal and biography are core sources and sites of theoretical examination for 
these authors: everything from work and the domestic sphere, to walking in urban 
environments and events, such as May ’68, with world historical significance. It 
should not be forgotten that Vaneigem is a real, historical figure who was, and 
remains, active in the revolutionary struggles of his day. To ignore this ‘lived’ aspect 
of the work of Raoul Vaneigem would be to arbitrarily exclude a large part of its 
richness and, indeed, its historical import from our analysis. Intellectual biography 
allows us to convey this crucial relationship between theory and life. 
 Although this thesis is divided roughly into two periods—1934 to 1970 and 
1971 to the present day—, a purely chronological presentation would make it difficult 
to consider the theory in isolation before examining its place in the historiography. It 
is for this reason that the current work begins with a theoretical analysis of ‘Banalités 
de base’ and Traité, published in 1962-1963 and 1967, respectively. Together these 
texts are treated as a whole that best represent the state of the theory of Raoul 
Vaneigem during his time as a member of the Situationist International and the core 
of his theoretical contribution to the group. They are also his most widely read and 
influential works of theory both then and now.  
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The analysis proceeds through a logical exposition, beginning with the most 
basic theoretical categories and assumptions employed by Vaneigem up to his most 
complex theories and concepts. There are several reasons that this method has been 
employed. First, one of the central arguments of this thesis is that a core aspect of the 
contribution of Raoul Vaneigem to the SI was his understanding of ‘praxis’ as the 
theoretical basis of radical critique. By focusing on this most basic concept from the 
very start, the more complex aspects of his theory can be seen as the logical result of a 
more fundamental argument. This helps us to establish the coherence of the overall 
theoretical framework Vaneigem develops. Secondly, the exposition of his theory 
allows us the space to clearly define exactly what Vaneigem means by such diverse 
terms as ‘médiation’, ‘réalisation’, ‘volonté de vivre’, ‘volonté de puissance’, 
‘subjectivité’, ‘objectivité’, ‘créativité’, ‘spontanéité’, ‘survie’ and, crucially, 
‘subjectivité radicale’ through close textual analysis. This not only helps to argue for 
the coherence of the theoretical framework developed by Vaneigem, it also allows us 
to open up his entire body of writing, which until now has often seemed to many to be 
hermeneutically sealed. Thirdly, by debuting with this theoretical exposition, the 
reader will have the foundational terminology and concepts to hand when the thesis 
moves on to historical analysis and later theoretical developments. 
 With the first movement of theoretical analysis complete, the thesis moves on 
to contextualising it through an assessment of the relationship between Raoul 
Vaneigem and Belgian modernity. The term ‘Belgian modernity’ here is used in two 
senses: first, the history of capitalist social relations in Belgium in the twentieth 
century, and secondly, the modernist and avant-garde cultural movements that 
emerged in Belgium in the late 1890s and which largely came to a conclusion in the 
early 1970s. 
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In the first case, the current work employs the relevant autobiographical 
writing by Vaneigem, as well as some historiography on Belgian social history, to 
establish a picture of the industrial world and working-class communities in which 
Vaneigem grew up and in which his political consciousness was formed. An 
important aspect of this task is an extensive examination of the Belgian general strike 
of the winter of 1960-1961, Hiver ’60, through sources from the period with which 
Situationists would have been familiar or to which they contributed. Vaneigem took 
part in this strike and it was the context in which he first joined the Situationist 
International. Vaneigem is largely situated in relation to these aspects of Belgian 
modernity through an analysis of the more autobiographical sections of his work and 
its possible impact on the contents of Traité. This socio-cultural and biographical 
historical analysis provides the basis for claiming that Belgian modernity, in 
particular its class struggle expression, is a crucial context for understanding the 
origins of Vaneigem’s critical theory and the author’s immediate impact on the SI 
upon his arrival. 
 In the second instance, the thesis draws on the definition of Belgian modernity 
theorised by Nathalie Aubert and others in From Art Nouveau to Surrealism: Belgian 
Modernity in the Making (2007).167 There is an assessment of how these qualities of 
Belgian modernity compare with aspects of the work of Vaneigem. As such, it is 
possible to discuss the extent to which Vaneigem is part of a modernist tradition 
specific to his home region. From here the thesis analyses the relationship of 
Vaneigem with specific individuals that made up the Surrealist group in Hainaut and 
the local tradition of proletarian literature. This analysis is largely based on a 
presentation of his own texts written about Belgian and Parisian Surrealism, and it is 
                                                
167 See Nathalie Aubert and others, ‘Preface’, From Art Nouveau to Surrealism, Belgian Modernity in 
the Making (London: Legenda, 2007). 
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augmented by the inclusion of some original primary material by the authors 
concerned. This is followed by an exposition of the unpublished university mémoire 
by Vaneigem on another avant-garde figure, Isidore Ducasse, le Comte de 
Lautréamont, which allows the thesis to consider the state of his critical theory at this 
time. 
 Taken together, these two analyses of the relationship of Raoul Vaneigem to 
different aspects of Belgian modernity provide an historical overview of his early and 
pre-Situationist intellectual development, as well as the importance of local influence 
to his work. 
 This socio-cultural history is followed by an historical analysis of Vaneigem 
as an active member of the Situationist International. The thesis divides this study into 
three chronological periods: 1961-1964, 1965-1968 and 1969-1970. These divisions 
of time are made according to roughly defined periods of activity. 1961-1964 mainly 
covers the entrance of Vaneigem into the SI, his role in the exclusion of the artists and 
his early contribution to Situationist theory. 1965-1968 examines his role in the 
Strasbourg scandal of 1966, in the exclusion of the English members of the SI, the 
publication of Traité and the events of May ’68. Finally, 1969-1970 looks at the place 
of Vaneigem in the aftermath of these events, the breakdown of his friendship with 
Guy Debord and, ultimately, his resignation from the Situationist International. Our 
analysis draws on a variety of primary sources such as the Situationists’ journal 
Internationale situationniste, Guy Debord’s correspondence and other Situationist 
material in order to establish the facts of the engagement of Vaneigem in the group. 
This allows the thesis to provide an assessment of the practical contribution of Raoul 
Vaneigem to the Situationist International, of the context in which his theory was 
disseminated and of its position within the wider collective project of the group. The 
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aim is both to counteract the ‘great man’ tendency of a work such as this, which is 
consecrated to a single author, and to once more contextualise the practice from 
which his theory emerged. It also allows us to consider some of the immediate impact 
of this theory in the 1960s. This historical analysis ends the first section of our study 
which is centred on Vaneigem both before and during his membership of the 
Situationist International. 
The second part of the thesis is devoted to a theoretical analysis of the post-
Situationist work of Raoul Vaneigem. The previous exposition of ‘Banalités de base’ 
and Traité lay the groundwork for this discussion by providing a point of reference 
for understanding later developments in the theory. This new movement of theoretical 
analysis is divided into two parts. The first examines the main theoretical 
developments in the work of Raoul Vaneigem since his resignation from the SI. The 
second focuses specifically on his critique of religion. 
The first theoretical analysis is centred for the most part on the key book 
length essays of general theory that Vaneigem has published in this period. These 
include Le Livre des plaisirs (1979), Adresse aux vivants sur la mort qui les gouverne 
(1990), and L’Ère des créateurs (2002). 168  Through a series of theoretical 
comparisons the thesis seeks to establish the relationship between the developments in 
the theory found in these texts with the psychological theories of the American 
psychotherapist Alexander Lowen, whose works were first published in France in the 
1970s. On the basis of this relationship the thesis argues that many of the major later 
developments in the work of Raoul Vaneigem can be traced back to an engagement 
with Lowen. As such, it is argued, Vaneigem is exploring the issue of the 
psychological form of the subject of capitalist social relations because for Lowen the 
                                                
168 See Raoul Vaneigem, Le Livre des plaisirs (Paris: Encre, 1979), Adresse aux vivants sur la mort qui 
les gouverne et l’opportunité de s’en défaire (Paris : Seghers, 1990), L’Ère des créateurs (Brussels: 
Complexe, 2002). 
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capitalist subject is essentially defined by a ‘fear of pleasure’. Equally, this discovery 
opens up a theoretical understanding of non-capitalist or liberated subjects. This 
analysis allows a logical exposition of the theoretical categories and language that 
Vaneigem employs in his later work because the theory of Lowen helps us to better 
understand exactly what is happening in these texts. Terms such as ‘le vivant’, 
‘gratuité’, ‘le corps’, ‘peur de jouissance’ can be revealed as essentially a terminology 
employed to discuss issues around the effect of modern life on capitalist subjects, and 
the potential psychological forms and praxis of non-capitalist subjects. This latter is 
explored in particular through the only novel Vaneigem has written, Voyage à 
Oarystis, that describes a visit to a non-capitalist utopia.169 
The second theoretical examination of the later work of Raoul Vaneigem 
centres on his critique of religion. The analysis focuses on the extensive theoretical 
and historical works on Christianity and heresy that Vaneigem has devoted much time 
to since his resignation from the SI: Le Mouvement du Libre-Esprit (1986), Les 
Controverses du christianisme (1992), La Résistance au christianisme (1993), and De 
l’inhumanité de la réligion (2000).170 As with the previous two theoretical analyses, 
this examination proceeds from the most basic fundamentals of Vaneigem’s theory of 
religion. The primary task is to establish the definition of religion that Vaneigem 
gives in his theoretical work. The analysis then moves on to explore why Vaneigem 
considers the critique of religion an essential aspect of the critique of commodity 
society. Building on these new considerations and the earlier theoretical discussion, 
the thesis moves on to consider the importance of heresy to the work of Raoul 
Vaneigem and the meaning of his use of the language of mysticism and alchemy in 
                                                
169 Raoul Vaneigem, Voyage à Oarystis (Blandain: Éditions de l’Estuaire, 2005) 
170 Raoul Vaneigem, Le Mouvement du Libre-Esprit; généralités et témoignages sur les affleurements 
de la vie à la surface du Moyen Age, de la Renaissance, et, incidemment, de notre époque [1986] 
(Paris: L’Or des fous, 2005), [Tristan Hannaniel], Les Controverses du christianisme (Paris: Bordas, 
1992), De l’inhumanité de la religion (Paris: Denoël, 2000). 
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his work. In so doing the current work is able to explain how this metaphorical 
language is grounded in the fundamental theoretical categories of Vaneigem that have 
been analysed and presented throughout. 
The thesis concludes with a critical reappraisal of the theory of Raoul 
Vaneigem, which has now been properly established by the current work, from the 
perspective of the ‘critique of value’. The ‘critique of value’ is a school of thought 
that emerged out of debates that took place in Germany in the 1980s and 1990s that 
argued for a break with traditional Marxism by returning to the critique of the basic 
categories of capitalist society begun by Marx. Its main body of theory is best 
represented by Moishe Postone (1942-) in the United States,171 by the late Robert 
Kurz (1942-2012) in Germany,172 and by Anselm Jappe (1962-) in France.173 The 
‘critique of value’ stresses the fetishistic nature of a society based on the logic of the 
value form. In this schema capitalism is essentially a type of domination ‘without a 
subject’, where capitalist social relations themselves, not necessarily individuals and 
their subjective intentions, embody the role of oppressor. In capitalist society 
therefore human needs and concrete reality are thus subsumed beneath the logical 
requirements of an ‘automatic subject’, the value form. As a result, human subjects—
worker and capitalist—are merely the vessels for the process of value’s incessant and 
tautological valorisation. This has led, on the one hand, to the gradual transformation 
of humanity into the narcissistic agents of value, and on the other, the destruction of 
the material world through the brutal demands of purely abstract necessity. These 
                                                
171 See Moishe Postone, Time, Labor and Social Domination: A Reinterpretation of Marx's Critical 
Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993). 
172 The major works of Kurz have yet to be translated into English. However, there are several 
independently published translations of selected essays. See, for example, Robert Kurz, Marx 2000 
(London: Chronos Publications, 2002) and No Revolution Anywhere (London: Chronos Publications, 
2012). 
173 See, Anselm Jappe, Les Aventures de la marchandise: Pour une nouvelle critique de la valeur 
(Paris: Denoël, 2003) and Crédit à mort: La décomposition du capitalisme et ses critiques (Paris: 
Lignes, 2011). 
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realities, for the ‘critique of value’, define the conditions of emancipation in our time. 
It will not take a wilful act of revolution to destroy capitalism, it is already collapsing 
due to the inherent limits of the process of valorisation. The question now is whether 
humanity will have the theory capable of overcoming the dehumanising effects of the 
social categories of competition, work and the state when their very basis in the 
valorisation of value has fallen away. 
Although the ‘critique of value’ is mainly discussed towards the end of our 
theoretical examination, it has proved to be invaluable throughout the current work in 
providing a critical perspective from which to judge the theory of Vaneigem and the 
Situationist relationship to fetishism. In many ways the SI could be thought to have 
been forerunners of this theory. I was also particularly aided in understanding the 
ideas of Vaneigem around the theory of praxis by the chapter ‘Totality and dialectic 
in Hegel and Marx’ in Felton Shorthall’s The Incomplete Marx. Shorthall is a member 
of the Open Marxist school of thought that, although still remaining in the class-
struggle sphere of thinking, is based on a non-deterministic view of history and a 
rejection of authoritarian forms of emancipation. 
The reason that I have chosen to focus on the political and theoretical aspects 
of the writing of Raoul Vaneigem rather than its literary qualities is that I feel these 
are the most important and underexamined elements of his work. There is no doubt 
that Vaneigem has a brilliant style and that his oeuvre embodies one of the most 
impressive examples of French prose in the twentieth century. Certainly, this is part of 
its charm and what has made it attractive to certain readers. However, Vaneigem is 
not primarily a ‘literary’ author and he is, indeed, an enemy of ‘culture’ in this sense. 
His work aims at inciting people to the real, radical transformation of society, not 
purely literary enjoyment. Moreover, for a long time Vaneigem has been treated as a 
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largely rhetorical and lyrical figure, where Debord has tended to dominate theoretical 
discussion of the SI. This is a trend that I would like to combat with this thesis. There 
is, of course, a place in the critical field for further discussion of the more literary 
aspects of the work of Raoul Vaneigem but they must be seen as secondary to the 
theoretical and political. Further, as the current work hopes to demonstrate, even the 
more poetic language of Vaneigem is rooted in a decidedly Marxian critical 
framework. 
The final key in the methodology of the thesis was to establish the most 
extensive bibliography of the work of Raoul Vaneigem to date. This included archival 
research in both Brussels and Amsterdam that uncovered material previously 
unknown to the field. The Bibliothèque royal Albert I in Brussels contains a number 
of manuscripts by Raoul Vaneigem and also his correspondence with his mémoire 
supervisor Emilie Noulet. It was here that I found his film script of a never produced 
biopic of the life of the hennuyer author Charles-Joseph de Ligne discussed in chapter 
2 of the current work. I also visited the Université Libre de Bruxelles in order consult 
the second version of the university mémoire discussed in the same chapter. At the 
Situationist Archive at the Institute of Social History in Amsterdam one can also 
examine the original manuscript of Traité that contains passages expunged from the 
published version. Although not all of this material has been discussed in the current 
work directly, it has all informed my reading and understanding of the main texts 
dealt with in the thesis. This bibliography will lay the groundwork for future 
publications and editions, and, I believe, prove extremely useful to other researchers 
in this field. 
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Chapter 1. ‘Banalités de base’ and Traité: Praxis in the Critical Thought of 
Raoul Vaneigem 
 
Car seule l'incessante relation de 
la théorie et de la praxis vécue 
permet d'espérer la fin de toutes 
les dualités, le règne de la 
totalité, la fin du pouvoir de 
l'homme sur l'homme.174 
 
 
The aim of the current chapter is to clarify how Raoul Vaneigem interprets Marx and 
how this interpretation serves as the basis for the key critical positions, ideas and 
terminology he develops in his work. In order to achieve this aim, the main objective 
of this chapter is to provide an original reading of Vaneigem’s crucial contributions to 
the Situationist International in the 1960s: ‘Banalités de base’ (1961-1962) and Traité 
de savoir-vivre à l’usage des jeunes générations (1967). These texts are generally 
considered to be the core of the work of Raoul Vaneigem, his most influential writing, 
and they contain the most detailed discussion of the author’s basic critical framework. 
Further, in many ways the texts embody a maturation of Raoul Vaneigem’s thought as 
represented in his university mémoire, discussed in the following chapter, and were 
central to the transformation the SI underwent in its later period. 
 The largely implicit interpretation of Marx that Raoul Vaneigem develops in 
his work has never been the subject of detailed study. Guy Debord, on the other hand, 
has been given this treatment in the work of Anselm Jappe. In his 1993 study, Guy 
Debord, Jappe explained the theorist of the Spectacle in more familiar Marxist terms. 
To achieve this Jappe focused on the indebtedness of Debord to the interpretation of 
Marx’s theory of praxis by György Lukács in the latter’s History and Class 
                                                
174Traité, p. 124. 
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Consciousness (1920). Jappe correctly demonstrates the centrality of the theory of 
praxis, the creatively conscious dimension of human practice, to the Situationist 
reading of Marx. However, in focusing on Debord, Jappe ignores the far more 
detailed and explicit discussion of praxis to be found in the work of Raoul Vaneigem. 
Indeed, Jappe is very dismissive of Vaneigem’s contribution to the SI and his 
understanding of Marx. Since Jappe, the doctoral thesis of Adam Barnard in 2002 is 
one of the few critical works to have examined the relationship between a Situationist 
interpretation of Marx, rooted in the theory of praxis, and the organisation’s critical 
perspectives. However, despite reading Vaneigem alongside Debord, Barnard relies 
heavily on Jappe’s discussion of Lukàcs. He provides no close textual analysis of 
Vaneigem’s own writing on the subject and his explanation of the critical perspectives 
put forward in Traité suffers greatly as a result. 
 The need for a new reading of Vaneigem based on an examination of his own 
critical interpretation of Marx is a necessary one; not only because it has not been 
done before, but because it is fundamental to how his critical perspective, that is to 
say, his historical contribution to the SI and sixties radicalism, is understood. The 
meaning of terms such as radical subjectivity, survivalism and even the most basic, 
such as creativity, have too often been taken for granted in the critical literature, with 
no clear explanation rooted in the arguments and words of Raoul Vaneigem himself. 
The clarification undertaken in the current chapter is therefore meant to lay the 
groundwork for a richer and more accurate comprehension of the importance of Raoul 
Vaneigem’s contribution to the Situationist International, May ’68 and its afterlives. 
  The reading of Marx that Raoul Vaneigem develops in his work is for the 
most part present in his critical positions and use of terminology. Vaneigem has never 
written for an academic audience and his writing is not packed with direct citations 
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and references to Marx. Nor can it be said that Vaneigem is particularly concerned 
with a rehabilitation of Marx or the kind of exposition that is presented here.175 For 
Vaneigem, Marx is always a source of inspiration to a critique that is eminently 
practical, ever changing and concerned with a radical transformation of the present. 
His audience is the everyday, alienated individual, not the specialist or expert. For this 
reason much of the interpretation of ‘Marx’ I analyse here is therefore implicit, even 
while Vaneigem is far more explicit and detailed in how he interprets Marx’s theories 
than Debord. 
 
The Theory of Praxis 
 
The theory of praxis that Raoul Vaneigem defines and develops in his work is the 
fundamental critical assumption he draws from the work of Marx. For Vaneigem it is 
on the theory of praxis that Marx based his critique of commodity society. It is also 
the basis on which Marx demonstrated the possibility of communist society. Raoul 
Vaneigem first outlined his definition of the theory and its importance as an 
ontological starting point for revolutionary critique in theses 27 and 28 of ‘Banalités 
de base’. These passages are the most detailed description of praxis to be found in the 
work of any Situationist, Guy Debord included, and, as will be argued in chapter 3 of 
the current work, were key to the new direction the SI took after the Gothenburg 
conference of 1961. 
Praxis can be defined as the consciously creative dimension of human 
practice. Marx’s theory of praxis, as understood by Vaneigem, is that Man, 
                                                
175 This is not to say, however, that Vaneigem is not highly aware of what is, at least from his own 
perspective and one shared by many more recent schools of Marxian thought, a falsification of Marx 
by the official left; as he remarks with irony, ‘De Marx, il est vrai, les spécialistes de la révolution 
connaissent surtout ce qu’il a écrit sous le pseudonyme de Staline, ou au mieux de Lénine et Trotski’, 
Traité, p. 268. 
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subjectivity, and Nature, objectivity, are a dialectical unity created through the 
mediation of this conscious human activity that develops through time.176 Vaneigem 
is therefore fundamentally an essentialist because for him praxis is the essence of 
what it means to be human.177 That is to say, for Vaneigem, to be human means to 
engage in a conscious and imaginative process of world and self-creation.178 At the 
same time, this means that Vaneigem is also in some sense an anti-essentialist 
because concrete human praxis is not fixed but is defined, if anything, by its lack of 
fixism.179 The essential content and shape of human life, individual and collective, 
changes throughout history and between societies as a result of a process of self-
transformation. 
 Equally, it makes no sense for Vaneigem, and arguably Marx, to think of 
subjectivity and objectivity, of human consciousness and reality, as distinct 
categories.180 Such an approach denies the fact that humanity is a part of reality, that 
praxis reveals humanity as an objective-subjective creature. There is no objectivity, 
however defined, for Vaneigem, that is not a product of the human subject (even at 
the most basic level that observation and understanding of Nature involves conscious 
activity on the part of the subject). At the same time, there is no subjectivity or human 
subject that is not itself a product of its environment, social and ‘natural’. For this 
reason, Vaneigem and Marx are both materialists because they are aware that praxis 
                                                
176 ‘seule la praxis fonde le rapport entre les hommes et la nature’, ‘Banalités (II)’, p.  45; ‘le monde 
objectif (ou la nature, comme on veut)’, Traité, p. 110. 
177 The theory of praxis is a revolutionary theory and not a purely descriptive or metaphysical one. The 
aim of the theory, as is discussed below, is to liberate the activity it describes. Moreover, the theory 
itself is a self-conscious product of this activity. Cf. ‘les faits saisis de façon statique dans un système 
d'interprétation du monde et les faits saisis dans leur devenir, dans la praxis qui les transforme’, ibid., 
p. 132. 
178 Vaneigem affirms this statement regularly throughout his work, often negatively (in the sense that it 
is an essence that has been perverted or alienated): ‘l'homme […] transforme [le monde] et se 
transforme’, ibid., p. 110. 
179 ‘L’erreur des philosophes fut de construire une ontologie et une idée d'homme éternel sur ce qui 
n'était qu'un accident social, une nécessité contingente’, ibid., p. 140. 
180 This is not to say that they are immediately identical. Vaneigem is clear in ‘Banalités (II)’ that it is a 
mediated unity: ‘seule la praxis fonde le rapport entre les hommes et la nature’, op. cit.. The accusation 
of mysticism aimed at Vaneigem on this point by Jappe is therefore unfounded. 
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takes place within given historical circumstances, natural and social. On the level of 
social critique this is important because praxis is not only an individual process but 
also a social totality in which all subjectivities take part.181 The manner in which the 
human essence expresses itself, in thought and practice, is therefore dependent on the 
social relations in which praxis takes place. However, these social relationships 
themselves are only ever provisional and can be consciously transformed by human 
beings through praxis. 
 On an individual level this is an obvious point. If a person were to decorate a 
table then her transformation of that object is defined by the fact that another person 
has already arranged Nature in the form of a table, by the materials she has to hand, 
by the time she can devote to the project, by whether she has creative control over the 
decorative design etc. The decoration of the table is already defined in some way by 
the conditions under which creativity is to take place. The same applies to any other 
human activity, in thought and practice. Vaneigem administers this logic to the whole 
of society. Our individual and collective process of consciously transforming the 
world and ourselves is defined by the historical social relations in which it takes 
place. The theory of praxis, therefore, grasps the human essence as both trans-
historical, in the most abstract sense, and as historically situated, in the most concrete. 
 
With the practical, essentialist and materialist character of the theory of praxis 
established it becomes possible to consider what the term ‘alienation’ means to Raoul 
Vaneigem. In ‘Banalités de base (II)’, Vaneigem makes a distinction between praxis 
                                                
181 ‘L'organisation des sociétés humaines a changé le monde, et le monde en changeant a bouleversé 
l'organisation des sociétés humaines’, Traité, p. 205. 
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and praxis aliénée.182 These two forms of praxis in Marx have been designated ‘first’ 
and ‘second order mediation’, respectively, in some Marxist literature.183 For the sake 
of clarity they will be referred to as such. 
 
First order mediation, or praxis, is the basic theory of praxis outlined above. For 
Vaneigem, what distinguishes human beings from other animals (or in Hegelian 
terms, what makes Man and Nature a mediated unity rather than a completely 
immediate one) is the former’s ability to be conscious of what it creates.184 In Capital 
Marx famously contrasted the way in which the bee builds its beehive and the 
architect builds her building.185 Although the creation of the bee can put the architect 
to ‘shame’ in its beauty, the architect nevertheless has to imagine her own 
construction before she undertakes it.186 Moreover, it could be added that where the 
bee is pre-programmed by Nature or evolution to produce only the beehive, the 
architect can, given the right circumstances, produce any building she can imagine. 
As such, an immediate unity exists between the bee and Nature/objectivity, while 
subjectivity is involved for human beings, as they must imagine what they produce.187 
The act of creation for human beings is therefore one in which they turn their 
subjectivity into objectivity; a process Marx calls ‘objectification’ and what 
                                                
182 ‘La praxis, même aliénée, est ce qui maintient le contact avec la totalité’, Vaneigem, ‘Banalités (II)’, 
p. 45; ‘Dans la perspective de la praxis, tout fragment est totalité. Dans la perspective du pouvoir, qui 
aliène la praxis, tout fragment est totalitaire’, ibid. 
183 See Shorthall, p. 99. Shorthall is drawing on Chris Arthur, The Dialectics of Labour (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1986), and István Meszaros, Marx's Theory of Alienation (London: Merlin, 1970). 
184 ‘Ce qui différencie l'enfant de l'animal tient à ce que l'enfant possède le sens de la transformation du 
monde, c'est-à-dire la poésie, à un degré illimité’, Traité, p. 277. 
185 See Karl Marx, trans. Ben Fowkes, Capital Vol. 1 [1867] (London: Penguin, 1990), pp. 283-284. 
186 ‘A spider conducts operations which resemble those of the weaver, and a bee would put many a 
human architect to shame by the construction of its honeycomb cell. But what distinguishes the worst 
architect from the best of bees is that the architect builds the cell in his mind before he constructs it in 
wax’, ibid., p. 284. 
187 ‘At the end of every labour process, a result emerges which had already been conceived by the 
worker at the beginning, hence already existed ideally. Man not only effects a change of form in the 
materials of nature; he also realises [verwirklicht] his own purposes in those materials’, ibid., p. 284. 
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Vaneigem terms ‘la réalisation’ or, as in thesis 27 of ‘Banalités de base (II)’, ‘la 
réalisation objective dans l’objectivité’.188 
 ‘Objectification’ or ‘réalisation’ occurs through the process of ‘mediation’ by 
which human beings consciously shape objectivity. Mediation as such encompasses 
every way in which a human being objectifies herself in the natural world and in 
society, from language and tilling a field to sculpture and the construction of a city. 
Mediations are therefore ‘concrete’ in the sense that they are real, conscious practices 
that unite human beings with nature; or, to put it another way, they are the means 
through which humanity realises its creative essence.189 Praxis and its various forms 
(mediations), therefore unite all humanity as the bearers of the same dialectical 
process and, at the same time, reveals its essence to be an infinitely varied process of 
creation specific to each individual. This last point forms the basis for the 
‘subjectivité radicale’ argument Vaneigem develops in Traité, discussed below. 
 In the work of Vaneigem first order mediation contains a final key element, 
not made explicit in Marx, termed ‘le vécu’ or lived experience.190 Praxis tells us that 
humanity is a part of reality and that our knowledge of reality arises from our 
                                                
188 Vaneigem, ‘Banalités (II)’, p. 45. Barnard refers to ‘objectification’ in Vaneigem. See Barnard, p. 
114. However, it is not a term used by Vaneigem and certainly not in the sense defined here (i.e. 
‘réalisation’, the term he does use). What Barnard is in fact referring to is an aspect of reification, see 
below, wherein alienating social relations reduce human beings to the state of objects (that is to say, 
they are treated as animals, machines, commodities etc.). 
189 Another way of expressing this would be that the ‘concrete’ is human practice understood within the 
totality of the subjective-objective historical moment: emotions, thoughts, feelings, social relationships, 
materials etc. As such, the concrete constitutes reality: ‘la totalité réelle (la réalité)’, ‘Banalités (II)’, p. 
45. Vaneigem refers to the concrete throughout his œuvre in this sense; for example, ‘Sous une forme 
concrète et tactique, le concept de lutte des classes a constitué le premier regroupement des heurts et 
des dérèglements vécus individuellement par les hommes; il est né du tourbillon de souffrances que la 
réduction des rapports humains à des mécanismes d'exploitation suscitait partout dans les sociétés 
industrielles’, Traité, pp. 31-32. 
190 Some examples of the use of le vécu in Traité: ‘Désormais, pour élaborer une collectivité 
harmonieuse, la théorie révolutionnaire devra se fonder non plus sur la base du communautaire mais 
sur la subjectivité, sur les cas spécifiques, sur le vécu particulier’, pp. 214-215;  ‘Il n'y a pas d'autorité 
en dehors de ma propre expérience vécue’, p. 253; ‘En incitant les prolétaires à s'emparer de la théorie 
tirée du vécu et du non-vécu quotidien, le Traité prenait, en même temps que le parti du dépassement, 
le risque de toutes les falsifications auxquelles l’exposait le retard de sa mise en œuvre 
insurrectionnelle’, p. 356; ‘Les surréalistes, certains du moins, avaient compris que le seul dépassement 
valable de l'art était dans le vécu’, p. 149. Vaneigem sometimes uses the terms ‘la vie’ and ‘la réalité’ 
relatively synonymously with ‘le vécu’; this is possible due to the totalising nature of these categories. 
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conscious and practical existence within it and shaping it.191 Philosophy, on the other 
hand, seeks out reality as though it were something external to conscious, practical 
life. The notion of the ‘vécu’ is therefore an antidote to philosophy because it asserts 
that the only reality that matters is human experience. For Vaneigem reality—
knowledge of the world—is therefore the reality that each human being lives 
everyday and cannot be found through abstract speculation: ‘Il y a plus de vérités 
dans vingt-quatre heures de la vie d’un homme que dans toutes les philosophies’.192 
Reality embodies the thoughts and feelings that make up the imaginative and 
consciously creative dimension of human practice. Human praxis, ‘le vécu’, is reality 
for all intents and purposes. 
 The ‘vécu’ is for these reasons key to understanding the notion of 
‘authenticité’ that Vaneigem puts forward. For Raoul Vaneigem, like the best of the 
proletarian literature authors, the authenticity of any thought or action is found in the 
extent to which its version of reality is rooted in the subjective experience of the 
author in interaction with the world (and, of course, a desire to transform that 
reality).193 For Vaneigem, the reality put forward by praxis, including his own 
writing, is always consciously practical and based in lived experience.194 This is what 
establishes, in a practical sense, the ‘authenticité’ of a book, of a way of living or a 
critique.195 That is to say, the authentic is le vécu.196 This is not to say, however, that 
                                                
191 ‘ma connaissance du monde n'existe valablement qu'à l'instant où je le transforme’, Traité, pp. 124-
125. 
192Ibid., p. 26. 
193 The following chapter of this thesis discusses the possible origins of Vaneigem’s notion of 
authenticity in proletarian literature. See pages 144 of the current work. 
194 ‘Un principe me paraît bien établi: dès qu’un langage cesse d’obéir à la volonté de réalisation, il 
falsifie la communication; il ne communique plus que cette abusive promesse de vérité qui s’appelle 
mensonge. Mais ce mensonge est la vérité de ce qui me détruit, me corrompt, me soumet’, Traité, p. 
131. 
195 ‘Si l'individu voulait considérer le monde non plus dans la perspective du pouvoir mais dans une 
perspective dont il soit le point de départ, il aurait tôt fait de déceler les actes qui le libèrent vraiment, 
les moments les plus authentiquement vécus, qui sont comme des trous de lumière dans la grisaille des 
rôles. Observer les rôles à la lumière du vécu authentique, les radiographier si l'on veut, permettrait 
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Vaneigem eschews all abstract thought (the notion of ‘praxis’, for example, is an 
abstraction). Rather, it is an argument against a type of thinking that is not ultimately 
rooted in the concrete experiences, needs and desires that define our everyday lives. 
 Finally, first order mediation reveals, for Vaneigem, the ontological basis for 
communist society because it demonstrates that social change is possible. Human 
beings can at any time imagine alternative social relations and objectify those social 
relations through mediation. Correspondingly, this possibility offers an idea of what 
communism would mean: the liberation of first order mediation in order to realise the 
autonomy of individuals and humanity as a whole. To understand this latter, 
revolutionary, aspect of praxis, however, it is necessary to understand the subjugation 
of praxis in fetishistic societies, that is to say, alienation. 
 
Second order meditation, or praxis aliénée, is a historically specific form of first order 
mediation that occurs only in human groups where hierarchical social relations have 
developed. In these societies, the domination of one part of humanity over another 
takes hold of the human ability to consciously shape itself and the world through 
practice. Or, in more Hegelian terms, power and the class that holds it hijack concrete 
mediation, the ability of the subject to objectify itself in nature.197 In Chapter 11 of 
Traité, significantly entitled ‘Abstraction médiatisée et médiation abstraite’, 
                                                                                                                                      
d'en détourner l'énergie qui s'y est investie, de sortir la vérité du mensonge’, Traité, p. 179. Vaneigem 
also cites ‘le docteur Solié’ on the importance of authenticity: ‘Il n'y a pas de maladie en soi, de même 
qu'il n'y a pas de malade en soi, il n'y a qu'un être-dans-le-monde authentique ou inauthentique’, cited 
in ibid., p. 192. 
196 Further, the vécu can be both authentic or, in the context of second order mediation, discussed 
below, authentically inauthentic. This latter, seemingly paradoxical position, has two aspects: first, our 
concrete practice can be alienated, at odds with the demands that arise from our own lived experiences, 
and, secondly, as above, our lived experiences of alienated practice reveal the inhuman nature of 
alienation more accurately than the abstract thought of philosophy. 
197 ‘Le pouvoir s’intercale parasitairement comme une médiation indispensable entre les hommes et la 
nature’, ‘Banalités (II)’, p. 45. 
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Vaneigem describes how praxis, or first order mediation, becomes praxis aliénée, or 
second order mediation, as a result of hierarchical social relationships: 
 
‘La médiation,’ dit Hegel, ‘est l’égalité avec soi-même-se-mouvant’. Mais se 
mouvoir peut être aussi se perdre. Et lorsqu’il ajoute: ‘C’est le moment du 
meurs et du deviens’, il n’y a pas un mot à changer pour que le sens diffère 
radicalement selon la perspective où l’on se place, celle du pouvoir ou celle de 
l’homme total. 
 La médiation échappe-t-elle à mon contrôle, c’est aussitôt vers 
l’étrange que m’entraîne une démarche que je crois mienne. Engels montrait 
judicieusement qu’une pierre, un fragment de la nature étrangère à l’homme, 
devenait humaine sitôt qu’elle prolongeait la main en servant d’outil (et la 
pierre humanise à son tour la main de l’hominien.) Mais approprié par un 
maître, un patron, une commission de planning, une organisation dirigeante, 
l’outil change de sens, il dévie vers d’autres prolongements les gestes de celui 
qui en use. Ce qui est vrai pour l’outil vaut pour toutes les médiations.198 
 
There is a literary quality to these phrases that conveys the sense of a dialectic 
dynamic between subject and object that is in danger of escaping humanity’s 
conscious control. It is based on a series of dualisms: death and becoming, control and 
loss, the human and the inhuman. Even at the most basic level of human interaction 
with the natural world, Vaneigem suggests, there is a process that risks taking human 
beings away from what makes them what they are. The stone is an alien fragment that 
becomes human through creative appropriation. Yet this appropriation of nature can 
also become the appropriation of mankind by something external in a society that is 
itself fragmented. The Hegelian turn here is important as it brings Vaneigem close to 
the more radical aspects of Marx: the critique of fetishism. We can interpret this as 
meaning that power, for Vaneigem, is what happens when mediations, the various 
ways in which human beings objectify themselves in nature, escape our control.199  
The question of autonomy and hierarchy is therefore a crucial one to the 
theory of praxis in Vaneigem and his interpretation of the work of Marx. In the 
                                                
198 Traité, p. 123. 
199 ‘Le pouvoir est la somme des médiations aliénées et aliénantes’, ibid., p. 123. 
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context of second order mediation, the concrete mediation that unites and 
distinguishes Man and Nature, subjectivity and objectivity, has its immediate 
subjective reality abstracted, literally ‘drawn out’.200 There is an inversion of the 
normal process of praxis where the subject, Man, rather than consciously forming the 
world, becomes the cypher of an objective process beyond its control. Vaneigem calls 
this ‘la réalisation objective dans la subjectivité […] qui est celle du pouvoir’.201 The 
mediation of human praxis instead of serving concrete human needs and desires obeys 
a totally alien and separate logic. In such circumstances mankind effectively produces 
an abstract determining presence with its own laws that is nonetheless created by 
human activity. It is for this reason that Vaneigem refers to ‘médiation abstraite’ or 
abstract mediation and ‘abstraction médiatisée’ or mediated abstraction. What is 
abstracted is precisely the qualitative needs, desires and rich consciousness—the 
totality in short—of each individual subject: ‘La façon de voir, imposée par le 
pouvoir, ‘abstrait’ les médiations de leur fonction initiale, qui est de prolonger dans le 
réel les exigences du vécu’.202 
 (Concrete-) abstract mediation, or second order mediation, is therefore a 
process where objectification produces an objectivity where the subject is essentially 
alien to itself.203 That is to say, in second order mediation, the subject actually 
produces an objectivity that is the product of its own praxis but is also alien to it.204 
People who live in hierarchical social relationships are forced to create material 
changes to Nature that they have neither decided on themselves nor over which they 
                                                
200 ‘ab-trahere, tirer hors de’, ibid., p. 123. 
201 ‘Banalités (II)’, p. 45. 
202 Traité, p. 121. 
203 Vaneigem does not use the term ‘concrete-abstraction’ but it is implicit, see below, and, in the form 
of an absolute, is presented as the future of hierarchical social relationships: ‘L’autorité, à son stade 
ultime, va culminer dans l’union de l’abstrait et du concret. Le pouvoir abstrait déjà comme on 
guillotine encore. La face du monde éclairé par lui s’ordonne selon une métaphysique du réel’, ibid., p. 
127. 
204 ‘Le monde se transforme dans le sens où il existe un travail forcé; et c'est pourquoi il se transforme 
si mal’, ibid., p. 70. 
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have eventual control. 205  The worker not only produces a world she has not 
consciously chosen and over which she has no real hold, she also produces herself as 
a ‘worker’, a concrete-abstract social form, and not therefore as a human being in the 
essential sense of a person who practices praxis according to concrete individual and 
collective human needs and desires. The very objectivity created by the subject—
even, by extension, its own subjectivity—is alien to it. In hierarchical social 
relationships objectification therefore becomes ‘alienation’. 
 However, alienation does not only apply to the more dramatic forms of human 
creation such as the manufacture of physical objects. Human thought and imagination 
are as much a product of first order mediation, or praxis, as any other aspect of the 
world produced by humanity. In free praxis, or liberated first order mediation, human 
thought is purely practical in the sense that thinking, emotions, the full complexity of 
the human consciousness in short, is inherent to the human transformation of Nature 
and objectivity to meet the desires of the subject. But in second order mediation, 
Vaneigem argues, thought appears to stand over and above real activity and lived 
experience, and, in a limited sense, actually does so in the form of specialists of this 
abstract thought such as aristocrats, philosophers, union bosses, ideologues, 
capitalists, theologians etc. that manage human practices. As such alienated thought, 
‘la pensée séparée’ or ‘abstraction médiatisée’, as it is variously termed by Vaneigem, 
attempts to impose itself as both a limitation on what practices are possible and, as a 
result, what forms of objectivity are possible. Hence ‘la pensée séparée’ has the social 
                                                
205 ‘Les instruments de la praxis n’appartiennent pas en propre aux tenants de la praxis, aux 
travailleurs, et c’est évidemment pourquoi la zone d’opacité qui sépare l’homme de lui-même et de la 
nature fait partie de l’homme et de la nature. Il n’y a pas une nature à retrouver mais à refaire, à 
reconstruire’, ibid., p. 110. 
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function of justifying hierarchical social relations as ‘objective’, eternal and fixed, 
while at the same time, it is quite blind to the fact that this is all it is doing.206 
 For Vaneigem, this separated thought, with its purely abstract methodology, is 
therefore the product of hierarchical social relationships and it is a totalising process 
that seeks to maintain these social separations at all costs. Indeed, in Traité Vaneigem 
argues that capitalist social praxis is itself in some sense shaped by the forms of 
metaphysics, literally ‘beyond the physical’, which, for him, is the embodiment of 
alienated thought or ‘la pensée séparée’.207 An important part of this alienated 
thinking, for Vaneigem, is the erroneous separations and dualisms established by 
bourgeois society: ‘Et aujourd’hui encore, personne ne peut sous-estimer la 
dichotomie aberrante entre pensée et action, théorie et pratique, réel et imaginaire … 
Ces idées-là sont des forces d’organisation’.208 Vaneigem thereby wishes to bring our 
attention to the fact that a lot of the separations we take for granted are in fact 
historical impositions of a hierarchical society. Moreover, Vaneigem says, these 
myths are deeply dangerous ones: ‘Le monde du mensonge est un monde réel, on y 
tue et on y est tué, il est préférable de ne pas l’oublier’.209 Vaneigem therefore 
concludes that far from being no longer a major force in the world, abstract thought 
has in fact been realised within the very fabric of capitalist society: 
 
On a beau ironiser sur le pourrissement de la philosophie, les philosophes 
contemporains se retirent avec un sourire entendu derrière leur médiocrité de 
pensée: ils savent au moins que le monde reste une construction 
philosophique, un grand débarras idéologique. Nous survivons dans un 
paysage métaphysique.210 
                                                
206 The importance of the utopian socialist tradition of the likes of Fourier to the SI and, arguably Marx, 
is precisely that it breaks through the limitations of what is thought possible set by this reified thinking. 
207 ‘On s’étonne beaucoup trop peu à mon sens de voir le monde emprunter, à certaines époques, les 
formes de la métaphysique dominante. La croyance au diable et à Dieu, si farfelue soit-elle, fait de l’un 
et l’autre fantômes une réalité vivante sitôt qu’une collectivité les juge assez présents pour inspirer des 
textes de lois’, Traité, p. 122. 
208 Ibid. 
209 Ibid. 
210 Ibid. 
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The almost world-weary language here conveys a sense of frustration with a 
contemporary discourse that obscures the role of abstraction in the process of 
capitalist reproduction. Philosophy in some sense, for Vaneigem, turns the world into 
a ‘débarras idéologique’ or ideological storeroom. It is not only that philosophy 
obscures reality here, its categories actually shape it in very concrete ways. The 
separation of human powers, between imagining concrete desires and realising them 
in practice, is one that exists at every level of reality. In this sense philosophy, itself a 
social separation, is realised in all of the false oppositions of capitalist society.  To 
some extent Vaneigem is saying, much as Marx in his critique of commodity 
fetishism, that metaphysics is made material in the very process of contemporary 
social relationships. As Vaneigem concludes this passage: ‘La médiation abstraite et 
aliénante qui m’éloigne de moi même est terriblement concrète’.211 
The lack of autonomy that is at the heart of abstract mediation is, Vaneigem 
argues here, reproduced, or seeks to be, in both the actions and thoughts of the 
alienated subject. In more concrete terms, the factory owner dictates what the subject 
must manufacture or the king how his ‘subjects’ must serve him. Theologians, 
academics and philosophers dictate what the subject must think (and she must think 
that the way things are is the way things must always be, even if this means denying 
her own feelings of alienation that could change them). The very real existence of 
specialists of thought only serves to highlight the point that on a social level thought 
is an abstract mediation. The metaphysical idea that imagination is separate from 
reality, thought from action, theory from practice, is simply a reflection and 
justification of a society in which social relationships have made this the case. 
                                                
211 Ibid. 
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 Metaphysics is, for Vaneigem, therefore practical in the most abstract and 
blind way possible. It regards itself as eternal and above human activity, but is itself a 
product of alienated activity and the hierarchical social relations that it seeks to 
impose on humanity for all time. It is for this reason that alienating mediation is at 
one and the same time abstract and yet also so ‘terriblement concrète’.212 It prevents 
human beings from understanding their own relationships and actions in the clear 
light of day.  
 However, praxis is not an abstraction but a real concrete activity. Vaneigem 
realises that alienation can never be all-embracing because it is still a form of concrete 
mediation performed by real, imaginative and consciously creative people: ‘la 
médiation ne perd jamais tout à fait contact avec le vécu, elle résiste à l’attraction du 
champ autoritaire’. 213  The closure between alienated objectivity and alienated 
subjectivity is only ever a provisional one, in constant threat of collapsing due to the 
consciousness and feelings of alienation it cannot help but produce in each subject. It 
is this fact that makes revolutionary subjectivity an ever-present possibility. 
 Vaneigem explicitly associates the mystifying and conditioning role of 
abstract theoretical and practical mediations in praxis aliénée with the theory of 
fetishism in Marx: ‘Il n’y a pas de communication authentique dans un monde où les 
fétiches gouvernent la plupart des comportements. Entre les êtres et les choses, 
l’espace est contrôlé par les médiations aliénantes’. 214  In the work of Raoul 
Vaneigem, hierarchical societies are fetishistic societies in the sense that in them the 
products of human praxis take on the appearance of agency, a human quality. As 
above, social relationships, produced by human beings through alienated mediation 
appear as fixed objects beyond their control. Because these abstractions are not seen 
                                                
212 Ibid. 
213 Ibid. 
214 Ibid., p. 322. 
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as the product of human activity, the agency and ‘objectivity’ that human social 
relationships give them is seen to belong to that abstraction itself.  
 This process, termed ‘reification’ by Lukàcs, is the logical origin of the 
abstract categories of hierarchical societies such as God, money, the market, work, art 
etc. that shape social praxis as incontestable objects but that are simply the alienation 
of the imaginative and consciously creative dimension of human practice.215 As such 
the credence given to these abstractions channels human praxis and gives them the 
appearance of agency. In the Middle Ages, for example, plague and war might be 
interpreted as a punishment from God rather than as the product of human actions that 
could have been avoided. In contemporary society, there may be more than enough 
food and housing to end poverty but these resources cannot be allocated directly 
because of the lack of money. God and money, the prize commodity, are the fetishism 
in these examples; abstractions that limit and obscure human praxis despite 
themselves being the product of praxis. Second order mediation, or praxis aliénée, is 
therefore the ontological basis for fetishistic societies; or, to express this differently, 
where fetishism dominates social life, alienated praxis is the cause. 
 In the work of Raoul Vaneigem these various aspects of second order 
mediation—alienation, reification, metaphysics and fetishism—have serious 
implications for ‘le vécu’ or lived experience. They both attempt to define and replace 
the reality of actual human life as it is experienced and constantly created: 
 
                                                
215 Arguably one of the most important critiques that can be aimed at both Vaneigem and Debord is 
that the importance of ‘value’, that many Marxian scholars (Postone, Kurz, Jappe et al.) now see as 
central to the work of Marx, was not one of the abstractions they critiqued. Interestingly, Asger Jorn 
did discuss value in Critique de la politique économique, suivie de La Lutte finale (Paris, 1960) but his 
understanding of the subject was limited and was written long before the theory of praxis became 
central to the group. It should be added, however, that while the SI may have not developed a critique 
of value, Vaneigem’s understanding of praxis by no means excludes one and was perhaps, indirectly, 
an influence on the origins of the contemporary critique of the value form. 
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L’autorité, à son stade ultime, va culminer dans l’union de l’abstrait et du 
concret. Le pouvoir abstrait déjà comme on guillotine encore. La face du 
monde éclairée par lui s’ordonne selon une métaphysique du réel; et c’est pain 
bénit que de voir les fidèles philosophes rempiler à son service avec un grade 
de technocrate, de sociologue, de spécialiste à tout crin. 
 La forme pure qui hante l’espace social est le visage discernable de la 
mort des hommes. Elle est la névrose avant la nécrose, le mal de survie qui 
s’étend à mesure qu’au vécu se substituent des images, des formes, des objets, 
que la médiation aliénée transmute le vécu en chose, le madréporise.216 
 
The use of religious language in this extract once again provides the sense that for 
Vaneigem capitalist social life is in some way a concretisation of religion in the very 
fabric of reality. Here authority is identified with God and philosophers, along with 
other specialists of thought who are presented as its faithful theologians. This is, 
moreover, a religion founded upon death. Again we see this idea that abstraction is a 
lethal act. In a world defined by alienation at all levels the best way to express the 
essence of this society, for Vaneigem, is simply death. One might say that where for 
Debord the key relationship is one of spectacle, for Vaneigem, it is even more 
essentially one of systematic mortification presided over by zealous priests. Indeed, 
Vaneigem employs the curious term ‘madréporise’, a neologism of the Symbolist poet 
Jules Lafargue,217 which comes from the noun madrépore, a type of rocky coral. The 
idea is that humanity is in a certain sense being turned to living stone. The literary 
turn is clearly designed to convey the feeling of a humanity that is being transformed 
into something alien to its essence. 
In fetishistic societies, the reality of lived experience or the ‘vécu’ is 
alienation. The subject, if it grasps its own alienation and, with it, an ability to 
imagine and create an alternative ‘vécu’ or ‘mode d’emploi de la vie’, is capable of 
                                                
216 Traité, p. 127-128. 
217 ‘Ma vie est toujours affreusement la même. J'entre dans une période d'apathie, c'est pourquoi je me 
suis payé un néologisme: je 'madréporise’’, Jules Lafargue, letter to Théophile Ysaye, June 1885, in 
Œuvres complètes, tome II (Lausanne: Editions l’Age d’Homme, 1995), p. 766. No doubt Vaneigem 
was attracted by the term for its conveyence of a certain kind of boredom. 
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abolishing fetishistic social relations. For second order mediation to work then, even 
provisionally, it must fill social life and, by extension, social consciousness with 
abstract mediations that seek to channel all of human consciousness and, therefore, 
the forms human practice takes, with a total absence of any authentic concrete 
mediation that would overcome it. The ‘vécu’ or lived experience of alienation is 
simply denied (e.g. claims that the proletariat no longer exists or that work is 
edifying). Or, far more subtly, what critical consciousness that arises from alienation 
exists is condemned to incoherence due to the abstractions that fragment any total 
critique of contemporary social relations. 
 The artistic avant-garde continued to think in terms of ‘art’ and ‘aesthetics’, 
not seeing these as a product of contemporary social relations that needed to be 
abolished in order to realise the very free creativity they desired. The left, likewise, 
never challenged ‘work’, ‘money’, ‘politics’, ‘the commodity’ etc. and so was 
condemned to simply reproduce the very capitalist social relations that created the 
alienation which gave the movement its original impetus and strength. This reification 
of the ‘vécu’, of the real lived experience of alienation and of the imaginative 
possibility of another way of life, therefore defines what Vaneigem means by the 
inauthentic, be it an idea, a movement or a way of life. 
 It is also the context in which the Situationist notion of an inauthentic desire 
should be understood.218 The SI do not argue that the subject does not in a sense 
actually desire the happiness associated with buying a commodity. Rather, the fact 
that the realisation of that desire takes the form of a commodity, an abstract social 
form specific to capitalism, is a reification of that desire precisely because it takes the 
                                                
218 ‘L’architecture existe réellement, comme le coca-cola: c’est une production enrobée d’idéologie 
mais réelle, satisfaisant faussement un besoin faussé’, Raoul Vaneigem and Attila Kotányi, 
‘Programme élémentaire du bureau d’urbanisme unitaire’ in Internationale situationniste, 6 (August 
1961), p. 16. 
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form of an abstraction. As such, the desire for a prized commodity is an alienation of 
the desire for free objectification of desires within liberated praxis, which can take 
any form.219 In capitalism, desires must always be realised as an alienation; that is to 
say, as a specific abstract social form, the commodity (hence money is the highest 
form of commodity fetishism because it purchases all other commodities). Likewise, 
in feudal society, where God is the dominant reified social form, inauthentic desires 
might be those mediated by the Church, a desire for heavenly favour that brings 
absolution, safety and a paradise after death. 
 Inauthentic desires are therefore inauthentic because if realised within 
fetishistic social relations they are simply alienations of the demands of the subject 
that arise from the ‘vécu’. The purchase of a widescreen TV will never abolish the 
subject’s lived unhappiness because the social production of commodities—again, a 
social form specific, or rather central, to the totality of the historical social relations 
termed capitalism—is the very cause of that unhappiness in the first place. It is 
therefore possible, within the strict context of reification, to talk meaningfully about 
authentic and inauthentic desires. An authentic desire would be one realised directly 
by the subject rather than one mediated by (concrete-) abstract social categories such 
as the commodity and God (depending on the historical social relations discussed); 
the social forms would be transparent, that is to say, directly under the conscious 
control of free agents. 
 
The two orders of mediation explained above, praxis and praxis aliénée, are the 
context in which the theory and practice of class struggle should be understood in the 
work of Raoul Vaneigem. For Raoul Vaneigem—and arguably for Marx—the class 
                                                
219 ‘On remplace la nécessité de boire par celle de boire coca-cola’, Raoul Vaneigem, ‘Commentaires 
contre l’urbanisme’ in Internationale situationniste, 6 (August 1961), p. 34. 
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struggle is a struggle by alienated subjectivities to abolish second order mediation 
and, in so doing, liberate first order mediation. The working class, as the most 
dispossessed creatively in thought and practice—that is to say, the most alienated 
emotionally, consciously, imaginatively, ‘materially’—,220 embody the potential of a 
privileged locus around which a consciousness capable of grasping the inhumanity of 
praxis aliénée, of second order mediation, can be formed. That is to say, the 
emergence of revolutionary consciousness is neither inevitable nor limited to the 
working class. 
  It should also be stressed that the potential revolutionary consciousness of the 
working class is only revolutionary according to the extent to which it considers itself 
in purely negative terms when faced with the possibilities of free consciously creative 
practice. In contrast, any positive valorisation of the existence of the working class as 
such simply reinforces their existence as alienated subjects and aids the reproduction 
of capital. The working class, for Vaneigem, must therefore abolish itself if it is to be 
revolutionary in any meaningful sense. If this collective consciousness emerges as a 
social force in history, it will be the negation of a life reduced to the reproduction of 
fetishistic social forms and it will embody the positive desire for an existence beyond 
this. As such the revolutionary working class, as well as those subjectivities of other 
classes that have experienced enough alienation to associate their own cause with that 
of the workers, is the bearer of both a negative project that is itself a positive, the 
abolition of fetishistic/hierarchical social relations, and a positive project, the 
establishment of a society based on free human praxis, that is to say, first order 
mediation. 
                                                
220 Obviously consciousness, imaginations, emotions etc. are just as material as the products of human 
labour. Here I mean that workers are the poorest, in the sense of not having enough to eat or a roof over 
their head. 
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 Interpretations of Vaneigem that situate him in a traditional Leftist paradigm 
where class struggle is a battle within capitalist social relations and not against and 
beyond those social relations—including the very (concrete-) abstractions through 
which they function (work, money, the commodity, value, the state, art, politics 
etc.)—are simply wrong. Class struggle, for Vaneigem, is a very real battle between 
humanity and inhumanity, creativity and labour, happiness and unhappiness, desire 
and false desire, reality and metaphysics, concrete and abstract, life and death, praxis 
and praxis aliénée. It is a struggle fought by real people, individually and collectively, 
in real historical circumstances at every moment of every day. 
 It is this final point where the notion of ‘la vie quotidienne’ or everyday life 
becomes important to Raoul Vaneigem. As stated above, praxis, for Vaneigem, is a 
social and individual totality that defines human existence. As such any and every 
aspect of life, the entirety of the reality created through humanity’s consciously 
creative activity, is at issue. The problem of alienation, of abstract mediation, is not 
one that faces people only in the workplace or in consumption but rather encompasses 
all experience, all reality. Everyday life, the concrete experiences of people as they go 
through their quotidian activities—taking the metro, shopping, conversation, work, 
watching television, family life etc.—is as much defined by social praxis, and, in 
fetishistic society, therefore alienation, as any other part of the totality. Second order 
mediation, for Vaneigem, invades our lives in all manner of roles, practices, thoughts 
and emotions that people undergo everyday. The abolition of second order mediation, 
the negative project, and the realisation of first order mediation, the positive, therefore 
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offers the real possibility of a total transformation of human reality and reveals our 
present one as inhuman.221 
 Significantly, the realisation of first order mediation, this positive project, is 
exactly what has so often been vilified by critics of Raoul Vaneigem as ‘idealist’, 
‘Romantic’ and ‘utopian’. From his perspective on Marx, however, the real possibility 
of such a fundamental metamorphosis of human experience is based on and inspired 
by the very basis of Marxian critique. 
 
Radical Subjectivity and Revolutionary Praxis 
 
The theory of praxis that has been presented above explains the causes of fetishistic 
social relations and makes it clear that completely different ones are possible. With 
this established we now to turn to a slightly different question. What constitutes 
revolutionary praxis for Raoul Vaneigem? If capitalist society embodies an alienation 
of the human essence and a society beyond this offers the possibility of its realisation, 
there must be some theory as to how humanity will bridge the gap. This relates very 
closely to what the point of an organisation like the Situationist International or of 
simply writing a work of critical theory actually is. Commensurately, this also leads 
one to the question of exactly where other revolutionary movements and groups have 
gone wrong. The relationship between theory and practice is therefore key to the 
problem of human emancipation.  
In Traité Vaneigem seeks to resolve these issues by turning once again to the 
work of Karl Marx. He specifically cites one of the most famous passages from 
Marx’s Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right (1844) that defines the meaning of 
                                                
221 ‘Ceux qui parlent de révolution et de lutte de classes sans se référer explicitement à la vie 
quotidienne, sans comprendre ce qu’il y a de subversif dans l’amour et de positif dans le refus des 
contraintes, ceux-là ont dans la bouche un cadavre’, Traité, p. 32. 
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‘radical theory’ and why it can be an effective material force.222 Vaneigem offers his 
own interpretation of these lines in Traité, which describes both the counter-
revolutionary nature of traditional Marxist theory and what, in contrast, makes 
revolutionary theory genuinely radical. The subject, Vaneigem states, is part of 
reality, it is, moreover, in a constant state of conscious creation and experience of the 
world. As such, the thoughts, feelings and ideas that arise in the subject are those that 
develop as part of the ‘vécu’. Because this lived experience of everyday life is itself 
the product of social relations created by subjectivity, human beings have immediate 
(in the sense of concrete) access to those social relations. In other words, ‘alienation’ 
and hierarchy are lived experiences by people in fetishistic societies. The theory of 
alienation, or any radical theory, is for this reason a theoretical discovery, or 
reasoning out, of a reality directly grasped in the unhappiness, isolation and suffering 
of the masses: ‘la théorie radicale pénètre les masses parce qu’elle en est d’abord 
l’émanation’.223 Radical theory is therefore something that arises out of spontaneous 
critiques of capitalism based in the everyday experiences of the masses.224 Equally, 
however, it is the role of radical theory to ensure that the practical power of the 
masses can be fully realised: ‘elle a pour mission d’en assurrer la force de frappe’.225 
Radical theory, for Vaneigem, thus emerges from individual experience and reaches 
others through a shared human desire for self-realisation.226 For Vaneigem, Marx is 
referring explicitly to the theory of praxis: the ‘racine de l’homme’ is subjectivity in 
mediation with the world. 
                                                
222 ‘La théorie devient force matérielle lorsqu’elle pénètre les masses. La théorie est capable de 
pénétrer les masses dès qu’elle fait des démonstrations ad hominem et elle fait des démonstrations ad 
hominem dès qu’elle devient radicale. Etre radical, c’est prendre les choses par la racine. Et la racine de 
l’homme, c’est l’homme lui-même’, Karl Marx cited in Traité, p. 129. 
223 Ibid. 
224 Vaneigem describes it as ‘dépositaire d’une créativité spontantée’, ibid. 
225 Ibid. 
226 ‘La théorie radicale émane de l’individu, de l’être en tant que sujet; elle pénètre les masses par ce 
qu’il y a de plus créatif dans chacun, par la subjectivité, par la volonté de réalisation’, ibid., p. 130. 
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 The role of theory is not, therefore, to sit outside everyday experiences but to 
grasp them and to give them back to the subject with more coherence. It cannot sit 
over and above the subject seeking to overcome alienation. It cannot direct its action. 
Rather, it must come from the alienated subject. That is to say, alienation cannot be 
overcome by alienated thought, by party leaders, bureaucrats, union bosses or 
academics directing human actions. Authentically radical theory, one form of the 
consciously creative dimension of human practice, is capable of becoming a ‘force 
matérielle’ because it is the product of the real, practical lived experiences and desires 
of alienated subjects in their daily lives. Radical theory is concrete thought that seeks 
its own conscious realisation in practice. It stands and falls on how accurately it 
addresses the concerns of the masses and is useful to them in a battle against 
alienation they wage autonomously. 
 Vaneigem contrasts this with the abstract thought of ‘la pensée séparée’, the 
ideas created by leaders within a hierarchical structure, which, he argues, turns theory, 
the product of lived alienation, into a force arrayed against the alienated. Religion, art, 
philosophy, traditional Marxist theory and representative democracy—all the different 
forms alienated thought takes—are, for Vaneigem, like the tool, referred to above, 
which has been turned against its user. These are thoughts by men that make an 
argument against mankind: ‘un argument ad hominem contre l’homme lui-même’.227 
The power of ideology to provisionally grip the masses is based on the fact that it too 
draws on the very lived alienation that it creates, offering an illusory explanation that 
reinforces the reproduction of its own social origins. Radical theory, however, is able 
to grasp the true nature of ideology as the latter reveals its fetishistic character 
through the alienation it inevitably causes in the subject. In turn, radical theory offers 
                                                
227 Ibid. 
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the alienated subject the possibility of an emancipation of human creativity: ‘Elle est 
la technique révolutionnaire au service de la poésie’.228 
 Although for the most part he treats theory as a separate category, Vaneigem 
does not, of course, see it as the only source of consciously creative practice. For 
Vaneigem, liberating praxis extends to any number of concrete mediations and, in 
particular, to language itself. Indeed, at one point in Traité Vaneigem explicitly 
conflates revolutionary theory with radical poetry: 
 
cependant, les hommes se servent aussi des mots et de signes pour tenter de 
parfaire leurs gestes interrompus. Et parce qu’ils le font, il existe un langage 
poétique; un langage du vécu qui, pour moi, se confond avec la théorie 
radicale, avec la théorie pénétrant les masses, devenant force matérielle.229 
 
 
Vaneigem is saying here that radical poetry is the product of incomplete gestures of 
dis-alienation that have been extended into language. Unable to act in a way that 
instantly transforms the totality, the poet or theorist perfects the conscious aspect of 
revolutionary practice through writing. It is through language, centrally, that effective, 
liberating praxis is made possible and the need for such practice is revealed on a 
historical level: ‘Dans le langage d’une époque, on peut suivre à la trace la révolution 
totale, inaccomplie et toujours imminente’.230 Vaneigem argues that it is not only 
theory that is necessary to bring about effective, unified revolutionary praxis but all 
spaces in which human imagination and experience can be communicated. Radical 
poetry, as the textual realm that seeks to express emotion and desire—perhaps even 
the incommunicable—as well as ideas, merges with theory because it too is ultimately 
the product of concrete, lived experiences. Both theory and poetry, in this sense, 
therefore play a part in the development of effective human action of dis-alienation, 
                                                
228 Ibid., p. 129. 
229 Ibid., p. 131. 
230 ‘Banalités (II)’, p. 278. 
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breaking through abstract thought: ‘Quand un poème de Mallarmé apparaîtra comme 
seule explication d’un acte de révolte, alors il sera permis de parler sans ambiguïté de 
poésie et révolution’.231 
 For Vaneigem it is important that revolutionary poetry and theory not be 
confused with the reifications with which they are associated: poets and theorists. The 
SI is not a Leninist vanguard that seeks to direct the masses. On the contrary 
Situationist praxis is an offering to the alienated. Its writing acts as a critical kernel 
through which the everyday experiences of people, otherwise fragmented by the 
divisions of alienating mediation, are returned in a more unified, theoretical form. 
Revolutionary theory and poetry is only revolutionary by virtue of its accurately 
reflecting the spontaneous, directly lived, experience of the mass of people and, most 
importantly, only if the masses spontaneously find it useful to their own realisation. 
That is, if they control theory and poetry themselves: ‘Partout se vérifie la loi ‘il n’est 
pas une arme de ta volonté individuelle qui, maniée par d’autres, ne se retourne 
aussitôt contre toi’’.232 Again, we see in the heart of the theory of Vaneigem the 
repetition of this notion that mediation can escape the control of human beings. It is 
this essential problem that Vaneigem seeks to combat in his definition of 
revolutionary praxis. Key to this is his insistence that individuals themselves should 
constantly make the concrete reality of their everyday lives the ultimate test of radical 
theory.233 
These points should serve to underline the fact that Vaneigem is not interested 
in the creation of a speculative philosophical critique of capitalist society but in 
                                                
231 Ibid. 
232 Ibid., p. 29. 
233 ‘Si quelqu’un dit ou écrit qu’il convient désormais de fonder la raison pratique sur les droits de 
l’individu et de l’individu seulement, il se condamne dans son propos s’il n’incite aussitôt son 
interlocuteur à fonder par lui-même la preuve de ce qu’il vient d’avancer. Or une telle preuve ne peut 
être que vécue, saisie, par l’intérieur. C’est pourquoi il n’est rien dans les notes qui suivent qui ne doive 
être éprouvé et corrigé par l’expérience immédiate de chacun’, ibid., p. 29. 
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providing a coherent understanding that will form the basis of practice to overcome it 
as a totality. As such, it has to be rooted within the real lived experiences of its writer 
and its readers. Vaneigem is very explicit here that readers should not just swallow his 
arguments whole but judge them according to their own actual immediate experience. 
In a sense this one passage contains the totality of his argument. Revolutionary praxis 
can only emerge out of the ‘vécu’ of the individual within the social totality and must 
change and respond accordingly. Any ‘revolutionary’ or ‘progressive’ theory or 
practice that is not based in this individual desire for self-realisation of the needs that 
arise from lived experience is an argument against the autonomy of the subject, 
against praxis, against creativity, against humanity. 
 Vaneigem is above all concerned in these passages to distinguish his own 
theories from ideology. Ideologies are reifications of human praxis that are used to 
justify inhumanity; that is, hierarchical social constraints on human praxis. This 
applies to work and art, as discussed above, but even more importantly, in this case, to 
false ideas of human liberation: ‘Le triple écrasement de la Commune, du Mouvement 
spartakiste et de Cronstadt-la-Rouge (1921) a montré une fois pour toutes les autres à 
quel bain de sang menaient trois idéologies de la liberté: le libéralisme, le socialisme, 
le bolchevisme’.234 If revolutionary theory is just an abstraction, and not a practical 
tool used by people to liberate themselves, it can always be used as a justification for 
any kind of inhumanity. 
 However, the issue of individual and collective realisation raises the problem 
of how any theory of human liberation can avoid falling into the same authoritarian 
role in human history when it pretends to embody the interests of ‘humanity’ as a 
                                                
234Ibid., p. 29. 
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whole.235 It is this problematic that takes Raoul Vaneigem towards his concept of ‘la 
subjectivité radicale’ that, while extremely well-known, is rarely, if ever, understood. 
Indeed, the theory of radical subjectivity is actually a very specific idea in the work of 
Raoul Vaneigem. Now that we have established his definition of the theory of praxis 
it is easier to grasp the exact meaning of this term.  
Vaneigem defines the radical subject very straightforwardly as ‘la conscience 
que tous les hommes obéissent à une même volonté de réalisation authentique, et que 
leur subjectivité se renforce de cette volonté subjective perçue chez les autres’.236 He 
goes on to restate the theory later on in the text: ‘toutes les subjectivités diffèrent entre 
elles et présentent cependant une identité dans leur volonté de réalisation intégrale’.237 
There are several ways we must think about this definition in the light of what has 
previously been discussed. With the term ‘réalisation authentique’ we can see that 
Vaneigem is repeating his assertion that the human essence is praxis or first order 
mediation. The nature of praxis, in its essential form, is such that it requires the 
freedom to consciously create ourselves and the world around us according to our 
individual concrete needs and desires. This means that although all of us are different 
we still require the same fundamental freedom to realise ourselves. It is crucial, for 
Vaneigem, that as social animals this freedom is necessarily dependent on a collective 
will to individual realisation.238 As such, with his notion of radical subjectivity, 
Vaneigem is arguing that there is a fundamental point of solidarity or interest at the 
root of mankind that stands in opposition to any system that prevents human beings, 
individually and collectively, from realising their concrete needs and desires. In more 
Hegelian terms, our subjectivity can only freely objectify itself with the help of other 
                                                
235 These debates actually go back as far as Max Stirner and it is no accident that Vaneigem is an avid 
reader of both Stirner and Marx. 
236 Traité, p. 253. 
237 Ibid., p. 316. 
238 ‘On ne se sauve pas seul, on ne se réalise pas isolément’, ibid., p. 317. 
	   	  93 
subjects freely objectifying themselves. The radical subject is therefore a state of 
knowledge or consciousness that recognises the commonality of our drive to 
individual self-realisation and that understands that the combined will to realise this 
drive is the requirement of collective emancipation. 
 Vaneigem is very clear that all human beings have this urge to realise their 
essence of conscious creation, of praxis, whether they are conscious of it or not.239 A 
subject is only radical, for Vaneigem, to the extent that it consciously grasps this fact. 
That is to say, in order to be radical the subject must become conscious of what it is 
essentially. Commensurately, the opposite is true, the counter-revolutionary or 
fetishistic subject is not radical to the extent that it is unconscious of its own essential 
character. Vaneigem expresses this duality neatly by pointing out that just as power is 
essentially the same though it takes many different forms, so too, conversely, are 
subjects.240 The question remains, however, as to how human beings can access this 
understanding. Vaneigem suggests that it is a case of making abstraction serve human 
beings rather making human beings serve abstraction.241 This means, once again, 
making lived experience, the vécu, the most concrete possible immediate reality, the 
source of knowledge. In this way, Vaneigem argues, human beings will discover that 
human creativity in its infinite concrete forms can be emancipated in thought and 
                                                
239 ‘Il existe une racine commune à toutes les subjectivités uniques et irréductibles: la volonté de se 
réaliser en transformant le monde, la volonté de vivre toutes les sensations, toutes les expériences, tous 
les possibles. A différents degrés de conscience et de résolution, elle est présente en chaque homme’, 
Ibid., p. 317. This is in fact a détournement of Stefan Zweig’s description of the démon in his 
biography of Kleist, Hölderlin and Nietzsche that Vaneigem tells us was a major influence on his early 
development, see Vaneigem, Le Chevalier, p. 211. Cf. ‘Le démon, c’est le ferment qui met nos âmes en 
effervescence, qui nous invite aux expériences dangereuses, à tous les excès, à toutes les extases’, 
Stefan Zweig, trans. Alzir Helle, Le Combat avec le démon [1929] (Paris : Le Livre de poche, 2009), p. 
9. That Vaneigem is thinking of Kleist here gives weight to the argument, given below, that his notion 
of volonté de vivre draws on aspects of German Romanticism. 
240 ‘Toutes les formes de pouvoir hiérarchisé diffèrent entres elles et présentent cependant une identité 
dans leurs fonctions oppressives. De même toutes les subjectivités diffèrent entre elles et présentent 
cependant une identité dans leur volonté de réalisation intégrale. C’est à ce titre qu’il convient de parler 
d’une véritable ‘subjectivité radicale’’, Traité, p. 317. 
241 ‘Les abstractions, les notions qui nous dirigent, il convient désormais de les ramener à leur source, à 
l’expérience vécue, non pour les justifier, mais pour les corriger au contraire, pour les inverser, les 
rendre au vécu dont elles sont issues et dont elles n’auraient jamais dû sortir!’, ibid., p. 253. 
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practice. What Vaneigem means practically is that we should take note of how we 
actually feel about our everyday lives and what this tells us about our true desires. 
Ultimately all of our thought and actions essentially come down to attempts to 
consciously realise some subjective desire or other that arises out of lived experience. 
These lived experiences and desires have an objectivity because they arise out of an 
alienating social praxis experienced by all, and, at the same time, they are therefore 
shared by other human beings. A prime example would be the desire to not work. Just 
as he seeks to do in Traité therefore Vaneigem is saying that it is our concrete 
subjective desires that will have to form the basis for a non-hierarchical society and 
emancipation from current domination.242 Vaneigem makes this explicit when he 
defines ‘la racine de l’homme’ as subjectivity in a détournement of the famous 
passage by Marx from the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right cited above.243 
The essential thrust of the theory of radical subjectivity is therefore that 
human emancipation must be based on this shared desire for mutual realisation. This 
realisation can only become fully conscious once human beings, individually and 
collectively, come to take note of their own subjectivity in all its concrete reality.244 
The material force of theory depends on the extent to which a united movement can 
be established on the basis of this shared desire and contain the many different 
individual expressions of it.245 Vaneigem is therefore a ‘radical subject’ by his own 
standards as he is conscious of this will to individual realisation within himself and, 
                                                
242 ‘C’est à cette condition que les hommes reconnaîtront sous peu que leur créativité individuelle ne se 
distingue pas de la créativité universelle. Il n’y a pas d’autorité en dehors de ma propre expérience 
vécue; c’est ce que chacun doit prouver à tous’, ibid., p. 253. 
243 ‘Seule une théorie radicale peut conférer à l’individu des droits imprescriptibles sur le milieu et les 
circonstances. La théorie radicale saisit les hommes à la racine et la racine des hommes, c’est leur 
subjectivité—cette zone irréductible qu’ils possèdent en commun’, ibid., p. 317. 
244 ‘Cette façon de partir de soi et de rayonner, moins vers les autres que vers ce que l’on découvre de 
soi en eux, donne à la spontanéité créatrice une importance stratégique semblable à celle d’une base de 
lancement’, Ibid., p. 253 . 
245 ‘Son efficacité tient évidemment à l’unité collective qu’elle atteindra sans perdre sa multiplicité’, 
ibid., p. 317. 
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by extension, in all mankind. The exact nature of this will or volonté towards 
realisation that Vaneigem says forms the basis of radical subjectivity is, however, in 
need of further exploration for it is perhaps the most central aspect of his development 
of the theory of praxis in his critical perspective. 
 
The Will as Subject 
 
Where radical subjectivity has been misunderstood, the Will, or la volonté, is a key 
concept in the work of Raoul Vaneigem that has received even less critical attention. 
As will become clear, la volonté can only be properly understood within the context 
of the theory of praxis developed above. In his later work Raoul Vaneigem moves 
away from Marxian language to develop or rather affirm a new terminology that is his 
own. La volonté, although originating in Traité, is one of the most crucial terms and 
the context of praxis is absolute. As the term praxis is largely absent from the later 
work, the examination of the Will in Traité also provides evidence for the ways in 
which praxis is subsumed into this new terminology while still underpinning it. 
 The Will, as Vaneigem uses the term, originates in the philosophy of Arthur 
Schopenhauer, as exemplified in his major philosophical work The World as Will and 
Representation (1818). In essence, Schopenhauer was reacting to the limits on 
metaphysical knowledge established by Kant. Our understanding of reality, Kant 
argued, is always limited by the categories that our rational mind imposes on sensory 
perception. Everything that we know is therefore purely a mental representation of an 
underlying reality that we can never access. 
 In opposition to Kant, Schopenhauer (significantly the first western 
philosopher to experiment with meditation) pointed out that humanity actually 
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possesses two forms of perception: a representation of reality mediated by the 
categories of mind and an immediate inner experience of the body. This inner 
experience is a posteriori knowledge because it has no notions; it just is. Through an 
examination of inner experience human beings can uncover the reality of the world: 
‘c’est en partant de nous-mêmes qu’il faut chercher à comprendre la Nature, et non 
pas inversement chercher la connaissance de nous-mêmes dans celle de la nature’.246 
It is this inner experience, the underlying reality of the world, that Schopenhauer calls 
Will.247 
 In examining the Will, Schopenhauer concludes that humanity is essentially 
striving and desiring from within. He calls the Will the Will to Live or Volonté de 
Vivre because reality is defined by the desire to grow and expand. He explicitly 
associates the Will to Live with sexuality and the general drive to reproduce. 
Moreover, the Will is more often than not subliminal. Individuals may rationalise 
their actions but are in actual fact moved by unconscious drives.248 An accurate 
knowledge or representation of reality would therefore reflect the Will or sensual 
experience that drives human beings.249 By implication humanity is therefore part of 
Nature but also distinct from it in being conscious of its Will. Schopenhauer, 
however, saw nothing good in his discovery of the Will to Live. Rather it filled him 
                                                
246 Arthur Schopenhauer, trans. A. Burdeau, Le monde comme volonté et représentation, tome 3 [1819] 
(Paris : Félix Alcan, 1909), p. 8. 
247 N.B. The similarities between this notion of the Will in Schopenhauer and the vécu or authentic in 
Vaneigem are immediately apparent. 
248 Schopenhauer is sometimes attributed as the originator of aspects of Darwinism and the Freudian 
subconscious. 
249 A singularly interesting détournement by Guy Debord suggests the direct influence of Schopenhauer 
on the SI. The title of the fourth chapter of La Société du Spectacle is ‘Le Prolétariat comme sujet et 
comme représentation’. The obvious implication is that Debord is developing a détournement of the 
argument of Schopenhauer in this chapter. The proletariat has historically been caught in the Kantian 
limitation placed on reality (i.e. trapped in the vulgar materialism of Marxism theoretically and 
institutionally). Only by uniting the Will (explicitly associated with subjectivity) with its own 
representation or idea of itself can it realise its historic role of abolishing capitalism. This use of 
Schopenhauer seems to originate in the work of Raoul Vaneigem and is not original to Debord. It 
suggests that Debord is drawing on his intellectual relationship with Vaneigem in the central chapter of 
his major work. 
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with a deep pessimism because humanity is condemned to desires that can never be 
finally fulfilled and is forced to strive pointlessly with no final goal. 
 Nietzsche turns the pessimism of Schopenhauer on its head. The Will for 
Nietzsche is to be celebrated and pursued as the very essence of life. In his first major 
work, The Birth of Tragedy (1872), Nietzsche associated the Will with the Greek 
worship of the god Dionysus and Representation with Apollo. As such Nietzsche sees 
the Will as a force of creation that in its most concrete form is close to intoxication 
and disorder. Representation, in contrast, gives shape to the Will in abstract form. The 
important shift, however, is to turn the Will into the source of passionate experience 
that forms the basis of human creative powers. Creativity emerges from the Will in 
the form of desires and passions that push Man to action. Although Nietzsche later 
moved away from many of the arguments put forward in The Birth of Tragedy the 
centrality of the Will is continued in his mature philosophy. 
 Nietzsche was concerned with the way in which certain societies encouraged 
or denied the essential creative powers or Will of humanity. His approach to 
Representation, our values, ideas and reasons, was based in a practical desire to 
realise the Will, our passions, desires and needs. Nineteenth-century bourgeois 
German society with its nationalism, Christianity and family values embodied a 
denial of the sensual consciousness and its realisation that Nietzsche called for. At the 
same time, the Will was a source of opposition to this society. The individual should 
strive to overcome social constraints placed on the Will and live according to those 
values the individual best felt realised it.250 Those who achieved this were the 
Masters, those who let their Will be constrained were the Slaves.  
                                                
250 It is no accident that Nietzsche was a major influence on the individualist anarchists of the early 
twentieth century. Today we tend to think of Nietzsche with reference to Nazism but for the 
Situationists it is primarily this earlier strands of Nietzschean influence on which they are drawing. 
Parry provides a summary of illegalist readings of Nietzsche and Stirner that, evidently drawing on 
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 The problem with the materialism of Nietzsche, for Vaneigem, was that he 
accepted hierarchy as trans-historical: ‘Nietzsche consacre la permanence du monde 
hiérarchisé, où la volonté de vivre se condamne à n'être jamais que volonté de 
puissance’.251 Instead of seeing the struggle of subjectivity or the Will in terms of 
antagonistic social relationships, and therefore the possibility of social relations that 
realised the Will or subjectivity, he envisioned it as a struggle between individual 
wills to dominate. Nietzsche therefore turns the Will to Live into the Will to Power. 
For Nietzsche, there will always be masters and slaves, not, as Vaneigem would later 
write referring to Nietzsche in Traité, ‘Maîtres sans esclaves’.252 
 In the work of Raoul Vaneigem, and following his theory of praxis, 
subjectivity is not an empty category but rather one that should be conceived of as 
concretely as possible for each individual and for each society. As in his work on 
Ducasse, Vaneigem is interested in the whole subject, its psychology, consciousness, 
attitudes, imagination, knowledge, lived experiences, emotions, ideas, passions, 
desires, drives etc.253 For Vaneigem these various aspects of a person form a whole 
that is not irreducible to any such fragmentation. Moreover, subjectivity (all of it) is a 
part of physical reality and arises from real activity in the world. Human beings are 
therefore subjective-objective creatures. The move towards using the language of la 
volonté or Will is a way of talking about subjectivity in praxis that allows Vaneigem 
to synthesise all the infinite richness of the consciously creative subject in its 
dialectical relationship with the objective. 
                                                                                                                                      
Vaneigem, he terms a form of ‘radical subjectivity’, see Richard Parry, The Bonnot Gang (London: 
Rebel Press, 1987), pp. 15-19, 
251 Traité, p. 310. 
252 This is the title of chapter 21 of Traité. 
253 Vaneigem’s work on Isidore Ducasse, Le Comte de Lautréamont, is discussed on page 152-161 of 
the current work. 
	   	  99 
 Vaneigem identifies two forms that the Will can take, la volonté de vivre and 
la volonté de puissance. These two versions of the Will Vaneigem associates with the 
subjectivity that emerges out of ‘first’ and ‘second’ order mediation respectively. In a 
sense, la volonté de vivre is simply the subject’s drive to realise itself in nature 
through practice. Vaneigem makes this link to praxis fairly explicit: ‘Pas une 
technique, pas une pensée dont le premier mouvement n’obéisse pas à une volonté de 
vivre’.254 As such the volonté de vivre is trans-historical and provides the original 
impetus behind all action, as the embodiment of praxis, in all societies. It is therefore 
an abstract category of thought applied to what, Vaneigem argues, fundamentally 
drives all of the different human practices in changing historical conditions. 
 In a certain sense then, la volonté de vivre is simply subjectivity in its 
dialectical relationship with objectivity. At the same time, this subjectivity in 
movement is what we are as human beings and therefore la volonté de vivre is our 
ideas, our emotions, our passions, and so on. Vaneigem also suggests that la volonté 
de vivre, in its most intense form, can be felt simply as a passion for changing the 
world: ‘la volonté de se réaliser en transformant le monde, la volonté de vivre toutes 
les sensations, toutes les expériences, tous les possibles’.255 It is the impetus that 
drives the dialectical movement of reality. Once it has become better understood by 
the subject, it takes, as above, the form of ‘la subjectivité radicale’. 
  The reason why the past is able to speak to the present, even though 
conditions have changed, is because la volonté de vivre is present throughout human 
history as the desire for unrestrained self-realisation. The Movement of the Free Spirit 
embodies such an example, following Vaneigem, of people who had a certain 
                                                
254 Traité, p. 221. 
255 Ibid., p. 317. 
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conception of freeing la volonté de vivre from the fetishistic constraints of religion.256 
Equally, Fourier, Marx, Ducasse and all of the people and movements that the 
Situationists and Surrealists bring together are seen by Vaneigem to embody a greater 
or lesser degree of awareness of la volonté de vivre (and, therefore, of human praxis). 
 In fetishistic societies, those where hierarchical social relations exist, la 
volonté de vivre, as first order mediation, is still what drives the subjective-objective 
dialectical movement but it is perverted by alienation. Within fetishistic social 
relations, Vaneigem argues, la volonté de vivre is constrained, by the actual 
organisation of life under conditions of hierarchy. This is what, he asserts, creates la 
volonté de puissance: ‘C’est la passion de créer et de se créer, emprisonnée dans le 
système hiérarchique, condamné à faire tourner les meules de la répression et de 
l’apparence’.257 For Vaneigem the Will to Power is therefore a movement of self-
realisation that has been unable to realise itself freely as part of a society based in 
conscious praxis: ‘La volonté de puissance est le projet de réalisation falsifié, coupé 
de la participation et de la communication’.258 The result is that human beings still 
have passions, desires and needs but they now take a form shaped by power, that it is 
to say by the hierarchical structures of society: ‘Prestige de l’humiliation, autorité et 
soumission, voilà le pas de manœuvre de la volonté de puissance’.259 Fetishistic 
society is still created by living human beings with a volonté de vivre, which in its 
essential liberated form now only exists on a social level as a possibility, but it is the 
Will to Power that defines the passions of capitalist subjects. It is clear from the 
                                                
256 The Movement of the Free Spirit was a Medieval Christian heresy that according to Vaneigem, 
rejected guilt, sacrifice and suffering in favour of self-fulfilment in this life. The most important texts 
by Vaneigem on this subject are his Le Mouvement du Libre-Esprit and La Résistance au 
christianisme. For a more detailed account of Vaneigem’s interest in the movement see pages 261-265 
of the current work. 
257 Traité, p. 309. 
258 Ibid. 
259 Ibid. 
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description of la volonté de puissance, which Vaneigem provides here, that we are 
meant to identify it with second order mediation praxis, with alienation and 
inauthenticity.  
In the concept of la volonté de vivre or the Will to Live and la volonté de 
puissance or the Will to Power, Vaneigem has a powerful explanation of both what is 
possible in a non-hierarchical society but also what drives capitalist subjects to not 
only live against their essence but to even revel in their inhumanity. The desire to 
dominate, to cause pain, to murder, to submit, to embody a role, to bully and kill for 
pleasure etc., both passive and active positioning of the self in a hierarchy, originate 
from a volonté de vivre that has been constrained, twisted and transformed into its 
opposite. Inhumanity is only a humanity perverted by the mediation of power from its 
desire for self-realisation. Or rather, la volonté de puissance is what happens to a 
subject whose volonté de vivre is placed or formed under hierarchical constraints. 
Ironically, this means that even the most negative and destructive products of the 
subject are expressions of a volonté de vivre, our humanity, but expressed through 
constraint, as inhumanity. 
 Fetishistic forms of self are able to take over the subject precisely because 
they are based essentially on a volonté de vivre constrained by the fundamental 
structures of a fetishistic society: the objective and the subjective reflect each other as 
two movements in the same dialectical process of human being but, under these 
conditions, the subject is as fetishistic as the forms of the objective world in which it 
lives. Each fetish, Vaneigem argues, be it that of the commodity, God or otherwise, 
contains an element of an alienated volonté de vivre. This is particular obvious for 
Vaneigem in the way that ideology functions—be it Fascism, Liberalism, 
Communism, Christianity or any other—, he states that this is exactly from where 
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these ideas draws their strength.260 What is perhaps most disturbing about the concept 
of the Will that Vaneigem develops here is that even the most inhuman concepts and 
movements are essentially the product of an original positive impulse but one that is 
unconscious of its true self and therefore beyond its control, turning into its exact 
opposite. In other words, the existence of la volonté de puissance tells us that the 
logic of fetishism now characterises our very selves. 
 
For Vaneigem, this tension between la volonté de vivre and la volonté de 
puissance in our society is one that each individual struggles with at every moment. 
This is a central point that spans the entire work of Vaneigem, the problem is not one 
only posed in certain special moments, rather la volonté de vivre is in a state of 
constant battle. Failure can result as much in resignation and submission as a desire to 
dominate and dehumanise. Vaneigem therefore sees the liberation of la volonté de 
vivre as the prime goal of revolutionary praxis. It is the project of a subject realising 
itself in Nature as part of a society where this process of praxis is the conscious heart 
of communal life. There is no space, however, for la volonté de puissance or the 
Übermensch (or, indeed, Maldoror) in this world. Rather, for Vaneigem, it is the 
realisation of an altogether different kind of human being: ‘le projet de l’homme total, 
une volonté de vivre totalement’.261 Here Vaneigem explicitly associates the notion of 
the homme total [totaler Mensch] of Marx and Lefebvre with his own volonté de 
vivre. In the later work this subject who freely and consciously creates the world and 
                                                
260 ‘Et même le fascisme immonde est une volonté de vivre niée, retournée, la chair d’un ongle incarné.  
Une volonté de vivre devenue volonté de puissance, une volonté de puissance devenue volonté 
d’obéissance passive, une volonté d’obéissance passive devenue volonté de mort; car céder d’un pouce 
sur le qualitatif, c’est céder sur la totalité du qualitatif. Brûler le fascisme, soit, mais que la même 
flamme embrase les idéologies, toutes les idéologies sans exception, et leurs valets’, ibid., p. 221. 
261 ‘[la jeune génération] rappelle que la raison des luttes passées est ancrée dans le présent des 
hommes qui les ont menées et que ce présent-là, en dépit des conditions historiques différentes, est 
aussi le sien. En bref, il y aurait, à la croire, un projet constant qui animerait les courants 
révolutionnaires radicaux: le projet de l’homme total, une volonté de vivre totalement à laquelle Marx 
le premier aurait su donner une tactique de réalisation scientifique’, ibid., p. 87. 
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itself is termed ‘le vivant’ (as, for example, in the title of his 1990 book Adresse aux 
vivants sur la mort qui les gouverne).262 The language of life and death that pervades 
the work of Raoul Vaneigem is meant to reflect the reality of la volonté de vivre and 
la volonté de puissance in our everyday lives. Moreover, as we shall see in chapter 4 
of the current work, the concept of the Will as praxis and praxis as essence lays the 
basis for his later considerations of the ‘fear of pleasure’ in the capitalist subject.  
 
The Negative Project 
 
With the fundamental critical perspective of Raoul Vaneigem explained, a new 
reading of the arguments, themes and language contained within Traité is possible. 
Vaneigem divides Traité into two parts ‘La Perspective du pouvoir’ (chapters 1 to 18) 
and ‘Le Renversement de perspective’ (chapters 19 to 25). In the Introduction to 
Traité, Vaneigem explains that these two parts of his book are meant to reflect the 
duality of our contemporary struggle.263 We can think of this in terms of the two 
moments in the dialectic of revolutionary praxis, the alienated subject that Vaneigem 
defines as ‘l’homme de la survie’, for reasons discussed below, and the imagination of 
liberated human subjectivity it gives rise to that can be realised in practice. 
Revolutionary praxis requires a desire to overcome contemporary social relations 
                                                
262 Debord also uses this term in Spectacle just below his détournement of Schopenhauer mentioned 
above: ‘Le sujet de l’histoire ne peut être que le vivant se produisant lui-même, devenant maître et 
possesseur de son monde qui est l’histoire, et existant comme conscience de son jeu’, Debord, Œuvres, 
p. 792. For a more detailed discussion of the vivant in the work of Vaneigem see pages 232-235 of the 
current work. 
263 ‘L’homme de la survie, c’est aussi l’homme unitaire, l’homme du refus global. Il ne se passe pas un 
instant sans que chacun de nous ne vive contradictoirement, et à tous les degrés de la réalité, le conflit 
de l’oppression et de la liberté; sans qu’il ne soit bizarrement déformé et comme saisi en même temps 
selon deux perspectives antagonistes: la perspective du pouvoir et la perspective du dépassement. 
Consacrées à l’analyse de l’une et de l’autre, les deux parties qui composent le Traité de savoir-vivre 
mériteraient donc d’être abordées non successivement, comme l’exige la lecture, mais simultanément, 
la description du négatif fondant le projet positif et le projet positif confirmant la négativité. Le 
meilleur ordre d’un livre, c’est de n’en avoir pas, afin que le lecteur y découvre le sien’, Traité, pp. 20-
21. 
	   	  104 
(ironically born of those same social relations) and an idea of what social relations 
should replace them. To be effective, revolution can neither be purely negative nor 
purely positive but, rather, these two are aspects of a single dialectical movement of 
human praxis. In other words, Vaneigem seeks to show that the desire to destroy 
capitalism is a real one that emerges out of the lived experiences of subjects in 
capitalism and he imagines the social relations that need to replace it in practice. Only 
a unity of these dimensions of consciousness required for human praxis can make 
revolutionary practice effective. Both desire and imagination are required for the 
subject to realise itself in the objective world. 
 The first part of Traité then, ‘la description du négatif’, is the exposition of the 
effects of alienated praxis on the subject that gives rise to the desire to abolish 
alienation. Rather than adopt the objective style typical of bourgeois literature, 
Vaneigem critiques capitalism self-consciously as a subject-object of alienated praxis 
(i.e. rejecting the subject-object divide of idealism).264 For Raoul Vaneigem there is 
no such thing as an objective analysis that can be distinguished from the position of 
the subject in relation to the object. Our knowledge of ‘objective’ capitalist social 
relations is our day-to-day ‘subjective’ experiences of those social relations. The 
objective reality of social relations is the subjective reality because we are those social 
relations. Therefore it makes sense to examine one’s own experience because such 
experience is what constitutes reality. Moreover, Vaneigem, in taking this position in 
his writing, is staying true to the notion of radical subjectivity because it recognises 
that subjectivity is both universal and individual. The experiences of alienation and 
the reflected desire to destroy it are the same experiences of other alienated subjects 
in society because they arise from the same social relations.  
                                                
264 ‘j’ai conjecturé que l’analyse de ma propre subjectivité, loin de constituer une démarche isolée, 
résonnerait en consonance d’autres tentatives similaires et, jouant sur l’air du temps, lui imposerait de 
quelque manière les modulations du désir’, ibid., pp. 9-10. 
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 Vaneigem therefore places his own experience of capitalist society under the 
microscope to reveal its general character. Vaneigem does this by examining the sort 
of everyday interactions and experiences that capitalist society gives rise to: paying 
the waiter at a café, the journey to and from work on public transport, shaking hands, 
daily routine, the social roles we adopt, the fact no one believes politicians, the 
disappointment of consumption and so on. Vaneigem describes a society where 
despair, loneliness and boredom are more pervasive than at any other point in human 
history. His findings are nicely expressed by the titles of these chapters: 
‘L’humiliation’, ‘L’isolement’, ‘La souffrance’. These real aspects of life under 
capitalism are obscured by the perspective of power that invades subjectivity in the 
form of ideology that renders the everyday insignificant. The aim of Vaneigem, as the 
title of his first chapter, ‘L’insignifiant signifié’, tells us, is to signify the insignificant. 
 The conclusion that Raoul Vaneigem comes to once the insignificant has been 
signified, once the experience of everyday life is taken as a totality, is that mankind is 
suffering from what he calls a ‘mal de survie’ or survival sickness. The origins of this 
term are in his theory that fetishistic social relationships demand that the human 
ability to consciously create the objective be suppressed to serve social relationships 
ostensibly beyond our control: ‘Jusqu’à présent, les hommes n’ont fait que s’adapter à 
un système de transformation du monde’.265 The problem is that such a process is, 
Vaneigem argues, a total offence to what it means to be human and reduces us to a 
pseudo-animal state of mere survival.   
 As was outlined above, what Vaneigem feels distinguishes human beings from 
animals, what makes them both united with and distinct from Nature, is that they 
consciously transform the world, whereas animals are programmed, as it were, by 
                                                
265 Ibid., p. 205. 
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Nature and cannot therefore be distinguished from it. In hierarchical societies, 
however, this aspect that separates human beings from Nature is no longer in the 
control of the subject and is instead mediated by an outside force (class and its 
abstract social forms of organisation). As such, humanity finds itself in a bizarre 
situation, at once distinct from Nature due to its conscious creativity but at the same 
time this conscious creativity is now programmed from without. Hierarchical societies 
therefore reduce mankind into a strange sort of animalistic state where human beings 
are distinct from the objective, but at the same time, forced to adapt to it, ‘d’une façon 
supérieurement animale’,266 rather than change it through autonomous conscious 
creativity: 
 
Absolument soumis à l’adaptation, l’animal ne possède pas la conscience du 
temps. L’homme, lui, refuse l’adaptation, il prétend transformer le monde. 
Chaque fois qu’il échoue dans sa volonté de démiurge, il connaît l’angoisse de 
s’adapter, l’angoisse de se sentir réduit à la passivité de l’animal.267 
 
 
It is probable that Vaneigem has Darwin in mind when he associates this reduction to 
an animal state with survival. The notion that animals must adapt to conditions in 
order to survive is translated into a society where humanity is forced to survive, like 
animals, by adapting to social conditions. Adaptation to social norms and constraints 
therefore reduces man to the animalistic state of a struggle for survival. By a leap of 
mystification, fetishistic society argues these same social relations, that force human 
beings into a pseudo-animal state, are justified as necessary to ensure human survival. 
In other words, the capitalist mind-set is that hierarchy is necessary to ensure survival 
at all costs, but Vaneigem reveals that hierarchy simply reduces life to survival. The 
‘homme de la survie’ is the subject who lives within this state of affairs. 
                                                
266 Ibid., p. 208. 
267 Ibid. 
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 It is at this point that the language of life and death becomes so central to the 
critical perspective of Raoul Vaneigem. Given that, as I have explained above, 
Vaneigem defines human life as the conscious creation of the world and the self 
through praxis, the alienation of praxis—the reduction of Man to a quasi-animal 
position of survival—actually constitutes the death of humanity. Vaneigem means 
this both literally and analogically in that people can be driven to suicide or to kill due 
to social relations and that everyday life, by being an alienation of human life, is a 
sort of living death. In other words, what distinguishes human life from animal life—
the ability to socially and consciously create happiness, joy, fun experiences, to 
develop a joie de vivre—is reduced to the necessity of adaptation, the activities of an 
unconscious or semi-conscious animal. 
 The problem of fetishism is precisely that human beings are not the 
unconscious animals it reduces them to. Unlike the rest of Nature, Man has a 
conscious volonté de vivre, a complex and rich subjectivity, that is constantly 
attempting to realise itself through consciously transforming the world. The 
experience of human life reduced to survival is a stifling of this Will and therefore 
constitutes a consciousness or everyday experience of suffering. In other words, the 
humiliation, isolation, fragmentation and quantification of existence by a social life 
dominated by the economy is a world that ticks by through a ‘temps mort’ where the 
subject can never realise itself through transforming the world but is instead 
transformed by a social existence over which it has no control. Unable to realise 
themselves freely, Vaneigem argues, they are forced into realising themselves within 
the hierarchical constraints of a society structured on survival.268 It is in this way that 
                                                
268 ‘Dans l’optique orientée du consommateur, dans la vision conditionnée, le manque à vivre apparaît 
comme un manque à consommer du pouvoir et à se consumer pour le pouvoir. A l’absence de la vraie 
vie est offert le palliatif d’une mort à tempérament. Un monde qui condamne à mourir exsangue est 
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originally positive drives to live become morbid passions. This explains why 
capitalist subjects do not merely perform fetishistic acts as a necessity but also at 
times revel in their inhumanity. As such the ‘homme de survie’, or simply ‘les morts’, 
is a subjectivity fashioned in the image of hierarchical social relations. They are 
subjects whose volonté de vivre is sublated into a volonté de puissance. The danger of 
all of this process of dehumanisation is that mankind may very well destroy itself 
before revolution ever takes place, so rooted is fetishism in the minds of capitalist 
subjects: ‘Si l’on détruit la passion, elle renaît dans la passion de détruire. Personne, à 
ces conditions, ne survivra à l’ère de la survie’.269 
For Raoul Vaneigem the history of inhumanity and its contemporary reality is 
one that can be explained by this reduction of man to survival by the economy. But 
commodity society with its power more clearly rooted in the material, economic 
condition, Vaneigem argues, reveals the origins of survival in exploitation. Indeed, 
much of Traité is devoted to the discussion of the qualitative differences between 
earlier societies and capitalist society. For Vaneigem capitalist society is characterised 
above all by a rationalisation of exchange and the increasing quantification of life that 
such rationalisation demands. Everyday life, Vaneigem argues, has never been more 
abstractly mediated by social forms. The number of roles, consumer lifestyles, social 
norms and constraints has increased. The mythic, qualitative unity or totality, albeit 
illusory, that once characterised Western society under feudalism was broken with the 
rise of the bourgeoisie into mere fragments of power, alienated praxis, consumed in 
the form of commodities. 
 The importance of the negative project of critique is to show that the 
increasing abstraction of life, the accumulation of commodities under capitalism, 
                                                                                                                                      
bien forcé de propager le goût du sang. Où règne le mal de survie, le désir de vivre prend spontanément 
les armes de la mort : meurtre gratuit, sadisme …’, ibid., p. 209. 
269 Ibid., p. 209. 
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produces an immense accumulation of suffering in the subject. The experience of 
alienation, laid bare by capitalism in its openly material and abstract origins, in turn 
gives birth to the collective desire and critical understanding for the negation of 
fetishistic social relations. 
 
The Positive Project 
 
Just as the desire to destroy social relations provides the negative impetus behind 
revolution, so the corollary desire for new imagined social relations and ways of life 
that liberate humanity is the positive. In a sense, where the negative project was the 
exposition of praxis aliénée, the positive project is the exploration of liberated praxis 
both as revolution and the longer-term results of this liberation. The positive project is 
therefore the most ‘utopian’ aspect of the work of Raoul Vaneigem, a critique of 
contemporary society founded on those aspects of lived experience now that stand in 
opposition to alienation and on its comparison to a way of life in which human 
creativity is liberated. The positive project should not be considered therefore as 
completely distinct from the negative project but rather as one aspect of the dialectic 
of creatively conscious human practice. 
 The transformation of social life, Vaneigem argues, requires a ‘renversement 
de perspective’ where the self-understanding, and therefore practice, of subjects is no 
longer mediated by external forces: ‘c’est cesser de voir avec les yeux de la 
communauté, de l’idéologie, de la famille, des autres’.270 . Vaneigem explicitly 
associates this with the adoption of the perspective of human praxis: ‘Le 
renversement de perspective remplace la connaissance par la praxis’.271 Liberating 
                                                
270 Ibid., p. 243. 
271 Ibid., pp. 242-243. 
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(revolutionary) and liberated praxis therefore demand that the transformation of the 
world responds to the demands that rise out of lived experience by each subject, 
individually and collectively. The adoption of this position is the source of all life and 
the subversive optique from which social relations can be transformed: ‘C’est se saisir 
soi-même solidement, se choisir comme point de départ et comme centre’.272 That is 
to say, the reversal of perspective is that of ‘la subjectivité radicale’. 
 Towards the end of Traité, and continued in his later work, Vaneigem starts to 
replace the term praxis with a new language. Just as in the negative project Vaneigem 
states that ‘Il y a plus de vérité dans vingt-quatre heures de la vie d’un homme que 
dans toutes les philosophies’, so in the positive project, ‘Les hommes vivent en état de 
créativité vingt-quatre heures sur vingt-quatre’. 273  In other words, the term 
‘creativity’, in the work of Raoul Vaneigem, is simply synonymous with praxis itself. 
Calling praxis créativité is to develop a language away from Marx while still retaining 
its origins in the Marxian critique of philosophy. Equally, it is meant to bring the 
positive associations we have with a term usually applied to art to the practice of life. 
 Vaneigem links liberating and liberated creativity to the quality of 
spontanéité: ‘le mode d’être de la créativité individuelle’.274 Spontaneity is essentially 
praxis, or creativity, that is autonomous; that is to say, unmediated by hierarchical 
social relations. As such spontaneity implies lived experience, or consciousness, free 
of reification and practice, or réalisation, that is free of abstract mediation of the 
subject: ‘la spontanéité constitue une expérience immédiate, une conscience du vécu, 
de ce vécu cerné de toutes parts, menacé d’interdits et cependant non encore aliéné, 
non encore réduit à l’inauthenticité’.275 Of course, spontaneity is a term that was used 
                                                
272 Ibid. p. 243. 
273 Ibid., p. 245. 
274 Ibid., p. 250. 
275 Ibid., p. 251. 
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commonly in the revolutionary milieu to refer to workers’ actions that were organised 
by workers’ themselves.276 With his use of the term Vaneigem is clearly attempting to 
unite the various aspects of human praxis together as a form of intense creation that 
replaces art (a mere fragmentation and alienation of human creativity). 
 Spontaneous (liberated) or revolutionary (liberating) creativity Vaneigem 
terms poésie or poetry.277 In this redefinition of the term Vaneigem sees himself as 
reaching back towards the term’s original meaning. 
 
Qu’est-ce que la poésie ? La poésie est l’organisation de la spontanéité 
créative, l’exploitation du qualitatif selon ses lois intrinsèques de cohérence. 
Ce que les Grecs nommaient POIEN, qui est le ‘faire’ ici rendu à la pureté de 
son jaillissement originel et, pour tout dire, à la totalité.278 
 
Again in this instance poetry is a term that seeks to replace praxis by giving the idea 
of praxis the positive associations that we give to poetry. Or rather, to suggest that the 
Situationist merger of life and art is simply a statement that praxis must be liberated 
and that this liberation should be termed poetry, because life, and with it the 
movement to abolish capitalism, will have the qualitative richness previously held 
only by art. In the later work of Raoul Vaneigem the language of créativité and poésie 
completely replaces that of praxis but, at the same time, the critical position of praxis, 
if not the term itself, is retained within this new language. 
 In a relatively explicit reference to Nietzsche, Vaneigem describes the 
realisation of the positive project as a world of ‘maîtres sans esclaves’.279 Vaneigem 
terms this process: ‘le dépassement aristocratique de l’aristocratie’.280 As was shown 
above, Raoul Vaneigem makes extensive use of the Nietzschean concept of the Will 
                                                
276 An example of this can be seen in Hiver ’60, which is discussed in the following chapter. 
277 ‘Qu’est-ce que la poésie? La poésie est l’organisation de la spontanéité créative, l’exploitation du 
qualitatif selon ses lois intrinsèques de cohérence. Ce que les Grecs nommaient POIEN, qui est le 
‘faire’ ici rendu à la pureté de son jaillissement originel et, pour tout dire, à la totalité’, Traité, p. 257.  
278 Ibid., p. 257. 
279 Ibid. 
280 Ibid., p. 272. ‘Dépassement’, or overcoming, is a term that Vaneigem often uses to refer to 
libertating praxis in his work. In French it implies a movement of overtaking some object or of moving 
beyond a fixed boundary. 
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in his critical thought. But Vaneigem also rejects the volonté de puissance in favour of 
the volonté de vivre. Where Nietzsche saw hierarchy as ahistorical and therefore 
something to be overcome through attaining the aristocratic status, rejecting the social 
roles and mores that do not suit the subject but also in the sense of realising a desire to 
dominate others, Vaneigem sees this dépassement ‘aristocratique’ only in the 
rejection of all hierarchical social relations in practice. As such, Nietzsche is wrong to 
say that mankind is caught between being a master and a slave. Rather, Vaneigem 
argues, humans are caught between the master-slave dialectic or becoming a master 
without slaves, by which he means someone who overcomes what seeks to subjugate 
their individual volonté de vivre (i.e. the realisation of new social relations). 
 The transformation of society, Vaneigem argues, will totally metamorphose 
the human experience of space and time, as well as our communication and collective 
transformation of the world and ourselves. The most fanciful imaginings of Fourier, 
for Raoul Vaneigem, embody the realisation of a ‘nouvelle objectivité’ or ‘nouvelle 
nature’,281 by which he means a society free of fetishism, where humanity will have a 
completely different consciousness and experience of life than the one we do now. 
Where in capitalist society the passing of time is experienced as loss due to the 
alienation of human creativity into the abstract measured time of commodity 
production and consumption, communist society will embody a time experienced 
qualitatively, full of rich lived experience born from the pleasure of free poetic 
creation of everyday life. Spatial relationships will change as the spaces in which we 
move are shaped by liberated time to serve the needs of individual pleasure and 
collective creativity.282 The liberation of praxis will abolish work, abstractly mediated 
                                                
281 Ibid., p. 279. 
282 ‘C’est l’espace-temps unitaire de l’amour, de la poésie, du plaisir, de la communication’, ibid., p. 
293. 
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activity, and it will be replaced by a creative experience that bears the characteristics 
of play and poetry. 
 In the light of the positive project, Ducasse’s practice of détournement, for 
Raoul Vaneigem, becomes much more than a technique but an expression of liberated 
praxis in a universal sense: ‘Au sens large du terme, le détournement est une remise 
en jeu globale. C’est le geste par lequel l’unité ludique s’empare des êtres et des 
choses figées dans un ordre de parcelles hiérarchisées’.283 Détournement is the subject 
engaged in the incessant process of transforming every aspect of the objective 
according to the desires and imaginative creativity that arise out of lived experience. 
In this sense, communism, as Vaneigem understands it, is détournement: ‘La 
créativité n’a pas de limite, le détournement n’a pas de fin’.284 This is because 
détournement is the general character of liberated creative praxis. It is the constant 
change and development of the world and the self by human beings through the 
consciously creative dimension of human practice liberated from its chains. 
 The critical perspective that Vaneigem outlines in Traité demands a complete 
rethink of the old revolutionary movement. The old social forms, the State, work, the 
division of labour, the separation of pleasure and labour, exchange, money, the 
economy, every form of ‘communauté aliénante’, social norms and roles, all these 
abstractions that reduce man to the state of an animal, need to be abolished.285 In their 
place, Vaneigem concludes, there is the possibility of a new world characterised by a 
‘nouvelle innocence’, 286  where détournement, réalisation, communication, 
participation, joy and pleasure will characterise the human experience of everyday 
life and its creation. The abstract mediations that dominate life, turn it into suffering 
                                                
283 Ibid., p. 342. 
284 Ibid., p. 345. 
285 Ibid., p. 354. 
286 Ibid., p. 346. 
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and isolation from one another, will be abolished by the radical subject in ‘la 
reconstruction des rapports humains par une praxis passionnante et consciente 
touchant tous les aspects de la vie sociale’.287 
 
This chapter sought to clarify the fundamental critical positions developed by Raoul 
Vaneigem in ‘Banalités de Base’ and Traité, his two most influential texts as a 
member of the Situationist International. It has demonstrated that the perspective of 
the theory of praxis is absolutely essential to grasping the critical thought of Raoul 
Vaneigem as a totality. Moreover, the chapter provided new definitions of key terms 
and ideas based on close reading of these works. The theoretical exposition in this 
chapter provides a basis for a discussion of the cultural contexts, historical activity 
and intellectual developments that these texts by Raoul Vaneigem emerged from and 
to which they have contributed.  
                                                
287 Ibid., p. 354. 
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Chapter 2. Belgian Modernity and its Discontents: On the hennuyer Origins of 
the Radical Subject. 
 
With the first theoretical exposition complete, the current work now looks to 
contextualising the theory of Raoul Vaneigem and his original entrance into the 
Situationist International. This chapter will examine three new contexts in which to 
consider Raoul Vaneigem that have gone previously unexamined in the critical 
literature: first, his working-class background and the events of the Belgian general 
strike of the winter of 1960-1961; secondly, his relationship with the cultural avant-
garde movements of Hainaut; and thirdly, his educational background, in particular 
his university mémoire on the work of Isidore Ducasse. The aim in covering these 
areas is to provide the critical field with a more complex picture of Raoul Vaneigem 
before he joined the Situationist International and to show that the history of class 
struggle in Hainaut was an important source of influence on his work. 
 
Raoul Vaneigem and the hennuyer Working Class 
 
Raoul Vaneigem was born on the 21st of March 1934 at number 9 Rue des Carrières 
in Lessines, Hainaut. Raoul was the only son of working-class parents, Marguerite 
Tilte and Paul Vaneigem. The name of the street where he was born evidently holds a 
certain symbolism as it took its name from the local quarries of igneous rock that 
defined the lives of the 9000 or so inhabitants of Lessines; just as the coal mines did 
in the neighbouring area of Le Borinage. Raoul’s father, Paul, was a cheminot, or 
railway worker, employed by the Société nationale des chemins de fer belges 
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(SNCB).288 Paul was a committed socialist and trade union member, and shared in the 
local tradition of anti-clericalism.289 Class struggle was therefore, right from the 
beginning, a familial context for Raoul Vaneigem in his early development.290 
 Paul Vaneigem had taken part in the Resistance during the Occupation; he 
sabotaged carriages that were used for the deportation of detainees.291 In his later 
work Raoul Vaneigem recalls his experience of the Occupation vividly and focuses 
on a particular air raid as a formative moment in his early critical awareness of 
capitalist barbarism.292 Vaneigem later had his first direct experience of political 
violence when he watched the execution of Nazi collaborators after the Liberation in 
the period of épuration.293 
 In the 1940s the Vaneigem family moved to Houraing, one of the faubourgs of 
Lessines, which, Vaneigem recalls as the social space in which his class identity as an 
adolescent was formed. The area was, he tells us, nicknamed ‘la petite Russie’ by the 
local bourgeoisie for its bolshie population of ‘lumpenproletariat’.294 Raoul attended 
communist youth organisations such as the Jeune Garde Socialiste (JGS) and the 
Faucons Rouges, with other children from the area.295 The Maison du Peuple, an 
                                                
288 Six, p. 16-17. 
289 Vaneigem speaks of the ‘éducation irréligieuse et anticléricale’ that he received from his parents, 
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movements, see Guignard-Perrein, Liliane, ‘Les Faucons Rouges 1932-1950’ (unpublished doctoral 
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institution much like the English workingmen’s club, was another important point of 
working-class organisation and cultural activity. Vaneigem came here to play the 
trumpet in the local brass band ‘Les Prolétaires’.296 These aspects of a certain 
weltanschauung Marxism, a working class with its own culture and values, are 
evidently looked back on with a certain, albeit disabused, nostalgia in the more 
autobiographical sections of Vaneigem’s writing. What they show, however, is that 
Vaneigem was tied to a community that was self-consciously proletarian and, in some 
sense at least, anti-capitalist in its outlook. 
The pervasiveness of a certain radical perspective on capitalist society among 
the hennuyer working class was due to its peculiar social history. Hainaut was the first 
region on the Continent to undergo the Industrial Revolution;297 this long history of 
industrialisation defined the population. Throughout the nineteenth century and well 
in to the twentieth, working conditions and wages in Hainaut were some of the worst 
in Western Europe. The heavy industries that dominated employment in the region 
were both physically exhausting and extremely dangerous. Work-related disease and 
fatal accidents were commonplace. Literally hundreds of men died every year in 
Hainaut’s extraction industries. In 1932, for example, no less than 210 workers were 
killed in Le Borinage alone.298 While in 1956, 262 workers were killed in a single 
mining disaster in Charleroi,299 not far from Nivelles where, at that time, Vaneigem 
worked as a teacher. 
                                                                                                                                      
thesis, Université Paris X, Nanterre, 1982). 
296 Le Chevalier, pp. 172-173. 
297 Bruno Demoulin and Jean-Louis Kupper, Histoire de la Wallonie, De la préhistoire au XXIe siècle 
(Toulouse: Privat, 2004), pp. 244-245. 
298 This figure is given in a 1933 documentary film by Joris Iven and Henri Storck, Misère au 
Borinage. It is a classic of Belgian cinema that depicts a world of poverty and exploitation that would 
have been very recognisable to the Vaneigem family. 
299 Demoulin and Kupper, p. 316. 
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 The quarries of Lessines were just as dangerous. In a description of his 
hometown, Vaneigem quotes a fellow Lessinois, the Surrealist poet Louis Scutenaire, 
on this subject, ‘Dans mon enfance on ne trouvait pas la mort chose normale, sauf les 
suicides et les accidents aux carrières’.300 Vaneigem adds, drawing on his own 
experience, ‘Croisant un enterrement, les gens avaient coutume d’interroger: ‘Dé Ké 
Trô’ (Dans quel trou ?)’.301 Vaneigem was not an observer of these tragedies; they 
personally affected him. In one of the most moving passages from his later work, 
Vaneigem describes his reaction to the death of a close friend, ‘Grand Belin’, an older 
boy who fell thirty metres to his death while scaling the rock face to place dynamite: 
 
La mort du Grand Belin m’a fait jurer solennellement de septembriser les 
patrons et les exploiteurs et de venger par un massacre à jamais dissuasif les 
holocaustes quotidiens du capitalisme. Le souvenir de ces jours de rage et de 
détresse m’est revenu alors que j’écrivais, avec les mots d’une fureur mal 
contenue, un libelle appelant à l’abolition de la société marchande et à la 
création d’une société vivante.302 
 
 
Here Vaneigem links this deeply personal experience of loss directly to his critique of 
capitalism and his attempts to overcome it. As much as Hainaut in this industrial 
period embodied much that is now missed, particularly by a leftism that Vaneigem 
stands against, the reality was one of a systematic destruction and dehumanisation of 
life. These kinds of traumatic directly lived experiences were what defined everyday 
life for the hennuyer working class. Vaneigem makes it very clear that he thinks it 
was this industrial form of alienation that shaped the consciousness of the local 
population, and gave it a radical edge that both included and went beyond the local 
context: 
 
                                                
300 Cited in Raoul Vaneigem, Louis Scutenaire (Paris: Seghers, 1991), p. 16. 
301 Ibid., p. 16. 
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il y a là [Hainaut] une région que le capitalisme industriel a colonisée sans 
ménagement, prêtant, par le biais de luttes sociales incessantes, un caractère 
universel à des conflits locaux et à des aventures existentielles qu’aucune 
limite territoriale ne saurait borner.303 
 
 
Indeed, from the mid-nineteenth century onwards, the workers of Hainaut quickly 
developed an international reputation for the extremity and, significantly, spontaneity 
of their struggle. In the same essay on Surrealism in Hainaut, from which this latter 
quote is taken, Vaneigem refers to one of the most dramatic examples of this 
insurrectionary history. On the 18th of March 1886 a demonstration was held by 
anarchists in Liège to commemorate the anniversary of the Paris Commune of 1871. 
The reunion soon turned into a riot and looting by the local working population. In 
solidarity with workers in Liège, workers in Hainaut responded with a wave of 
wildcat strikes and acts of vandalism. Around 800 workers in Charleroi destroyed 
local machinery and other property. In Jumet a state-of-the-art glassworks was burned 
to the ground along with the owner’s chateau. The strike, which was now verging on a 
revolutionary situation, ended only with the intervention of the army, which shot 
dozens of striking workers. 
  Vaneigem situates himself in this long line of historical radicalism that 
belonged to the region through autobiography. The practice of the grève sauvage or 
wildcat strike, a strike undertaken against and often in opposition to party and union 
leadership, was an important feature of this history; as was the general strike, a strike 
that mobilised workers across all industries.304 In 1936, for example, workers won 
massive concessions from the government after an initially spontaneous strike that 
soon mobilised huge numbers of Belgian workers. In 1950 a general strike combined 
                                                
303 Raoul Vaneigem, ‘La section des piques du surréalisme’ in Europe, 912 (2005), pp. 102-111 (p. 
103). 
304 In his work Vaneigem sees the grève sauvage as the key to the realisation of workers’ self-
management and liberating social change, see De la grève sauvage, op. cit. 
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with a mass march on Brussels by workers brought about the abdication of Leopold 
III for his collaboration during the Occupation. Vaneigem therefore awoke to the 
critique of capitalism in the context of a social history defined by working-class life 
and the constant struggles of his community that would regularly go beyond and 
against official leftist sanction. He was a teenager when workers marched on Brussels 
in 1950, but it was Hiver ’60, in many ways the most significant of all the wildcat 
general strikes in Belgian history, that would define his political development and 
later contribution to the Situationist International. 
 
Hiver ’60 
 
The background to the strike was an economic crisis that hit Belgian capital as a result 
of Congolese independence. At the start of the 1960s, Hainaut was still a highly 
industrialised region that had largely retained its nineteenth-century character.305 
Under the management of financial institutions a few corporations dominated key 
industries (coal in particular).306 The lack of competition meant that Belgian capital 
was reluctant to invest in new emerging sectors such as the production of modern 
consumer goods.307 Instead Belgium had always relied on traditional industry to fund 
imports. As such, the country was greatly affected by prices on the world market. 
When international demand for its commodities, such as coal, was high, production 
soared, when it was low, as in the American recession of 1957-1958, it plummeted.308 
Belgian capital had historically foisted the worst of these effects on to its colonies.309 
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The decision to finally award Congo its independence in June 1960 therefore 
demanded that the economy be restructured in order to maintain the normal rate of 
profit capital expected. 
 A liberal-conservative coalition under the Social Christian Prime Minister 
Gaston Eyskens (1905-1988) was in power at that moment in time. Towards the end 
of the year the government announced a programme of structural economic reforms. 
It was no accident that the announcement came amid the wedding celebrations of 
King Badouin of Belgium to Princess Fabiola of Spain that was to take place on the 
15th of December 1960. A vote was planned in parliament the weekend after the royal 
wedding. The reforms were to be voted on all in one bill or ‘loi unique’ (later to be 
termed ‘la loi inique’ by workers). 
Beneath the rhetoric of structural reform and progress was a brutal austerity 
programme. It proposed a number of new taxes, 85% of which hit workers hardest, a 
3 billion franc reduction in the public sector, the extension of the retirement age from 
60 to 65, and a 25% increase in pension contributions.310 The ‘loi unique’ also 
threatened the welfare system. It proposed to exclude certain workers from 
unemployment and health care after a number of weeks.311 These measures were to be 
accompanied by a ‘système d’inquisition’ aimed at people on benefits.312 
 The response of the official left to these moves was either underwhelming or 
simply in tune with the government. La Gauche, the weekly organ of the left-wing 
minority of the Parti Socialiste Belge (PSB), claimed that these changes were a 
technical and not a political problem. The Fédération générale des travailleurs belges 
(FGTB), the central authority that organised the majority of trade unions, agreed to 
limited industrial action after immense pressure from its base. They demanded, 
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however, that any strike-action be kept to the ‘Communaux et Provinceaux’, or public 
sector, workers. 
 On the 20th of December 1960 workers began to go on strike throughout 
Belgium, in both Flanders and Wallonia. Workers from across all sectors, not just the 
public sector, went on strike, in open opposition to the orders of the FGTB and the 
policy of the workers’ parties. Among the first to strike spontaneously, that is to say, 
workers organising themselves outside mediating union and party structures, were 
dockworkers in Anvers, metalworkers in Charleroi and teachers. In factories in almost 
every part of the country, but particularly Hainaut and Liège, workers organised their 
own strike committees and general assemblies. In effect, workers had created an 
alternative, directly democratic, form of organising that was outside union or party 
control. Union reps that condemned these moves were met with open hostility and 
condemned as ‘jaunes’ or scabs. In at least one recorded instance a union delegate 
was beaten so badly that he had to be hospitalised.313 
 The strike slowly brought the whole of Wallonia to a standstill as it spread. 
The general response of the leftist leadership was to invoke ‘la dignité’, ‘la 
discipline’, ‘la calme’ and to blame certain ‘irresponsables’.314 Such language did 
little, however, to combat the general enthusiasm workers felt in the real 
empowerment that they had created in self-organising or the sense that the leadership 
was simply obstructing any effective action. One correspondent recorded that he had 
heard workers respond to these mots d’ordre with the pithy phrase, ‘la dignité, je 
l’emmerde’.315 The face off with the unions reached such a height that, on the 22nd of 
December, around 200 hundred workers amassed outside FGTB headquarters in 
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Liège.316 They were furious at the refusal of the officials to support the strike. Rocks 
were thrown at the building and some workers even attempted to force their way in.317 
 Very quickly the original cause behind the strike, the famous ‘loi unique’, 
faded into the background as the movement took on a revolutionary character. In the 
daily demonstrations throughout the country the most common cry was ‘les usines 
aux ouvriers!’318 Workers already controlled much of the infrastructure and the many 
strike committees embodied an alternative power structure, a genuine dictatorship of 
the proletariat, outside state, party or union control. In effect, the real organising of 
workers had produced an historical moment that went beyond a simple response to a 
government austerity programme. The sense of empowerment is palpable in the 
statements of those taking part: 
 
‘La Loi Unique, c'est important, mais les causes sont beaucoup plus 
profondes’. ‘On en a marre, tu comprends’. ‘Ils se foutent de nous!’ ‘Même si 
on n'obtenait rien, on leur a quand même montré qu'on les emmerde’, ‘ils ont 
la frousse’. Un vieux cheminot: ‘J'ai jamais connu une ambiance comme ça, 
on n'a jamais été aussi heureux’. Ils sont tous très fiers que le mouvement soit 
de la base.319 
 
 
While confrontations with the leadership were not entirely new, the scale and extent 
to which workers had simply organised the struggle on their own was on a level that 
had rarely, if ever, been seen before in Belgium. Among other novel aspects of the 
strike was the importance of youth. School children, students and young workers were 
some of the most aggressive and revolutionary participants. With them were the 
blousons noirs, a new sub-cultural group of young rebels influenced by rock ‘n’ roll 
and films like Rebel Without a Cause (1955), who rode motorcycles and wore black 
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leather jackets.320 The JGS, the same communist youth group Vaneigem had attended 
as a child, was one of the most combative leftist tendencies. Disdain for the leadership 
was at its height among these young people. After one union boss had claimed ‘les 
travailleurs wallons ne voulaient pas êtres les fellaghas d’Alger-sur-Meuse’ (the 
Meuse is the main river that goes through Hainaut), protesting students were heard to 
shout ‘Nous voulons êtres les fellaghas d’Alger-sur-Meuse’.321 
 Events reached a peak on the 27th of December when some 700, 000 workers 
were on strike. Normal everyday life in Wallonia and many parts of Flanders had 
completely stopped. Factories were occupied, roads blocked and workers sabotaged 
infrastructure. Even Christian workers, usually the least combative had joined in 
opposition to their union. A statement was published in La Wallonie that called on the 
army to fraternise with workers, to not fire on them and to refuse to break strikes. The 
government arrested the authors and stopped the press but it was soon pasted up in 
copies on town walls. The threat of mutiny was such that in Charleroi, always at the 
centre of events, the police had to be used in order to stop workers and soldiers from 
fraternising.322 One interviewer who spoke to a soldier was told straight out that he 
would refuse to shoot if ordered.323 The government’s greatest fear was that workers 
would march en masse for Brussels, as had happened in 1950, or that they would arm 
themselves. The army was sent in to protect arms manufactories and cultural 
buildings. 
 Had workers continued to control the organisation of the movement of Hiver 
’60 there is really no way to say how far it may have gone. However, this is not what 
happened. The union leadership began to look for ways to take control of what had 
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become a reality despite their original opposition. Among the first was André Renard 
who, after the fact, declared the FGTB in Liège in support of the general strike on the 
21st of December. The central body of the FGTB had formally declared itself in 
favour of strike action by the 27th of December but still only in Anvers and Wallonia. 
It was the start of a process of seizing control of the organisation of the movement. In 
Flémalle, Liège, union reps refused to recognise the strike committee there and 
hunted down its members so that they could be ejected from the union.324 Gradually 
the unions replaced the spontaneous forms of organisation with its own bureaucracy. 
Now in control they were better able to shape the discourse such as limiting the 
insurrectionary character of the movement to a simple critique of Prime Minister 
Eyskens and ‘la loi unique’. Moreover, there was now no organising body through 
which workers could directly and collectively realise their intent. 
 A speech delivered by André Renard was by far the most disastrous of all the 
attempts to stop the movement. Earlier Renard had saved face because he had been 
one of the first union leaders to support the strike. For some he had therefore emerged 
as one of the few leaders worth listening to. Renard argued that the real impetus 
behind the movement had been the historic ethnic divide between Flanders and 
Wallonia. The strike had been a call for Wallonian independence from the yoke of 
Flanders. The speech should be considered in the historical context where Flanders 
had never been as industrially developed as Wallonia. As such, the Flemish working 
class were, traditionally speaking, less well-organised and influential. In Parliament 
this translated into a dynamic where the right-wing politics of Flanders was used to 
suppress the left-wing politics of Wallonia. Renard’s speech was to be the death knell 
of Hiver ’60 and would in many ways define Belgian politics of the future that is 
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based on ethnic division rather than the tradition of solidarity among the class across 
ethnic boundaries.325 
 It was most ironic that Renard had made this speech given that the workers of 
Anvers in Flanders had been among the most radical and some of the first to go on 
strike. The speech was a serious blow to the solidarity that had existed between 
Walloon and Flemish workers and that had been key to the generalness of the strike. 
Too many Walloon workers it seemed listened to Renard and workers in Flanders felt 
betrayed. The strike waned through January 1961 as workers began to take up work 
again. In Wallonia certain sectors held out until near the end of the month but by the 
18th of January Hiver ’60 had come to an end. The only result, declared a victory by 
the unions and parties, was that some of the leftist leaders were allowed to meet with 
the king to discuss their opposition. The revolutionary moment had passed and even 
the merely reformist aspirations of the movement had failed to be realised. 
 
Hiver ’60, however, had not simply been a disappointment. In many ways it 
embodied a great success. Almost the entire workforce of Wallonia had self-organised 
a spontaneous insurrectionary movement that, for a while at least, had stood in open 
opposition to its own representation (the leftist leadership and its representative 
structures). In this, Hiver ’60 looked back to the Hungarian Uprising, four years 
earlier,326 and forward to what would be May ’68. Vaneigem, and other Situationists, 
may well have been an important conduit for how the link between the two was made. 
 Above it was shown that Vaneigem was very much situated in the working-
class communities that were the ones to enact the movement of Hiver ’60. When the 
strike took place Vaneigem was working at a lycée in Nivelles, a steel-working town 
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not far from Lessines, and as a teacher was part of one of the important sectors to take 
action from the beginning. In Paris, Hiver ’60 was seen as an important moment of 
working-class action against the official Left. Guy Debord at the time was associated 
with the Socialisme ou barbarie journal, the organ of Pouvoir ouvrier (PO) of which 
he was then a member, that planned to do a special edition on it. He asked Pierre 
Guillaume of SoB to speak to Vaneigem, as a comrade on the ground, on a fact-
finding mission to Belgium. There had up to this point been no direct contact between 
Debord and Vaneigem. Eventually, Vaneigem contacted Debord directly for the first 
time in a letter dated the 24th of January. Debord replied amicably on the 31st. He 
regretted that they had been unable to meet in Paris due to events, ‘mais tout de 
même, la grève était mieux’.327 
 Neither Vaneigem nor the SI published a direct statement about Hiver ’60 at 
the time.328 However, Vaneigem has made it very clear that Hiver ’60 was a central 
element to the origins of his collaboration with Debord and his membership of the SI, 
‘Les grèves, qui inaugurèrent, en Belgique, les années 1960, nous autorisaient à porter 
à la révolution de la vie quotidienne un toast dont les mots se sont perdus mais dont 
les échos n’ont pas fini de résonner’.329 Hiver ’60 was evidence of a new momentum 
in the international workers’ movement. Vaneigem suggests here that it provided 
impetus to the development of Situationist critique in the 1960s; the period that 
prepared for May ’68. There are many ways in which this may well be the case. 
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 Vaneigem joined the SI in the immediate aftermath of Hiver ’60. His entry 
into the SI came at a point of massive change in the organisation. Previously, there 
had been some debate within the SI from the ‘right’ or ‘artist’ wing of the group over 
its ‘political’ nature; they disagreed with the possibility of proletarian revolution due 
to the apparent satisfaction of workers and an incapacity to act against their own 
bureaucracy.330 As will be discussed in the following chapter, Vaneigem was crucial 
in the rejection of this artistic tendency at the Gothenburg conference in the summer 
of 1961.331 The Situationist International focused on the development of a coherent 
critique of contemporary capitalism and the revolutionary milieu from this point 
onward. Vaneigem was key to this process as the author of major theoretical texts 
such as ‘Banalités de Base’ and Traité de savoir-vivre à l’usage des jeunes 
générations.332 Is it possible that Hiver ’60 was therefore a kind of galvanising 
moment for the SI? 
 Certainly a number of the themes of Hiver ’60 appear to be directly taken up 
in Traité (written between 1962 and 1965). The phenomenon of the blousons noirs, 
for example, as an emergent rebellious social group is a point of interest for 
Vaneigem: 
 
S’il existe aujourd’hui un phénomène international assez semblable au 
mouvement Dada, il faut le reconnaître dans les plus belles manifestations de 
blousons noirs. Même mépris de l’art et des valeurs bourgeoises, même refus 
des idéologies, même volonté de vivre. Même ignorance de l’histoire, même 
révolte rudimentaire, même absence de tactique.333 
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Vaneigem recognises the potential of this group that had been so active in events in 
Belgium. However, the blousons noirs is also an object of critique. The sentiments of 
the blouson noir are well founded. They reject the official left along with bourgeois 
society. But it is a milieu that still lacks a critical coherence behind its practice. It is 
essentially a nihilist rejection of capitalist society that lacks ‘la conscience du 
dépassement possible’.334 It is still a consciousness trapped within capitalist social 
categories. 
 It is important that this consideration comes in what is arguably the central 
chapter of Traité, ‘Le refus en porte à faux’. It is here that Vaneigem examines the 
various ideologies that have perverted revolutionary history. Perhaps most significant 
is the way in which a representation of the proletariat comes to stand against it in its 
moments of revolutionary ascendancy: 
 
Dès que le peuple en armes renonce à sa propre volonté pour suivre celle de 
ses conseillers, il perd l’emploi de sa liberté et couronne, sous le titre ambigu 
de dirigeants révolutionnaires, ses oppresseurs de demain.335 
 
 
Such is exactly what had happened at the height of Hiver ’60. In this Hiver ’60 is no 
different than so many other social movements that have given over their 
management to a representative structure. But Hiver ’60 was also the most recent and 
the only movement of this type that Vaneigem had yet taken a direct part in. The 
argument here is the same as that made by Guy Debord in what is also arguably the 
central chapter of La Société du Spectacle, ‘Le Proletariat comme sujet et comme 
représentation’. The working class is at a point where its own representation has 
become an autonomous force that stands against it. So many workers had found this 
theory a concrete reality in Belgium in the winter of 1960-1961, as Vaneigem and 
                                                
334 Ibid., pp. 234-235. 
335 Ibid., p. 216. 
	   	  130 
Debord well knew. What is interesting is that it is only after Hiver ’60 that these 
questions come to the centre of their writing. 
 
A lot of assumptions about the history of the SI are challenged if it is the case that 
Hiver ’60 marked the point at which it would become the group that would prepare 
the way for May ’68. The expulsion of the artists is more clearly the result of their 
failure to respond to the real movement of workers. Raoul Vaneigem can be seen as a 
bearer of the momentum Hiver ’60 and the radical history of his home region brought 
to the group. The two major theoretical works that the SI published in 1967, Traité 
and La Société du Spectacle, should be seen as much in the context of this earlier 
social movement to which they responded as to the one they would ultimately come 
to influence. In many ways May ’68 surpassed Hiver ’60 in its rejection of this 
autonomous representation of the revolutionary movement that stands against it. It 
was the SI in those years between that had most undertaken the critique necessary to 
make this a reality. The struggle of workers in May ’68 would therefore connect 
directly to Hiver ’60 through the critical work of Raoul Vaneigem and the other 
Situationists. 
 
The Belgian Avant-garde: Surrealism and Proletarian Literature in Hainaut 
 
Our discussion of the relationship between Raoul Vaneigem and Belgian modernity 
has up to this point focused exclusively on his direct experience of class struggle and 
working-class life in Hainaut. There is, however, another crucial aspect to his 
hennuyer background: the radical cultural tradition of the region. Hainaut has a 
surprisingly rich avant-garde heritage for an old and largely unrecognised industrial 
	   	  131 
backwater of Northern Europe. It was in Hainaut, for example, that Van Gogh 
decided to renounce a church career in order to pursue the life of an artist. He was 
inspired to do so, in part, due to the deep connection that he, like many artists and 
poets before and after him, developed with local workers, describing their ‘festering 
and deep rooted hatred and […] innate distrust of anyone who tries to boss them 
around’.336 Rimbaud and Verlaine also travelled here, both writing evocative poems, 
‘Au Cabaret-Vert’ and ‘Charleroi’ respectively, on this industrial Black Country.337 
Hainaut is far more interesting, however, for its indigenous tradition of counter-
cultural movements that Vaneigem, at least, suggests extends back as far as the 
Movement of the Free Spirit in the Middle Ages,338 and forward all the way to the 
Surrealists such as René Magritte and Louis Scutenaire, both, like Vaneigem, natives 
of Lessines. 
 Throughout his life and work Raoul Vaneigem has consistently and explicitly 
drawn upon and even promoted the radical cultural history of Hainaut. One of the first 
articles that Vaneigem ever published was on the work of the hennuyer Surrealist Pol 
Bury,339 and, even as early as ‘Banalités de base’, he can be observed citing Marcel 
                                                
336 Vincent Van Gogh, letter to Theo Van Gogh, April 1789, Vangoghletters.org. Web 15 June 2012. 
Van Gogh actually visited some of the mines of Le Borinage and lived with a borin miner for a period; 
his famous ‘Potato eaters’ series was partly inspired by Hainaut. Vaneigem also lists Van Gogh as one 
of his three favourite painters, see Conversation, p. 43. 
337 Verlaine was actually imprisoned in Charleroi for two years after shooting and wounding Rimbaud. 
His poem evokes the ever-dominating industrial landscape of Hainaut: ‘Plutôt des bouges / Que des 
maisons. / Quels horizons / De forges rouges! / […] Sites brutaux! / Oh! votre haleine, / Sueur humaine 
/ Cris des métaux!’, Paul Verlaine, ‘Charleroi’ [1872], Poésies complète (Paris: Éditions de La 
Banderole, 1923), pp. 177-178. 
338  ‘C’est dans les villes du Rhin—Cologne, Mayence, Strasbourg—et les cités du Nord—
Valenciennes, Amiens, Cambrai, Tournai, Bruxelles, Anvers—que le Libre-Esprit se manifeste avec le 
plus de détermination et, comme disent les historiens, sous ses formes les plus grossières’, Libre-
Esprit, p. 138. Tournai is a town in Hainaut, just East of Lille, very close to Lessines and Ath where 
Vaneigem is from. Brussels is also very nearby. 
339 Raoul Vaneigem, ‘Pol Bury ou l’Humour rétractile’, Synthèses, Revue Internationale, 179 (1961), 
pp. 298- 299. 
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Havrenne, another Surrealist of Hainaut.340 In 1984 he produced a never-realised film 
script, a biopic in fact, based on the life of Charles-Joseph de Ligne, a native of 
Hainaut, who stands, alongside Casanova, as one of the greatest memoirists of the 
eighteenth century.341 In 1991 Vaneigem published a book on the life and work of 
Louis Scutenaire (in large part a reprint of the latter’s Mes Inscriptions).342 Finally, in 
1999, Vaneigem released Sur les pas des écrivains en Hainaut, under the pseudonym 
Robert Desassarts, a comprehensive introduction to the literature of the region that 
demonstrates an encyclopaedic knowledge of its authors and history. 343  Taken 
together these references and publications denote a close association between 
Vaneigem and this cultural aspect of Belgian or, even more specifically, hennuyer 
modernity that deserves closer analysis. 
 
In order to understand the specificity of the relationship between the Belgian avant-
garde and Vaneigem it is first necessary to give an idea of the Situationist relationship 
with culture in general and with Parisian Surrealism in particular. It is important to 
stress that the term ‘culture’ for the Situationists does not refer to the universal 
production of signs and symbols. Rather, ‘culture’, for the SI, denotes a specific set of 
historical relationships under which these are produced. In capitalist society the 
symbolic sphere exists as a realm of human activity that is separate from everyday 
                                                
340 ‘Pour qui assortit de violence l’humour de Marcel Havrenne écrivant si joliment ‘il ne s’agit pas de 
gouverner et encore moins de l’être’, il n’y a ni salut ni damnation’, ‘Banalités de base’, Internationale 
situationniste, 7 (April 1962) p. 41. 
341 This is one of the more surprising new documents I discovered in my bibliographical research in the 
archives of the Royal Library in Brussels. Although it has little bearing on his contribution to the SI or 
his critical theory, the script is quite interesting in its own right. No doubt highly influenced by Stanley 
Kubrik’s Barry Lyndon (1975), it follows the comic, sexual and philosophical escapades of de Ligne 
and his manservant against the backdrop of eighteenth-century European society. See Raoul Vaneigem, 
‘Charles-Joseph de Ligne’ (unpublished film script, 1984), Archives et Musée de la littérature, 
Bibliothèque Royale Albert I, Brussels, Côté: MEM TOO972M. Elsewhere, Vaneigem describes de 
Ligne as a ‘Diderot futile’ who, though lacking the same spirit of revolt, shares a certain charm, see 
Raoul Vaneigem [Robert Desassarts],  Sur les pas des écrivains en Hainaut (Brussels: L’Octogone, 
1999), p. 69. 
342 Louis Scutenaire, op. cit. 
343 Sur les pas, op. cit. 
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life.344 Historically, this has meant that art had some degree of autonomy from direct 
implication in commodity production, although it embodied what we could call the 
‘dark side’ of its reproduction,345 and it made rich, qualitative experience the preserve 
of a purely symbolic form of social practice, a mere representation. The Situationists 
therefore saw culture as a mode of social praxis specific to capitalist society that, at 
worst, provided ideological justification of that society, and at best, expressed the 
possibility of rich unified experience but one that in the form of art could exist only as 
an ideal. The Situationists therefore sought to abolish culture as a separate sphere of 
human activity, what Debord terms the ‘dépassement de l’art’,346 in order to realise it 
in the qualitatively rich and passionate creation of our everyday lives. Moreover, this 
could necessarily not be achieved by abolishing culture alone but it implied the 
abolition of all social separations, from the economy to the state. It should be added 
that, at the time the Situationists were writing, culture was becoming more directly 
implicated in economic reproduction, particularly in the form of advertising for the 
new consumer-based economy. This process they described as the ‘décomposition’ of 
art or ‘la crise de la culture’.347 
 This critique of culture and art is what defined the Situationist relationship 
with the avant-garde in general and with the Parisian avant-garde in particular. The SI 
obviously emerged out of the avant-garde tradition of contesting the culture of 
bourgeois society but what separated it from what came before, in their eyes, was an 
                                                
344 For a detailed version of the Situationist critique of culture, see Debord, Œuvres, pp. 843-855; see 
also, Raoul Vaneigem [Jules-François Dupuis], Histoire désinvolte du surréalisme [1977] (Paris: 
Éditions de l’Instant, 1988), pp. 7-46. What is presented here is an interpretation based on a synthesis 
of these two primary sources. 
345 I am referring here to Anselm Jappe’s theory of the ‘dark side’ of value that refers to those areas of 
capitalist reproduction—such as childcare within the family—that are not necessarily directly mediated 
by value but are nonetheless indirectly essential to its continued existence. See the chapter ‘‘Le côté 
obscur’ de la valeur et le don’ in Anselm Jappe, Crédit à mort, pp. 129-154. 
346 Debord, Œuvres, p. 847. This was also the title of painting by Debord with these words, see ibid., p. 
p. 654. 
347 Debord, Œuvres, p. 845; Vaneigem, Histoire désinvolte, p. 7. 
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awareness that culture itself needed to be overcome and that this implied a total 
transformation of every aspect of human society. The Situationists therefore situated 
themselves in a Hegelian teleology of cultural history: The Dadaist movement had 
sought to destroy culture absolutely but had failed to realise its message of a free 
creative life beyond social separations. Surrealism had sought, in turn, to realise the 
symbolic possibilities of culture but without first seeking to abolish it along with the 
totalising critique of capitalist society that entails.348 As such, Dada had simply 
dissolved into pure nihilistic destruction; while, by the late 1950s, Surrealism had 
only served to reinvigorate it (and advertising) despite its original revolutionary 
professions. The Situationists claimed to overcome both Surrealism and Dada by 
seeking to realise and abolish art and culture through the creation of a coherent 
totalising critical praxis aimed at the abolition of all capitalist social categories and 
the creation of a passionate, consciously creative, existence beyond them.349 
 
While the core of this position had already been established before he joined the 
group, as can be seen from the first issue of Internationale situationniste,350 Raoul 
Vaneigem would very quickly make it is his own and enrich it in a number of 
significant ways. As several authors have explored, most notably Jérôme Duwa in his, 
Surréalistes et situationnistes, vies parallèles (2008), there are a number of important 
points of connection between the SI and the Parisian Surrealists.351 Certainly, both 
Debord and Vaneigem, along with the rest of the SI, were avid readers of its major 
                                                
348 ‘Le dadaïsme a voulu supprimer l’art sans le réaliser; et le surréalisme a voulu réaliser l’art sans le 
supprimer’, Debord, Œuvres, p. 848. 
349 ‘La position critique élaborée […] par les situationnistes a montré que la suppression et la 
réalisation de l’art sont les aspects inséparables d’un même dépassement de l’art’, Debord, Œuvres, p. 
848. 
350 In particular the very first article by the SI ‘Amère victoire du surréalisme’ and the subsequent 
‘Définitions’, see Internationale situationniste, 1 (June 1958), pp. 3-4, 13-14. 
351 Jérôme Duwa, Surréalistes et situationnistes, vies parallèles (Paris: Dilecta, 2008). 
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and minor figures, from André Breton and Philippe Soupault to Paul Éluard and 
Georges Bataille. In the main we can say that the Situationists took from the Parisian 
Surrealists the idea of an avant-garde group that practiced inclusion and exclusion in 
order to retain a certain theoretical coherence, the practice of scandal as a means of 
political provocation, and the critique of the boredom of everyday life that rested 
upon the rediscovery, or even recreation, of the world as a place full of possibilities 
for subjective adventure and intense experience. 
 The most prominent contribution of Raoul Vaneigem to this subject, outside 
Traité and, presumably, debates within the SI, was his Histoire désinvolte du 
surréalisme first published under a pseudonym in 1977 but originally written towards 
the end of his time in the Situationist International.352 Vaneigem focuses his account 
of the history of Surrealism in particular on its Parisian expression. Vaneigem gives 
due credit to the Parisian Surrealists for a number of aspects of their work. He claims, 
for example, that one can find in parts of the work of Breton a veritable denunciation 
of ‘survival’ (as defined in the previous chapter).353 Further, Vaneigem also brings 
attention to the concern of the Surrealists with feeling and the primacy that this gives 
to areas of subjectivity usually excluded in critical discussion. 354  Indeed, the 
Surrealists, for Vaneigem, were reincorporating into our notion of subjectivity 
elements that are often excluded in capitalist ideas of human creativity and agency 
such as love, the unconscious and dreams.355 Above all, however, Vaneigem sees the 
Surrealists as a kind of didactic literary movement that popularised revolutionary 
authors such as Fourier and, of most significance to himself, Isidore Ducasse, le 
                                                
352 Significantly, Vaneigem originally published the book under the pseudonym Jules-François Dupuis, 
the name of Isidore Ducasse’s landlord, the last person to see the author of Les Chants de Maldoror 
alive. 
353 Histoire désinvolte, p. 47. 
354 Ibid., pp. 64-65. 
355 Ibid. pp. 66-68, 74-78, 78-80. 
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Comte de Lautréamont.356 The influence of Parisian Surrealism, and the movement 
more generally on Vaneigem, as for the rest of the SI, is therefore patently obvious. 
 However, what is perhaps more important and, indeed, more interesting about 
this relationship is the absolute vehemence of the critique that Vaneigem levels at 
Surrealism, and particularly its Parisian manifestation, in this work. The central point 
of this critique is Vaneigem’s claim that Surrealism was essentially a literary and 
artistic movement despite its revolutionary voluntarism and rhetoric. Vaneigem 
argues that the Surrealists proved themselves incapable of developing a coherent 
theoretical and practical critique of capitalist society.357 He suggests that this was in 
large part due to the essentially artistic concerns of the Surrealists grouped around 
Breton. The Surrealists, he argues, therefore had revolutionary intentions on a 
subjective level but objectively they were prone to compromise with culture.358 
Although Breton celebrated subjectivity and called for the transformation of everyday 
life he was unable therefore to attach them to a critical social praxis and as such he 
simply turned authentic desires for freedom into an aesthetic.359 The Surrealists 
therefore condemned themselves to merely harrying official culture as a counter-
cultural movement and presented nothing more than a revolution of the mind.360 As 
such, it was almost inevitable that the Surrealists should leave the main thrust of the 
revolution to the Communist Party, to which they would eventually adhere, because 
they never became the revolutionary theorists they should have been. 361  The 
Surrealists, for the most part, thereby turned a project of human emancipation into 
                                                
356 Ibid., p. 15. 
357 Ibid., pp. 53-54. 
358 Ibid., pp. 19-20. 
359 Ibid., pp. 65-66. 
360 Ibid., p. 66. 
361 ‘ces jeunes gens qui eussent dû s’affirmer comme théoriciens et praticiens de la révolution de la vie 
quotidienne, se contenteront d’en être les artistes, menant une guerre d’escarmouches à la société 
bourgeoise comme s’il appartenait au parti communiste de lancer l’offensive’, ibid., pp. 53-54. 
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support for the most authoritarian of pseudo-revolutionary institutions. Vaneigem 
argues that the Surrealists therefore served only to renovate the Spectacle362. They 
embodied what he calls a ‘reformist’ movement,363 an ‘ideology’ of liberation,364 
which on the one hand, proposed a merely cultural critique of culture and, on the 
other, hid the real potential of the proletariat’s own spontaneous revolutionary activity 
to abolish Spectacular society.365 
 
With the critical relationship between Parisian Surrealism and Raoul Vaneigem 
established, we can now turn to his specific ties to Surrealism in Hainaut. The idea of 
an important link between the Situationists and the Surrealists of Belgium has already 
been suggested by several critics. Andrew Hussey, for example, argues that Louis 
Scutenaire acted as a ‘bridge’ between the pre- and post-war avant-gardes, in 
particular the Situationists, due to the fact that his poetic techniques are rooted in ‘the 
real politics of class struggle and violent revolution’.366 Yves Di Manno, in turn, 
suggests that Paul Nougé was a precursor of Guy Debord because both authors sought 
to abolish the separation between art and life.367 Indeed, Debord seems to have had 
more direct contact with the Belgian Surrealists than those in Paris. He corresponded 
with Marcel Mariën and published a number of important Situationist texts in the 
Belgian Surrealist journal Les Lèvres nues. 368  Neither Hussey nor Di Manno, 
                                                
362 Ibid., p. 15. 
363 Ibid., p. 18, 50. 
364 Ibid., p. 41. 
365 Ibid., p. 15, pp. 70-71. 
366  Andrew Hussey, ‘The Splendours of Hatred: Louis Scutenaire between Surrealism and 
Situationism’ in From Art Nouveau to Surrealism. Belgian Modernity in the Making, ed. Nathalie 
Aubert and others (London: Legenda, 2007), pp. 190-198 (p. 191, 194). 
367 Yves Di Manno, ‘La révolution la nuit’, Europe, 912 (2005), pp. 74-79. 
368 See, for example, Guy Debord, ‘Introduction à une critique de la géographie urbaine’, 6 Les Lèvres 
nues (September 1955); ‘Mode d’emploi du détournement’, 8 Les Lèvres nues (May 1956); ‘Théorie de 
la dérive’, Les Lèvres nues, 9 (November 1956). In 1953 the Situationists also sent a response to a 
questionnaire published in an issue of La Carte d’après nature, edited by René Magritte, see Debord, 
Œuvres, p. 119. 
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however, have much to say about the relationship between Vaneigem and the Belgian 
Surrealists.369 Yet, as was noted above, this influence was clearly far more extensive 
for Vaneigem than for any other Situationist. Moreover, although for him no branch 
of Surrealism escapes the negative critique given above, in a later article, ‘La section 
des piques du surréalisme’, first published in 2002, Vaneigem contrasts the Surrealist 
project in Hainaut against Parisian Surrealism as a more radical expression of the 
Surrealist movement.370 
  In this article Vaneigem suggests that, where the Parisian Surrealists were, 
despite their protestations to the contrary, far more interested in literature than in 
revolution, the hennuyer Surrealists were, at least to begin with, more genuinely 
concerned with the struggles of the working class against commodity society.371 The 
reason for this, Vaneigem argues, is not due to any volontarism on their part, but 
rather, due to the pervasive proletarian culture and the radical history, which we have 
discussed above.372 What is more, where the Surrealist movement in Paris was 
dominated by the authoritarian grip of André Breton, in Hainaut Surrealism enjoyed 
far more liberty of association and action.373 Vaneigem therefore suggests that we 
could think of the Surrealist group in Hainaut as Surrealism’s ‘section des piques’, 
after one of the most radical sections of the city of Paris during the Revolution, and of 
which the Marquis De Sade was an important member.374 If what he says is the case it 
is highly significant because it would suggest that this branch of Surrealism emerged 
out of exactly the same milieu, albeit of an earlier generation, as Vaneigem himself.  
 
                                                
369 Hussey does make passing reference to the publication of Vaneigem’s Louis Scutenaire but without 
exploring the relationship much further. 
370 ‘La section des piques’, op. cit. 
371 Ibid., pp. 102-103. 
372 Ibid. 
373 Ibid. 
374 Ibid. p. 103. 
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There is, in fact, a lot of evidence to support the idea that the Surrealists of 
Hainaut were radicalised specifically by their links with the struggles and lives of the 
hennuyer working class. To begin with many of the Surrealists of Hainaut and 
associated figures came from working-class families. Paul (Pol) Bury, for example, 
was the son of a car mechanic.375 Marcel Pofondry’s father was a miner and René 
Lefebvre’s father was a worker.376 Alphonse Bourlard (1903-1969), better known by 
his pseudonym Constant Malva, a proletarian literature author and a member of the 
original Surrealist group in Hainaut, called Rupture, was himself a coal miner who 
worked in the mines of Le Borinage for most of his life. Although some of the more 
well-known figures such as Louis Scutenaire were from more middle-class 
backgrounds, they were still close to the local working-class community, which was 
pervasive in this region. Somewhat symbolically, where Guy Debord had attended the 
same school as Lautréamont in Pau, Vaneigem attended the same local school in 
Lessines (and later university) as had Louis Scutenaire many years before. 
More than these sociological factors, however, in the original Surrealist group 
in Hainaut, named Rupture after its journal founded in 1934, there was clearly a 
conscious desire to connect up with the struggles of the hennuyer proletariat. Achille 
Chavée, poet and co-founder of the group, is actually very explicit that it was this 
merger of Surrealist ideas from Paris with the revolutionary activity of the local 
working class that provided the original impetus for the first Surrealist group in 
Hainaut: 
 
Le groupe Rupture était fondé en Mars ’34. Mais le point de départ, c’était 
évidemment la découverte […] du Surréalisme, de Paris, naturellement. Et 
aussi, le phénomène des grandes grèves à caractère révolutionnaire de 1932. 
Nous avons été très sensibilisés par ces évènements et nous avons fait 
                                                
375 Paul Aron, La littérature prolétarienne en Belgique francophone depuis 1900 [1995] (Brussels: 
Labor, 2006), p. 174. 
376 Ibid. 
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naturellement la synthèse entre la situation et l’aspect culturel du problème. 
[…] Rupture, nous voulions indiquer par ce terme non-conformisme total […] 
radical […] à l’égard [de] la culture bourgeoise.377 
 
 
It is quite clear from these words that Chavée is still reproducing to some extent the 
social separation between culture and politics that Vaneigem is so quick to critique in 
his Histoire désinvolte du surréalisme. However, there is also a certain unity to them 
in the consciousness that it is the revolutionary activity of the working class itself that 
is providing the original inspiration behind their interest in Surrealism. The issue of 
culture, for Chavée as for the Situationists later, cannot be disassociated from the real 
struggles of radical movements against capitalism. Moreover, as in Hiver ’60, the 
strikes that shook Le Borinage in 1932 were also characterised to some extent by 
clashes of interest between workers and their representatives. At the time, this was 
framed somewhat in terms of a battle between revolutionaries and reformists. It is 
striking that, just as Vaneigem would later join the SI in 1961 in the aftermath of 
Hiver ’60, it seems these other hennuyer figures joined up with another Paris-based 
avant-garde movement much earlier under similar circumstances. 
  
As we saw above, the central criticism Vaneigem aims at Surrealism is that it was not 
able to create its own coherent theoretical and practical critique of capitalist society. It 
is reasonable therefore to assume that, in claiming the Surrealist movement in Hainaut 
embodied a more radical project than that undertaken in Paris, Vaneigem believes the 
connection of the Belgian Surrealists to local working-class movements was 
concretely reflected in their critical praxis. In ‘La section des piques’, it is clear that 
Vaneigem believes one of the high points of the Surrealist group in Hainaut was its 
                                                
377 Magritte, groupe Surréaliste de Bruxelles et Rupture (1920-1939) 1 (Sub Rosa, 2007), CD. 
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production of critical, and often humorous, aphoristic statements. 378  Vaneigem 
reproduces a number of these aphorisms in his text. Taken together they could be 
thought of as a guide by Vaneigem to the group’s most lucid theoretical positions 
from his perspective. 
First, Vaneigem is particularly keen to highlight that the Surrealists of Hainaut 
rejected regionalism and expressed strong anti-nationalist convictions. He goes so far 
as to say that there is no such thing as ‘Belgian Surrealism’ because the Surrealists of 
Belgium always rejected any national identity.379 This statement should also be 
understood in the sense that in this article Vaneigem is explicitly not trying to make 
claims to Surrealism as part of a regionalist identity.380 On the contrary, he is saying 
that it had and continues to have international implications. As evidence of this anti-
regionalism on the part of the Surrealists of Hainaut, Vaneigem cites, to begin with, 
Louis Scutenaire, who made the tongue-in-cheek call for all peoples to stay where 
they belong, ‘les Maoris au Groenland, les Basques en Éthopie, […] les Picards à 
Samos’;381 and later on in the text, this moribund and humoristic pun by Achille 
Chavée: ‘la patrie repose dans la tombe’.382 Of course, these aphorisms do not amount 
to a ‘theory’ in the sense of a highly developed set of abstract proposals and 
assertions, but they are still theory in that they embody critical ideas that imply a 
rejection of a certain kind of social practice: specifically the rejection of movements 
of emancipation within nationalistic frameworks.383 
                                                
378 ‘cette formule qui a la clarté d’un éclair, répercutant de loin en loin son tonnerre’, ‘La section des 
piques’, p. 105. 
379 Ibid., p. 102. 
380 Ibid. 
381 Cited in Vaneigem, ‘La Section des Piques’, p. 102. The hennuyer working class spoke a Picard 
dialect so it is quite clear Scutenaire is referring to his home region too. 
382 Ibid., p. 106. 
383 Vaneigem also cites Havrenne’s ‘Il ne s’agit pas de gouverner et encore moins de l’être’, ibid. 
p.107, which also suggests that these anti-nationalistic statements may have been accompanied by a 
critique of the state and hierarchy more generally. 
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Secondly, the Surrealists of Hainaut, Vaneigem shows us, critiqued the sphere 
of circulation and exchange. He cites, for example, a boldly blunt détournement by 
Marcel Havrenne of the Emperor Vespasian: ‘L’argent n’a pas d’odeur mais il fait 
puer tout le reste’.384 This rather folkish statement is accompanied by another, more 
world-weary and knowing, aphorism by Chavée: ‘On fait des terribles économies sur 
le néant’.385 And along with this, Vaneigem includes Chavée’s even more irreverent 
statement: ‘J’ai pissé sur cent mètres de banque’.386 Again, these proclamations do not 
amount to a fully developed theoretical discussion as one finds in a work of theory, 
but this is what we could term radical poetry, and as we saw in the previous chapter, 
for Vaneigem, radical poetry merges to some extent with revolutionary theory. The 
rejection of exchange by the Surrealists of Hainaut is therefore an important aspect of 
the revolutionary ideas that they were putting forward in their work; that it takes the 
form of a simple aphorism does not diminish this fact. 
Thirdly, the citations that Vaneigem makes demonstrate that the hennuyer 
Surrealists also critiqued the sphere of production. The key figure in this respect is 
Louis Scutenaire who it is clear Vaneigem considers to be the leading light of much 
of what was most lucid about the avant-garde project in Belgium. For example, 
Scutenaire provides much jocular insight into unemployment that would have been a 
highly visible problem for his community: ‘Le chômage est déplaisant parce qu’il 
n’est pas tout à fait généralisé’.387 If the absolute rejection of work is not clear enough 
in this latter statement, Vaneigem provides us with another example by Scutenaire 
that is even more to the point: ‘Je hais le travail au point de ne pouvoir l’exiger des 
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autres’.388 The critique of the sphere of production actually puts Scutenaire into direct 
conflict with the theories of Orthodox Marxism, which traditionally has always seen 
production as a merely technical issue and identified capitalism solely with the sphere 
of exchange. It therefore mirrors the critique of work that the Situationists would later 
launch on the world with the demand: ‘Ne travaillez jamais’.389  
It seems obvious therefore that Vaneigem sees in the Surrealists of Hainaut a 
foreshadowing of certain aspects of future Situationist praxis. Of course, the 
Situationists would take this to another level, developing a rich body of critical theory 
that the Surrealists were never able to attain themselves, but this does not detract from 
an obvious degree of influence. Indeed, although we have limited our discussion here 
to those elements highlighted by Vaneigem, further examination of the works of 
hennuyer Surrealists are brimming with proto-Situationist notions. For example, 
despite the fact that he would later become a well-known artist, Pol Bury, in his Les 
Caves Botanique of 1938, gives voice to an anti-art sentiment that is clearly rooted in 
this connection of the Surrealists of Hainaut with the local working class and even 
evokes the possibility of a ‘poésie vécue’.390 The work of Scutenaire, in particular 
Mes Inscriptions that Vaneigem took such pains to reprint, is, moreover, full of 
statements to the effect that we have discussed above. There is a language here that 
clearly finds a later outlet in the work of Vaneigem, himself a writer gifted with the 
aphoristic turn of phrase, and even in the graffiti that found its way onto the walls of 
Paris during May ’68 
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Albeit not strictly speaking surrealist, the proletarian literature of Hainaut is another 
local counter-cultural movement that Vaneigem refers to in ‘La section des piques’. 
He focuses in particular on the work of Constant Malva, referred to above, who was a 
member of the Rupture group and a life-long friend of many of the key hennuyer 
Surrealists. Founded in the 1930s by the French author Henri Poulaille, proletarian 
literature broke with traditional literary movements by rejecting aesthetic innovation 
as its foundation in order to instead seek the quality of ‘authenticity’. This 
authenticity was established by the fact that the author of the proletarian literature text 
had to be an actual member of the working class, or at least from that background, 
who wrote about, or from the perspective of, his own lived experiences of work and 
proletarian life.391 As was noted in the previous chapter, Raoul Vaneigem also places 
a lot of store in the notion of authenticity being rooted in lived experience so it seems 
likely, given his interest in Constant Malva, that proletarian literature may provide a 
source of inspiration for this conceptualisation of revolutionary praxis in his work. 
 Born in Hainaut in 1903, Malva followed his father into the mines of Le 
Borinage at the age of 15.392 Although he gained some minor literary success in later 
life, he came directly from this mining milieu and he worked as a miner for most of 
his existence. In ‘La section des piques’, Vaneigem displays an easy familiarity with 
the writing of Malva, citing from several of his works, and he describes him as the 
author of some of the most authentic texts in the proletarian literature movement.393 
Indeed, Malva is an extremely sensitive and honest author who takes great pains to 
document through anecdote, conversation and, occasionally, novelisation, his life and 
the lives of his community, his family and his friends. The frankness with which he 
treats the lives of those associated with Hainaut’s extraction industries is often highly 
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subversive. He records the suffering, the alcoholism, domestic abuse and the sheer 
levels of destructive physical exploitation endured by the mining community at the 
root of it all. Far from picturesque, the mine in his work is a place that every single 
miner wishes himself and his sons to escape but which somehow proves impossible to 
leave. In his own assessment of Malva, Vaneigem highlights how the author faithfully 
records the workers’ rejection of work, a sentiment that the Situationist claims is 
‘enranciné dans le prolétariat’ but which has always been actively obscured by leftist 
ideologues.394 Vaneigem is also clearly impressed with the way in which Malva 
honestly records his own subjective frustrations as a member of the hennuyer working 
class, both as a militant frustrated with the leftist milieu and more generally as a 
human being struggling with the emotional isolation of capitalist social relations to 
the point that he contemplates suicide.395 
 Whether or not the proletarian literature of Malva provided the theoretical 
impulse behind the notions of authenticity that Vaneigem develops in his own writing, 
it is a fascinating body of work that tells us much about the working-class milieu in 
which the avant-garde counter-cultural movements of Belgian modernity developed. 
Indeed, due to the fact that the economy of Hainaut did not shake off its nineteenth-
century character until well into the 1960s, Malva could be read alongside Zola’s 
Germinal (1885), a novel set just over the border from Hainaut with a similar Picard 
language and culture, in a world that was not unfamiliar to hennuyer workers growing 
up in the first half of the twentieth century.396 
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I have now examined some of the specific ways in which Raoul Vaneigem may have 
been influenced by the counter-cultural movements of Hainaut and his opinion of 
them. The weight of evidence suggests that the hennuyer avant-garde is an important 
context in which to consider Vaneigem and some of the sources of his contribution to 
the SI. Is it possible then to situate the life and work of Raoul Vaneigem within a 
cultural historical trend that has been termed ‘Belgian modernity’ and into which 
these same Surrealists have already been grouped?  
In From Art Nouveau to Surrealism, Belgian Modernity in the Making (2007), 
Nathalie Aubert and others define the characteristics of Belgian modernity as 
‘distance’, ‘doubleness’ and ‘negation’.397 First, they note that Belgian avant-gardes 
have typically harnessed themselves to metropolitan centres such as Paris in order to 
move beyond their own national boundaries.398 But equally, Belgian culture also 
retains a certain regional quality and is keen to stress its peculiarities. 399  The 
Surrealists, Aubert and others claim, played ‘a game of distance and proximity’ with 
their associates in France. 400  Moreover, they state that prominent sources of 
inspiration, including Berlin and Paris, cannot be considered ‘foreign’ sources of 
influence.401 This is because Belgium contains ‘the Nordic, the Latinate, the French 
and Germanic, the Walloon and the Flemish’ within it.402 The Belgian writer, Aubert 
and others conclude, ‘does not have to look to Paris in order to look outside 
himself’.403 Secondly, they assert that Belgian culture is at home with ambiguity and 
duality.404 It is characterised by ‘hybrid sensibilities’ and paradox.405 Belgian avant-
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gardes constantly escape easy classifications and consciously bring them into 
question.406 Thirdly and finally, they argue that many Belgian modernists often prefer 
‘the double negative as the only credible positive’, or ‘anti-definition’, and celebrate 
‘plurality and internal dissent’.407 In this respect, Aubert and others argue, the practice 
of subversion and détournement as well as a certain ‘anti-ambition’, an avoidance of 
literary fame, is typical of the Belgian avant-garde.408 
In terms of ‘distance’ Vaneigem is clearly part of this traditional game of 
distance and proximity. He associates himself with members of the Parisian section of 
the SI and the class struggle in Paris. At the same time, he is self-consciously 
hennuyer. As a member of the SI he was nicknamed ‘La Vampire du Borinage’ and 
his work is full of an evident interest in the radical counter-cultural history of his 
home. Moreover, in his more autobiographical writing, Vaneigem roots much of his 
early intellectual development in his working-class background and the history of 
class struggle he inherited from his community. He therefore stresses, like many 
writers from Belgium, both his distinctness and autonomy from Paris. Yet he is also 
keen to embrace what is useful to him and be part of an international project. His is a 
typically hard to classify anti-regionalist, regional interest. The work of Raoul 
Vaneigem is evidently characterised by a certain ‘doubleness’. He employs the double 
negative as a tool to break through the over-simplifications of capitalist society in 
order to access a more complex theoretical and practical reality. Vaneigem asks us, 
for example, to be ‘maîtres sans esclaves’;409 he speaks of the false distinction 
between ‘réel et imaginaire’,410 and continually describes life in the contemporary 
world as a kind of living death or death in life. The work of Vaneigem is also clearly 
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characterised by ‘negation’. The abolition of capitalist social relations and the 
corollary realisation of human freedom in communist society is the essence of his 
project. For Vaneigem, negation, as an aspect of revolutionary praxis, exists as the 
desire to transform the world, to replace la volonté de puissance with la volonté de 
vivre, work with creativity, inhumanity with humanity. 
Given the number of parallels between the life and work of Raoul Vaneigem 
and the characteristics of Belgian modernity that Aubert and others define, it seems 
relatively unproblematic to situate Vaneigem within this historical tendency. 
However, this should certainly not mean that Vaneigem be considered a ‘Belgian’ 
author or that his work should be considered within the Belgian context alone. On the 
contrary, it suggests that Vaneigem and, most crucially, the Situationist International 
as a whole found within Belgian modernity certain qualities that spoke to the 
international revolutionary movement against capitalist society. It was, as Vaneigem 
himself suggests, more an accident of historical circumstances that the Surrealist 
avant-garde in Hainaut was, due to its proximity to working-class life, partially 
conscious of the importance of tying class struggle to the struggle against culture. 
Moreover, it is important to stress, as Vaneigem does, that the Surrealists of Hainaut 
did not ultimately escape the errors of their Parisian counterparts. Indeed, Vaneigem 
notes that Achille Chavée returned from serving in the International Brigades in Spain 
as a convinced member of the Communist Party: ‘Tandis que Breton se ralliat au 
bourreau de Constradt, Chavée, Scutenaire et leurs amis—à l’exception d’André 
Lorent […]—célèbrent les vertus de Staline’. 411  Vaneigem does not therefore 
romanticise the radical cultural movements of Hainaut. He recognises their 
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limitations. Indeed, it was precisely the failure of the Surrealist movement in Belgium 
and Paris that made the Situationist International necessary. 
 
Education and University mémoire 
 
Before we move on to considering Raoul Vaneigem as a member of the Situationist 
International, it is worth examining the role that education played in his intellectual 
development. In the extant literature on the SI, the early Situationist writing of 
Vaneigem seems to appear as if from nothing. There is an implication that as a thinker 
Vaneigem owes nearly everything to his contacts with Henri Lefebvre and Guy 
Debord. As will be demonstrated, however, there is plenty of evidence that Vaneigem 
already had a relatively developed critical theory that engaged with both the cultural 
avant-garde and Marxism long before he joined the Situationists. Clarifying this 
aspect of the intellectual development of Raoul Vaneigem will provide a more 
complex and accurate understanding of where his theory emerged from and what he 
would later bring to the SI. 
 The formal education of Vaneigem began at the école moyenne in Lessines in 
1942.412 From 1948, however, he attended the more prestigious Athénée in the 
neighbouring town of Ath where he focused on greco-latin studies.413 Although 
Vaneigem has almost nothing to say about his own formal education in his writing, in 
1995 he did published a critique of capitalist education, Avertissement aux écoliers et 
lycéens, which knew quite a deal of success.414 Vaneigem does note, however, that the 
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work that would most influence his intellectual development during his adolescence 
was a translation of Le Combat avec le démon by Stefan Zweig.415 This text embodies 
a collection of three biographies of the lives of Kleist, Hölderlin and Nietzsche 
respectively. Zweig suggests these authors can be grouped together because the 
creativity of each emerged from a struggle with a desire, their démon, that was 
constrained or denied by bourgeois society: Kleist by his homosexuality, Hölderlin by 
his longing for the utopia of his childhood and Nietzsche by his, albeit more abstract, 
desire to realise his will. It is quite clear that the démon, particularly with this latter 
association, is an early source for Vaneigem of the notion of volonté de vivre that he 
develops in his work. Indeed, as was noted in the previous chapter, there is a 
particular passage in Traité on this subject that seems to be either a détournement 
from this text by Zweig or, at the very least, inspired by it.416 This certainly suggests 
that the origins of some of the essential elements of the critical theory of Vaneigem go 
very far back into his past. 
 In 1951 Vaneigem was accepted at the Université Libre de Bruxelles (ULB) to 
study philosophy and romance philology.417 The ULB was, at that time, a traditional 
left-wing stronghold that counted Louis Scutenaire and other Surrealists among its 
alumni. Again, Vaneigem is not very forthcoming about his university education in 
his writing. It seems likely he may have encountered certain artistic avant-garde 
figures and militants within the wider far-left scene.418 It has also been suggested that 
Vaneigem was briefly attracted to Trotskyism at around this time.419 However, the 
facts are by no means clear. What we do know is that Vaneigem formed a friendship 
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with one of his university teachers, Emilie Noulet (1892-1978), an expert on 
Symbolism who was also a former lover of Valéry and, when he knew her, the wife of 
a Spanish political exile. Vaneigem corresponded with Noulet from around the mid-
1950s, when he began his university mémoire, until the early 1960s, during the start 
of his time in the SI. 
 This still-unpublished correspondence of Vaneigem to Noulet concerns for the 
most part his attempts to create a new form of poetry and contains original poems in 
this vein.420 Given that this correspondence is the closest we can come to the positions 
laid out by Vaneigem in the ‘Fragments pour une poétique’ that he would later send to 
Lefebvre and through which Debord would first know him, it is very suggestive of 
exactly why Debord thought Vaneigem could possibly make a valuable member of 
the SI. Vaneigem speaks, for example, of creating a ‘poésie graphique’ that combines 
musicality, visual elements and a didactic revolutionary message in order to agitate 
the proletariat to action. 421 The poems themselves are not as interesting as the actual 
intention behind them, as Vaneigem seems to be aware, presenting them rather as a 
sketch.422 He is very clear in these letters that poetry can never be an end in itself. For 
him, the poet must play the role of agitator. He is extremely dismissive, for example, 
of modern poetry, which he claims is overly individualist and serves only to 
legitimise capitalist society.423 Somewhat surprisingly, given his later interest in the 
movement, Lettrism receives particular scorn.  
It should be understood, however, that Vaneigem says this in the context of 
seeking to overcome the limitations of poetry in order, as he sees it, to create the new 
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means of communication required to bring about revolutionary action.424 There is 
already a sense here therefore that culture is a problematic form of transmission. 
Indeed, in these letters Vaneigem seems to be saying that poetry is, or should be, that 
which serves to make popular consciousness more lucid and, in so doing, moves it 
towards its historical destiny of creating a world which is, as he puts it, ‘sans faim et 
où l’amour se confond avec le réel’.425 There is a foreshadowing here of his position 
in Traité that radical poetry and theory are one and the same. In these letters this idea 
is clearly tied for Vaneigem to contemporary working-class struggles that he notes are 
at that very moment rejecting both Stalinism and reformism.426 Vaneigem clearly 
wants to play his part: ‘Le ton, c’est la voix gigantesque d’octobre 1917, la clé, la 
pensée marxiste’.427 In this respect therefore Vaneigem already shared positions that 
were moving in the direction of those then being developed by Guy Debord and the 
other members of the SI. 
 
By far the most revealing text by Vaneigem in this period, however, is his university 
mémoire on the life and work of Isidore Ducasse that was written in around 1955 to 
1956. There are in fact two versions of this work: the original manuscript and a 
second, toned-down, version, which was submitted after the first was rejected by 
examiners due to its overt radical politics and explicit sexual content.428 Expunged 
from the final version is an introduction, entitled ‘Préliminaires’, in which Vaneigem 
sets forth his approach to literary criticism. The predominance of Marxian 
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materialism in this approach is quite apparent. Vaneigem consistently suggests that 
the subject of critique, in this case the work of Ducasse, should always be considered 
as an aspect of, and in relation to, a concrete historical totality. The role of the critic, 
Vaneigem argues, is not to examine any single aspect in isolation but rather to attempt 
to represent the whole.429 Implicit to Vaneigem’s methodology is the idea that this 
social totality, of which the work of art is one part, is filled with contradictions in 
dialectical, and therefore transformative, relationship with one another. The work of 
art, he suggests, as a part of this totality, also embodies the whole.430 Whether this is 
in some sense true of all art is not entirely clear, though there is the sense in the 
mémoire that a large part of the genius of Lautréamont, for Vaneigem, is that his work 
consciously, at least latterly (for reasons that will become clear below), plumbs the 
depths of these contradictions so well. 
  One of the reasons that this earlier section was expunged is perhaps that it 
contains a number of vitriolic rhetorical remarks against the state of contemporary 
criticism. Vaneigem claims in the strongest terms that literary critics are guilty of 
‘dirtying’ or ‘dishonouring’ (salir) Isidore Ducasse.431 The literary critic is even 
presented as something of a pitiable and contemptible figure by him.432 These 
rhetorical flourishes are notable both as early examples of the polemical style that 
would come to its peak in Traité and in demonstrating that, even in this examination 
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context, Vaneigem was already expressing his characteristic disdain for the cultural 
and academic world.433 
  Although this section is eliminated in the second version, Vaneigem takes the 
opportunity of a new one to add an appendix where he expands on his ideas about a 
materialist reading of literature in general.434 Vaneigem argues that ideology and 
culture depend on the relations of production currently in effect.435 Vaneigem seems 
relatively explicit that this is not a technical question, ‘infrastructure économique’, 
which would be the orthodox Marxist version of things, but a social question.436 It is 
the social relationships between people that define the economy, culture and ideology, 
all of which (as the graph he provides in the appendix tries to convey) are in a 
dialectical relationship with one another. The genius of a writer like Lautréamont or 
Diderot, Vaneigem argues, is to have lived these social relationships, at a point when 
they are changing, and then to have consciously represented them within the symbolic 
sphere of their work.437 Thus the writer reveals the essence of the new social 
relationships in development, hastening our conscious awareness of them.  
Vaneigem also suggests that this same process, in the greatest writers, reveals 
to them ‘la dialectique du réel’. Throughout the mémoire Vaneigem makes reference 
to fundamental dialectical laws of reality and even positively cites Lenin as a 
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discoverer of them.438 It is clear that Vaneigem is basically referring here to the 
orthodox Marxist idea of dialectical materialism where dialectics is erected as a kind 
of metaphysical fundamental property of the physical universe. This is by far the 
weakest part of the mémoire and clashes with the more concrete considerations 
previously described. However, extracted from its roots in Marxist dogma, what 
Vaneigem seems to have been moving towards in these comments is a very non-
orthodox Marxian notion of revolutionary praxis, such as that outlined in the previous 
chapter: that there is a potentially liberating, creatively conscious dimension of 
practice that is essential to humanity. There is by no means any such clear or coherent 
statement to this effect, however, at this point; but it might explain why Lautréamont, 
whose technique of, what would later be called, détournement was so essential to the 
SI’s early notions of liberating activity, was such an important figure for Vaneigem to 
explore before developing a more coherent theory of alienating and liberating praxis. 
 
The actual substance of the mémoire is true to its intention of crystallising as concrete 
a historical and biographical picture of Ducasse and his work as possible. Vaneigem 
travelled to the Bibliotheque nationale de France in Paris in order to undertake 
extensive original archival research for this project. Vaneigem is clear that his guiding 
principle is to try to grasp Isidore Ducasse as a real, rich and complex human being of 
his times: ‘Pierre de touche: l’image de Ducasse recomposée par le critique est-elle 
compatible avec l’œuvre, non seulement, mais avec l’Homme en général et, en 
particulier, avec l’homme du Second Empire?’. 439  Starting from this point of 
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departure, the mémoire moves through a series of demonstrations of how Les Chants 
de Maldoror and Poésies are rooted in the lived experiences of Isidore Ducasse. 
 For example, Vaneigem is insistent from the beginning of the mémoire that the 
representations of violence found in the work of Ducasse are a reflection of the actual 
times in which the author lived: ‘La violence Lautréamontienne atteint sa mesure 
selon l’intensité d’étouffement du Second Empire’.440 As such, Vaneigem says, his 
work in this respect cannot be considered as ‘bizarre’, ‘exceptionnel’ or as some kind 
of ‘monstreuse excroissance’. 441 The fact that this violence surprises us at all, 
Vaneigem states, is only the result of an ‘erreur d’optique’ that ‘s’estompe sous nos 
yeux la monstrueuse tyrannie de l’époque où vivait Ducasse’.442 This decision to tie 
the themes of Les Chants and Poésies to the historical realities of Second Empire 
society and, as we shall see, the author’s experiences of these realities is maintained 
throughout the mémoire.  
 Early on Vaneigem draws the reader’s attention to the relationship between 
Ducasse and his father, François Ducasse. Vaneigem notes that the image of father 
figures in the work of Ducasse is always negative. 443  They are presented as 
authoritarian and hypocritical. This applies equally to God who, Vaneigem suggests, 
is subconsciously tied in Ducasse’s mind to his own father. Based on the little details 
that are known about his family life and this vitriolic treatment of the pater familias in 
Les Chants, Vaneigem suggests Ducasse had a particularly difficult relationship with 
his father that contributed to a distain for the family and anger towards hierarchical 
social forms in general.444 The lived experience of Ducasse in this sense also speaks 
to the wider social structures of the time. Vaneigem notes, for example, that the 
                                                
440 Ibid. 
441 Ibid. 
442 Ibid. 
443 ‘Isidore Ducasse’, p. 9, 16-20. 
444 Ibid., p. 14. 
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family was a highly topical issue in contemporary literature.445 Les Chants, Vaneigem 
suggests, is therefore very much rooted both in its times and in the biography of 
Ducasse. Thus, one of the key features of analysis that is found in Traité—the idea 
that lived experience and emotion provide a crucial source for an understanding of 
social structures and the desire to overcome them—is already evident in the mémoire. 
 Although Isidore Ducasse was born in Montevideo, he was sent to school as a 
young child in southern France, first in Tarbes and then Pau.446 Vaneigem tries to 
imaginatively trace the journey and experiences of Ducasse in these early years. His 
research focuses primarily on some accounts by school friends and oblique references 
to this time in Les Chants. It would appear that, for Vaneigem, this period further 
instilled in Ducasse a desire to escape the banal existence to which his society had 
condemned him.447 However, Vaneigem is clearly also concerned to emphasise that 
Ducasse was, in many respects, an outwardly unremarkable youth. Indeed, Vaneigem 
argues that Ducasse, as he appeared to others, was the complete opposite of his 
creation Maldoror. Les Chants de Maldoror, Vaneigem argues, is the outgrowth of 
someone who has been forced to repress his desires, to never act on them, because 
these desires have been denied by the society in which he lives. The fury and passion 
demonstrated in Les Chants is a, at first unconscious, psychic projection of these 
frustrations onto the symbolic plane.448 
 Vaneigem does not, however, feel that the sheer level of destructive negativity 
expressed by Ducasse in his work at this point can be explained simply by a poor 
                                                
445 Ibid., p. 54. 
446 The school in Pau was the same one that Guy Debord would briefly attend in the following century. 
447 Certainly, Vaneigem sees the escape from banality as a driving force behind both Isidore and his 
father, ‘Isidore Ducasse’, p. 25. 
448 ‘Une fois admis que ‘Maldoror’ résulte d’une résorption permanente de rêves, d’idéaux, de besoins 
contrariés par la vie d’Isidore Ducasse en société, on réalise mieux avec quelle violence les pulsions 
refluaient au contact de l’extérieur et combien l’adolescent devait fatalement paraître faible’, ibid., p. 
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paternal relationship and a dull school life. Rather, Vaneigem seeks the answer to this 
specifically in Ducasse’s struggle with his homosexuality in the face of a society that 
rejected it.449 Vaneigem focuses in particular on the figure of Georges Dazet with 
whom it is now generally thought Ducasse had a sexual relationship before moving to 
Paris after he finished his education. Much of Vaneigem’s evidence for this is based 
on the subtly erotic language employed by Ducasse in Les Chants, which, in an earlier 
version of the start of the book is specifically aimed at Dazet.450 At the time 
Vaneigem was writing in the 1950s, however, this was by no means made explicit and 
it seems that his was the first work to really make use of this hypothesis in its 
analysis. Vaneigem essentially suggests that, despite his earlier relationship with 
Dazet, or even because of a rupture of some kind, when Ducasse began Les Chants he 
had chosen to repress his homosexuality.451 Maldoror is, for Vaneigem, therefore a 
projection of repressed desires launched against society. 
 With these points established Vaneigem asserts that, because they were 
written in chronological order, the different songs of Les Chants de Maldoror and 
then Poésie, can be read as an almost cinematographic set of successive 
representations of the state of Ducasse’s inner world. 452  Having launched his 
repressed desires against the world in the form of Maldoror, Vaneigem argues, 
Ducasse becomes increasingly conscious that this is in fact what he is doing.453 As a 
result, the mémoire closely reads Les Chants, in particular the theme of revolt—but 
also love, art and humour—in order to reveal this process. 
                                                
449 Ibid., pp. 47-48. 
450 Ibid., pp.44-48. 
451 Ibid., p. 106. 
452 Ibid., pp. 88-89. 
453 ‘Face à Maldoror, Isidore Ducasse parvient à graduer ses passions, celles dont se sont emparées les 
‘Chants’. Maldoror, c’est sa façon de les posséder, de leur attribuer une vie autonome, de les observer 
en cours de développement comme une microscope s’attache à suivre une cellule jusqu’à sa texture la 
plus imperceptible’, ibid., p. 58. 
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The first ‘prise de conscience’, Vaneigem argues, occurs through the writing 
of the first song after which Ducasse begins gradually to direct the hatred of Maldoror 
in more rational and specific directions as he becomes aware of the revolt he has 
launched against the world.454 Vaneigem argues that the second ‘prise de conscience’ 
occurs towards the closure of the book when Ducasse comes to understand that it is 
society he is critiquing and ultimately has to the overcome the pure malice of 
Maldoror for a new kind of revolt.455 Moreover, Vaneigem suggests, it is also at this 
point that Ducasse, having become conscious of the ignoble roots of oppressive social 
norms, consciously embraces his homosexuality, merging it with his attack on the 
Second Empire society.456 Poésie, Vaneigem argues, is the result of this conscious 
rejection of pure insurrection, embodied in Maldoror, in favour of a more utopian 
ideal of social transformation founded on the collective realisation of individual 
desires.457 He sums up his position quite succinctly: ‘Ducasse […] donne [Maldoror] 
son congé tandis qu’il unit révolte et praxis sous le couvercle des Poésies’.458 That 
Vaneigem employs the term praxis in this context is particularly significant as it 
shows a possible movement away from the more orthodox Marxist notions described 
above based on a critical engagement with the work of Ducasse.459 
                                                
454 Ibid., pp. 58-60. 
455 Ibid., pp. 92-93, 100-105, 153. 
456 Ibid., p. 92. 
457 Ibid. p. 101. 
458 Ibid., p. 93. 
459 It is in Poésies that the two key axioms of détournement, constantly evoked by the SI, are 
expressed: ‘La poésie doit être faite par tous. Non par un’; ‘Le plagiat est nécessaire. Le progrès 
l'implique. Il serre de près la phrase d'un auteur, se sert de ses expressions, efface une idée fausse, la 
remplace par l'idée juste,’ Isidore Ducasse, Œuvres complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 2009), p. 288, 283 . It 
seems more than an accident of history that Isidore Ducasse should have been such an important figure 
in the early intellectual development of the two men who would become the key theoreticians of the SI: 
Guy Debord and Raoul Vaneigem. 
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The political assertion of the mémoire, and the implicit conclusion, is that the 
work of Isidore Ducasse is essentially the embodiment of an ‘idéal anarchiste’.460 For 
Vaneigem it embodies a specific phase in the revolutionary struggle.461 Vaneigem 
also argues that Ducasse may have associated himself with an avant-garde group with 
radical pretentions at around the time of writing Poésies.462 These ideas are, however, 
somewhat underdeveloped in the mémoire. Indeed, Vaneigem is clear that in many 
ways his text should be considered as a sketch of a much larger study (he had hoped 
to continue this research as a doctoral candidate).463 Yet, although the mémoire itself 
was never published and he was not able to take his research further, Vaneigem did 
later publish a short essay based on some of these considerations that concludes on a 
much more explicit note: ‘Maldoror et les Poésies apparaissent en dernier ressort 
comme le reflet de la double tendance du mouvement anarchiste, de sa perpétuelle 
oscillation de la violence pure à l'utopie réformatrice’.464 In a sense Vaneigem credits 
Ducasse not only as the forerunner of Surrealism, for which he was well known at the 
time, but of certain aspects of modern anarchism also. The genius of Ducasse, for 
Vaneigem, is therefore to have consciously expressed something of both the nature of 
oppressive social forms and what was necessary to combat them. 
 
                                                
460 ‘Isidore Ducasse’, p. 55. ‘S’il est vrai qu’une pensée nouvelle exige une formulation nouvelle, 
Ducasse devait, dans son analyse du moi et de sa lutte contre le monde, éprouver le besoin de créer un 
langage à la mesure de ses révélations, le langage d’une conscience anarchiste. Qu’il y ait réussi, au le 
langage s’en soit imprégnée tient à son génie, non au hasard’, ibid., p. 179. ‘Sa pensée est anarchiste’, 
‘De la part de Lautréamont’, p. 4. 
461 ‘Lautréamont apparaît clairement, dans l’évolution des rapports humains, comme l’épiphénomène 
d’une phase typique : la lutte spontanée de l’individu opprimé contre la société du nihiliste russe au 
petit groupe blanquiste, de Stirner à l’anarchie, de Fourier, de Ballanche aux utopistes et réformateurs’, 
‘Isidore Ducasse’, p. 35.  
462 ‘Isidore Ducasse’, p. 146. 
463  ‘Ce mémoire doit demeurer plan, esquisse, chantier ouvert à des thèses plus vastes, plus 
scientifiques, plus proches de la vérité’, ‘De la part de Lautréamont’, p. 7.  
464 Raoul Vaneigem, ‘Isidore Ducasse et le Comte de Lautréamont dans les ‘Poésies’’, Synthèses, 
Revue Internationale, 151 (1958), pp. 243-249 (p. 249). 
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The picture of the state of intellectual development that we have described here based 
on the letters of Vaneigem and his university mémoire provide another crucial 
perspective from which to consider his entry into the Situationist International. They 
show us that Vaneigem was already driven by a critique of art based on a desire to 
overcome the constraints of culture. They also reveal a working familiarity with 
Marxian approaches, such as praxis and totality, that were later to become so key to 
his critical theory as a Situationist. Moreover, the totalising approach to lived 
experience that Vaneigem brings to the work of Ducasse is in many ways very similar 
to the technique he would later employ in the examination of capitalist subjectivity in 
Traité. We can therefore stop thinking of Vaneigem simply as the pupil of Debord 
and Lefebvre when he joined the SI or as someone whose critical thinking begins with 
‘Banalités de base’ in 1962. Instead, we can see him as a person who brought years of 
his own critical thought to the group as soon as he became a member. 
 
This chapter has established a number of new contexts from which to consider the 
critical theory of Raoul Vaneigem and his contribution to the SI. Vaneigem came 
from a working-class family in Belgium’s industrial heartland. It was a region defined 
by a radical history of class struggle that framed the lives of its inhabitants. Vaneigem 
lived through a crucial period of the Belgian workers’ movement that saw the largest 
wildcat strikes in its history. It was in this context that he joined the SI. Vaneigem 
was also deeply influenced by the Surrealist movement in Hainaut that, like him, was 
shaped by this radical local culture. It is possible therefore to see Vaneigem as part of 
this longer tradition of ‘Belgian modernity’. Finally, it is clear from an examination of 
his earliest writing that Vaneigem had already developed many elements of his 
critical theory before joining the Situationist International. 
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Chapter 3. Raoul Vaneigem and the Situationist International (1961-1970) 
 
The aim of this chapter is to provide an historical analysis of the participation of 
Raoul Vaneigem in the Situationist International from 1961 to 1970. Our main source 
of information is the Internationale situationniste journal as well as various other 
important texts that Vaneigem helped to create with the other Situationists during his 
time in the group. The chapter is divided into three parts that roughly cover the main 
periods of activity: 1961-1964, 1965-1968, 1969-1970. Our goal is to trace the 
historical contribution of Raoul Vaneigem to the SI as an active participant in the 
organisation. This is the story of the development and propagation of his critical 
theory, his collaboration with other members of the Situationist International and his 
involvement in the events of the Strasbourg Scandal and May ’68. We will also 
examine why he ultimately resigned from the SI in 1970 and what impact this had on 
the final years of the organisation before its dissolution in 1972. 
 
1961-1964 
 
Raoul Vaneigem joined the SI in the spring of 1961 in the immediate aftermath of 
Hiver ’60. At this time his main points of contact in the group were Guy Debord who 
would regularly visit Belgium and Attila Kotányi who was a member of the Belgian 
section of the SI. They would also be the members with whom he would collaborate 
the most over the coming years. It is perhaps for this reason that his first texts to 
employ Situationist terminology and theory were two articles on unitary urbanism.465 
Kotányi, with whom he would have had most contact, had been made head of the 
                                                
465 Raoul Vaneigem and Attila Kotányi, ‘Programme élémentaire du bureau d’urbanisme unitaire’, 
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‘bureau d’urbanisme unitaire’ at the Fourth Conference of the SI the previous year.466 
In these texts Vaneigem develops a critique of the modern humanist ideology that he 
sees embodied in contemporary urban planning. What is most striking, however, is an 
apparent move to expand the meaning of ‘situation’ to a definition closer to the 
general theory of revolutionary praxis described in Traité: ‘La destruction 
situationniste du conditionnement actuel est déjà, en même temps, la construction des 
situations. C’est la libération des énergies inépuisables contenues dans la vie 
quotidienne pétrifiée’.467 Much more recently, Vaneigem has suggested that, at least 
by the time he joined the group, the term ‘situationniste’ was more important as a 
word used to distance the activities of the organisation from contemporary ideologies 
rather than a specific form of practice.468 We can therefore already see a slight shift in 
emphasis in Situationist theory in these early contributions of Raoul Vaneigem to the 
SI. 
 
The first major impact Raoul Vaneigem would have on the Situationist International 
was at the Fifth Conference that occurred in Gothenburg in August 1961. The context 
for the events of Gothenburg had originated at the previous meeting a year earlier that 
took place in London. A minority tendency had emerged within the SI grouped for the 
most part around the German section after a debate about the ‘political’ nature of the 
organisation. The minority argued against the continued Situationist commitment to 
proletarian revolution because the workers’ movement, they claimed, was too 
dominated by its own bureaucracy.469 Further, the minority stated that workers were 
                                                
466 Internationale situationniste, 5 (December 1960), p. 25 
467 Internationale situationniste, 6 (August 1961), pp. 18. 
468 ‘Le mot situationniste n’a été qu’un signe de reconnaissance. Sa particularité empêchait de nous 
confondre avec la tourbe des idéologues’, Conversation, p. 12. 
469 Internationale situationniste, 5 (December 1960), p. 20. 
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satisfied with the current state of affairs and would not struggle against them.470 
Debord and Kotányi argued vehemently in opposition to these positions, citing the 
number of recent grèves sauvages in advanced capitalist countries.471 Eventually, the 
minority was forced to take back its statements. 472  The fact, however, that a 
conference of the SI could have been so dominated by such a question as ‘Dans quelle 
mesure l’I.S. est-elle un mouvement politique?’ demonstrates that there was a lack of 
clarity on this central ‘political’ dimension of Situationist activity.473 
 Previous to the strike, Guy Debord seems to have been looking outside of the 
SI, towards Socialisme ou barbarie, for a solution to the ‘politics’ of the group. 
Debord was for a while a member of Pouvoir Ouvrier, the group behind SoB, between 
1960 and 1961. In 1960, for example, Guy Debord produced a text with Daniel 
Blanchard of SoB entitled ‘Préliminaires pour une définition de l’unité du programme 
révolutionnaire’.474 This was an extremely important text in defining the future of 
Situationist critique. Among its novel additions to Situationist theory it elaborated a 
critique of work and of the increasing hierarchisation, parcellisation and abstraction of 
life in modern society. Moreover, it situated the notion of Spectacle, non-intervention, 
in a more explicitly Marxian-inspired critique of hierarchy and alienation. These 
themes also found expression at this time in Critique de la séparation, a film released 
by Guy Debord in 1961. The relationship between Debord and Pouvoir Ouvrier, 
however, eventually did not amount to a merger with the SI due to their lack of 
interest in many of the issues around creativity that the Situationists were posing. The 
‘political question’ raised in London was therefore still a very pressing one in 1961. 
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474 See Debord, Œuvres, pp. 511-518. 
	   	  165 
Fortunately for Debord, the events of Hiver ’60, discussed in the previous 
chapter, were an example of working-class spontaneity very close to home that flew 
in the face of the minority tendency in the SI. Not only had workers in Belgium been 
some of the highest paid in the world at the time of the strike, they had also aimed 
much of their violence at workers’ parties and unions. The strikes had begun 
completely unsanctioned and had a revolutionary character that had arguably not been 
seen in Northern Europe for a generation. In this context it seems likely that, in Raoul 
Vaneigem, Guy Debord had met a new collaborator who might help him deal with 
this problem. Raoul Vaneigem was, through his studies, conversant with Western 
Marxist thought, he shared many of the political views of Guy Debord with regards to 
workers’ autonomy, he wanted a merger of the artistic avant-garde and political 
action, and he was from the very worker milieu that had been at the heart of events in 
Belgium. It could be reasonably argued therefore that his break with Pouvoir Ouvrier 
was partly easier because Guy Debord had made a new intellectual collaboration that 
could help reorient the SI in the coming years on a more vigorously Marxian-inspired 
theoretical basis. 
 At the Gothenburg conference Raoul Vaneigem was to make his first big mark 
on the orientation of Situationist activity in the coming years. The conference opened 
with an attempted coup by the minority tendency in the SI. At the London conference 
the previous year it had been decided that a Central Council would be elected at each 
conference of the SI.475 The Central Council would have ultimate say on the inclusion 
or exclusion of members in order to keep the standard of membership democratic and 
international in between conferences.476 The minority tendency, however, began 
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proceedings in Gothenburg by calling for the autonomy of national sections.477 Such a 
motion, had it been passed, would have allowed the German and English sections, 
which were more art-oriented and supported the minority tendency, to flood the SI 
with members who held their position. As a result they could have undemocratically 
forced their tendency onto the organisation as a whole and would have brought the 
internationalism of the SI into question. 
 Although he had not been present at the conference the year previously, Raoul 
Vaneigem was the first to respond to the minority coup. Serendipitously, and despite 
not having been a member at the time of the previous conference, Vaneigem had 
already prepared a ‘Rapport d’orientation’ for the future of the SI that now proved to 
be extremely a propos. No doubt this has been done in close collaboration with 
Debord and Kotányi who had been at the forefront of the original argument. 
Vaneigem suggests that the disagreement with the minority, what Debord would later 
term a left-right split, was due to the lack of coherence in Situationist theory. That is 
to say, the attempted coup by the artists exposed confusion at a theoretical level that 
needed to be resolved. The effectiveness of the Situationists, Vaneigem argues, lay in 
the extent to which they escaped the reified thinking and bureaucratic modes of 
behaviour that characterise capitalist social relations.478 The actions of the ‘artistic 
right’ of the SI and their uncritical position towards aesthetic production exposed the 
extent to which these same ways of thinking had entered the organisation.479 In order 
                                                
477 Internationale situationniste, 7 (April 1962), p. 25. 
478 ‘L’Internationale Situationniste se trouve, tant par la conjoncture historique que par son évolution 
intérieure, à un niveau de développement tel que l’activité qu’elle s’estime en mesure de déployer, dans 
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479 Ibid. It is Debord who refers to the artists in the SI as the right wing of the group: ‘la ‘droite’ 
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to resolve this problem, Vaneigem called for a reorientation of the SI around a 
concept that would act as the linchpin of a new critical and organisational coherence: 
 
Pour que leur élaboration soit artistique, au sens nouveau et authentique qu’a 
défini l’I.S., les éléments de destruction du spectacle doivent précisément 
cesser d’être des œuvres d’art. Il n’y a pas de situationnisme, ni d’œuvre d’art 
situationniste, ni davantage de situationniste spectaculaire. Une fois pour 
toutes. 
 Une telle perspective ne signifie rien si elle n’est pas liée directement à 
la praxis révolutionnaire, à la volonté de changer l’emploi de la vie (ce qui ne 
peut en rien se ramener au fait de changer l’employeur des travaux 
existants).480 
 
Here Vaneigem restates the Situationist position on art, as discussed in the previous 
chapter, by stressing that it is an alienation of human creativity. Any position as an 
‘artist’, Vaneigem argues, is untenable in the SI. In contrast, he proposes 
revolutionary praxis, which as we have seen refers to the conscious creation of social 
relations so that all human beings have control over their own creativity, as the 
fundamental and totalising starting point for Situationist activity. Such a position also 
implied that the revolutionary agency of the proletariat was a necessary basis for such 
totalising transformation. Although Guy Debord was a big part of the move towards 
such a position, these words were the first time that the theory of praxis was clearly 
established as the ontological starting point for all Situationist practice. Indeed, 
Vaneigem goes on to say that revolutionary praxis is ‘le seul contexte où les 
situationnistes puissent parler de liberté d’action’.481 Arguably, the incorporation of 
earlier Situationist developments into a totalising theory of praxis marks the point 
where the SI becomes the organisation that will have the influence it did on the events 
of May ’68. It is a position that had not been seen before in the avant-garde in the 
coherent manner it would now be developed by the Situationists, in particular Guy 
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Debord and Raoul Vaneigem. Vaneigem had made it clear that all of the previous 
activity of the SI, its critique of art, was to be incorporated into a totalising critique 
and realisation of human praxis. 
 The ‘Rapport d’orientation’ was a serious blow to the position of the minority 
tendency. More so because the majority were in accord with the arguments Vaneigem 
had outlined. There was no possibility of the coup succeeding and, moreover, it had 
backfired because the rest of the conference was now devoted to a thorough attack on 
the minority. Guy Debord followed Vaneigem by saying that he had never made a 
‘film situationniste’, upsetting some local Situationist hopefuls who had believed their 
own work might gain this status.482 Attila Kotányi then delivered the crushing 
statement that the art produced by members of the SI was ‘anti-situationnistes’.483 
Although this is a very blunt statement, the extant literature has tended to overlook the 
qualification that Kotányi gives immediately after. He clearly states that this did not 
mean that members of the SI had to stop painting or writing.484 The problem for 
Kotányi is that these are not revolutionary activities in themselves. 485  From a 
revolutionary perspective, he argues, the most important activity for the SI to be 
engaging in is the development and propagation of critical theory.486 
All of these positions were immediately adopted by the majority, putting the 
minority completely on the defensive. Some of these ‘artists’ openly admitted to not 
understanding the arguments of Vaneigem and, for one of them, even Situationist 
theory in general, to which the account of proceedings in the SI review quipped: 
‘l’I.S. est la première avant-garde dont un des participants s’admire de ne pas 
                                                
482 Ibid. 
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484 ‘Je ne veux pas dire que quelqu’un doit cesser de peindre, écrire, etc. Je ne veux pas dire que cela 
n’a pas de valeur. Je ne veux pas dire que nous pourrions continuer d’exister sans faire cela’, ibid. 
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486 ‘Notre force est dans l’élaboration de certaines vérités, qui ont les pouvoirs brisants de l’explosif, du 
moment que des gens sont prêts à lutter pour elles’, ibid. 
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comprendre la théorie, qu’il a rejoint [sic] depuis plus de deux ans’.487 The conference 
concluded when the German section was forced to agree to unify their ideas with 
those of the majority as represented in the ‘Rapport’ given by Raoul Vaneigem.488 A 
new Central Council was elected that included Raoul Vaneigem for the first time.489 
 Since the London conference the previous year Guy Debord and Attila 
Kotányi had wanted to resolve the problem with the minority tendency. With the 
input of Raoul Vaneigem their collective efforts in Gothenburg had proved to be a 
complete success. The three of them, who had originally travelled up to Denmark 
together, now stopped off in Germany to spend several days in the city of Hamburg 
on their way back to Belgium. Wishing to build on the impetus provided by the 
success of the Gothenburg conference, they discussed the future direction of the SI 
and the clarifications it needed in order to move forward. The result of these debates 
was the ‘Thèses de Hamburg’ a set of theses that were the most radical proposals the 
SI had yet developed. In a strange twist, however, they decided to never write these 
theses down and to only remember them. Fortunately, Debord would later record the 
conclusion and importance of the ‘Thèses de Hambourg’ for posterity in a note 
written in 1989: ‘La conclusion résumée évoquait une célèbre formule de Marx en 
1844 (dans sa Contribution à la critique de la Philosophie du Droit de Hegel)’.490  
Given what has already been discussed in Chapter 1 of the current work, it is 
fair to speculate that the celebrated formula is the same one quoted by Raoul 
Vaneigem in Traité on the nature of radical theory.491 It would also seem likely due to 
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491 ‘La théorie devient force matérielle lorsqu’elle pénètre les masses. La théorie est capable de 
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the fact that it echoes the point made by Kotányi above that it is revolutionary theory 
that should occupy the Situationists most of all. The ‘Thèses de Hambourg’ would 
therefore lead straight to the theory of revolutionary praxis and radical subjectivity 
that is presented in Traité and La Société du Spectacle. It suggests that the vécu and 
theory would become the guiding formula of Situationist activities in coming years. 
Such speculation is further supported by another statement of Debord in this note that 
claims the ‘Thèses de Hambourg’ could be reduced to the words: ‘L’I.S. doit, 
maintenant, réaliser la philosophie’.492 This is an obvious reference to the theory of 
praxis, also termed the Marxian critique of philosophy, as it draws directly on the 
final thesis of the ‘Theses on Feuerbach’ where Marx first fully articulated his theory 
of praxis. Arguably the ‘Thèses de Hambourg’ therefore represents another moment 
where Raoul Vaneigem, in partnership with Debord and Kotányi, put forward a 
reorientation of the Situationist International around the theory of praxis and the basis 
of what would be his own theory of radical subjectivity. 
 Debord makes it clear in the same note that the move towards a coherent 
theory of praxis meant a radical break, not only with the minority tendency within the 
SI but also with the history of the left since the 1840s.493 The ‘Thèses de Hambourg’ 
was therefore the point at which the SI started to develop a much more coherent 
theory of what had gone wrong with the revolutionary tradition, not just in the realm 
of the avant-garde but in ‘politics’ also. From then on it was the Situationist 
International alone that was to radicalise the workers’ movement. This process of 
radicalisation, as has been speculated above, was based primarily upon the Marxian 
                                                
492 Debord, Œuvres, p. 585. 
493 ‘Elle signifiait à ce moment que l’on ne devrait plus prêter la moindre importance aux conceptions 
d’aucun des groupes révolutionnaires qui pouvaient subsister encore, en tant qu’héritiers de l’ancien 
mouvement social d’émancipation anéanti dans la première moitié de notre siècle; et qu’il ne faudrait 
donc plus compter que sur la seule I.S. pour relancer au plus tôt une autre époque de la contestation, en 
renouvelant toutes les bases de départ de celle qui s’était constituée dans les années 1840’, ibid., p. 586. 
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critique of philosophy. It meant that the theory of praxis, alienating and liberating, 
would now become the clear and central priority of Situationist practice. Debord 
states that this did not necessarily mean a break with the ‘right’ or the ‘artists’ of the 
SI but that it nonetheless made it highly likely.494 Moreover, Debord also states that it 
was the ‘Theses de Hambourg’ that led to the impact of the SI on the events of May 
’68.495 The ‘Thèses de Hambourg’ is important therefore because it situates Raoul 
Vaneigem squarely at the centre of a crucial moment in the history of the SI. His input 
appears to be a central component of the transformation that was to take place. 
 
The artistic right of the SI was eventually excluded early the following year in 
January 1962. As a member of the Central Council, Raoul Vaneigem voted in favour 
of the exclusion. The practical reason for the rupture with this large swathe of 
members was that the German section had refused to make the changes to its journal 
demanded at the end of the Gothenburg conference by the rest of the SI. Vaneigem 
signed and contributed to a number of texts on the exclusion.496 The excluded 
members were henceforth referred to as Nashists, after the most prominent member of 
their tendency Jørgen Nash (brother of Asger Jorn), and their brand of ideology was 
termed Nashism.497 The timing of this rupture was, however, a problem because 
almost immediately after it the Spur group, which made up the excluded German 
section, had come under attack from the West German state. Copies of its journals 
were seized and a number of members arrested. Under the circumstances the SI 
proper published statements in support of them in as far as they were being targeted 
                                                
494 Ibid. 
495 Ibid. 
496 See Raoul Vaneigem, Guy Debord, Attila Kotányi, Uwe Lausen, ‘Nicht Hinauslehnen’, 10 February 
1962; also, by the same authors, ‘Proclamation from l’Internationale situationniste!’, 18 March 1962.  
497 See ‘L’opération contre-situationniste dans divers pays’, Internationale situationniste, 8 (January 
1963), pp. 23-29. 
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by the government.498  Once this affair had blown over, several of the excluded artists 
would start a short-lived Second Situationist International, including an English 
journal, The Situationist Times, directed by Jacqueline de Jong. 499  This group, 
however, never gained any traction and was disbanded not long after its creation. 
 
In the months and years that followed the reorientation of the Situationist 
International on the basis outlined in the ‘Thèses de Hambourg’, a number of 
important elaborations were produced. One of the first was ‘Sur la Commune’, a set 
of theses by Vaneigem, Debord and Kotányi that not only embodied an analysis of a 
concrete historical moment, the Paris Commune of 1871, but also began to clarify and 
expand the Situationist critique of the traditional left.500 
The Commune was a revolutionary movement that began as a result of the 
collapse of the Second Empire during the disastrous Franco-Prussian war of 1870 and 
as a rejection of the establishment of the 3rd French Republic after a bitterly fought 
siege of Paris. The Commune held Paris as a self-governing direct democracy from 
the 18th of March to the 28th of May 1871. The city was run through a system of 
instantly recallable delegates, directly elected and who received the same wages as the 
average worker. After a week of intense fighting and summary executions, termed la 
Semaine sanglante, the Commune was brutally suppressed by bourgeois forces, les 
Versaillais. It is estimated that in the region of twenty thousand Parisians were either 
killed in the fighting or executed. Many more were later sent into exile or to hard 
labour in prison colonies abroad. Although the Communards held to a vast array of 
                                                
498 Raoul Vaneigem, Michèle Bernstein, Jeppesen Martin and Alexander Trocchi, ‘Déclaration sur le 
procès contre l’Internationale situationniste en Allemagne fédérale’, 25 June 1962. 
499 The Situationist Times: Facsimile Box Set (New York: Boo-Hooray, 2013). 
500 Raoul Vaneigem, Guy Debord, Attila Kotányi, ‘Thèses sur la Commune’, 18 March 1962, 
Internationale situationniste, 12 (September 1969), pp. 109-111. 
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different political opinions, from Republicanism to Anarchism, the most prominent 
political ideologies were a mixture of Blanquism and Proudhonism.501 
The Commune had always been an important and much fought-over point of 
reference for the modern revolutionary tradition. As was noted in Chapter 2, for 
example, the anarchist tradition had seen it as a historical moment around which to 
rally. The Marxist tradition had also adopted the Paris Commune, in part because 
Marx had written in its defence, but also because, previous to the Russian Revolution, 
it embodied the largest historical proletarian revolutionary movement in history. The 
official left therefore wished to recuperate this glorious story into its own discourse, 
but primarily, particularly in the case of the Communist Party, it used its failure as a 
historical justification for its hierarchical and authoritarian theories and practices. 
Lenin, for example, was obsessed with the Commune and compared its failure to that 
of the 1905 Russian Revolution. Lenin therefore saw the Bolshevik Revolution, 
erroneously as far as the SI were concerned, as the realisation of the Communard 
movement. Under the USSR the Commune was turned into something of a Soviet 
cult. Lenin was buried in a Communard flag and, even more strangely, the Soviets 
sent a shred from another into space in 1962. The symbolism is rather ironic given 
that the Bolsheviks, Lenin and Trotsky included, persecuted anarchist workers 
ruthlessly. 
 As we saw above, Vaneigem, Debord and Kotányi argued for both a return to 
the origins of the workers’ movement begun in the 1840s and a rejection of its later 
developments embodied in the left. In the first thesis of ‘Sur la Commune’ Vaneigem  
and the others quote from an editorial from the SI’s journal where this position is 
clarified further. In it they state that the leftist definition of the success and failure of 
                                                
501 For an overview of the Franco-Prussian war and the Commune, see Alistair Horne, The Fall of 
Paris 1870-71: The Siege and the Commune (London: Penguin, 2007) 
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the revolutionary workers’ movement needs to be turned on its head.502 Leftist 
reforms and the state bureaucracy of the Eastern Bloc may well be presented as 
successes but they are in fact terrible failures. In contrast, failed insurrections, such as 
the Commune of 1871 and the Asturian miners’ strike of 1934, were in fact great 
successes because they revealed the possibilities of a genuine social movement of 
emancipation.  
These statements are part of a crucial discourse in Situationist writing that 
seeks to clear away the legacy of Democratic-Socialism and, what we might call, the 
revolutionary reformism of the Communist Parties. Part of this task, as has already 
been discussed to some extent in Chapter 1 of the current work, involved a return to 
the work of Marx. This effort to read Marx (and Engels) against Marxism is an 
important methodological step present in ‘Sur la Commune’. 
The Situationists note that Marx said that the Commune’s greatest social 
measure was its own existence in acts.503 They interpret this to mean that the 
Communards had become masters of their own history at the level of ‘la vie 
quotidienne’.504 They cite the games that Communards played with their weapons as 
examples of the insurgents ‘playing’ (jouer) with power.505 Another example that 
Vaneigem and the others give is the destruction of symbols of power during the 
Commune.506 This they call the first historical realisation of unitary urbanism.507 
                                                
502 ‘Il faut reprendre l’étude du mouvement ouvrier classique d’une manière désabusée, et d’abord 
désabusée quant à ses diverses sortes d’héritiers politiques ou pseudo-théoriques, car ils ne possèdent 
que l’héritage de son échec. Les succès apparents de ce mouvement sont ses échecs fondamentaux (le 
réformisme ou l’installation d’une bureaucratie étatique) et ses échecs (la Commune ou la révolte des 
Asturies) sont jusqu’ici ses succès ouverts, pour nous et pour l’avenir’, Internationale situationniste, 7 
(April 1962), p. 12; cited in ‘Sur la Commune’, op. cit, p. 109. 
503 ‘Sur la Commune’, p. 109. 
504 Ibid. 
505 Ibid. 
506  ‘La Commune représente jusqu'à nous la seule réalisation d'un urbanisme révolutionnaire, 
s'attaquant sur le terrain aux signes pétrifiés de l'organisation dominante de la vie, reconnaissant 
l'espace social en termes politiques, ne croyant pas qu'un monument puisse être innocent’, ibid., p. 110. 
507 Ibid., p. 110. 
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Thus, in opposition to traditional leftist readings of the Commune, the Situationists 
suggest that what Marx celebrated was precisely its directly democratic quality. 
Indeed, they take Engels proclamation that the Commune was ‘the dictatorship of the 
proletariat’ to mean that workers’ power precisely does not mean a dictatorial state 
bureaucracy in its name.508 Significantly, they suggest that this everyday aspect was 
more important than the ‘governmental’ proclamations made by the Commune.509 
This would suggest that, in trying to understand the Commune and its significance for 
our times, we should look at the subjective desires implied in its actions rather than its 
merely explicit intentions. This is made clear by Vaneigem, Debord and Kotányi 
when, citing Engels directly, they effectively state that the role of the Situationists, 
and revolutionary praxis in general, is to make conscious what was unconscious in the 
Commune.510  Such a task, they state, is necessary because the social struggle 
embodied in the Commune of 1871 is essentially the same as the one that faces us 
today.511 For the Situationists, those who say that the Commune was a failure are 
simply missing the point: ‘pour ceux qui ont vécu l’événement, le dépassement était 
là’.512 This is why they famously term it the greatest ‘festival’ or ‘party’ (fête) of the 
nineteenth century.513 
Where much of the left has used the Commune as a lesson that justified the 
reproduction of hierarchical social relations within the workers’ movement, 
Vaneigem and the other Situationists argue that its suppression was due to its failure 
to abolish such social relations during its existence. The failure of the Communards to 
                                                
508 Ibid., p. 109. 
509 Ibid. 
510 ‘Pour le travail de ‘rendre conscientes les tendances inconscientes de la Commune’ (Engels), le 
dernier mot n'est pas dit’, ibid. p. 111. 
511 ‘La guerre sociale dont la Commune est un moment dure toujours (quoique ses conditions 
superficielles aient beaucoup changé)’, ibid. 
512 Ibid. 
513 Ibid., p. 109. 
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seize the money in the National Bank, for example, was because the building was 
protected by the belief in property.514 The use of barricades, in turn, was a completely 
defeatist strategy that was simply repeated due to the memory of 1848 (modern 
artillery made it pointless and the Communards, most historians agree, would 
probably have won if they had marched on the Versaillais straightaway).515 The 
Situationists therefore conclude: ‘La Commune de Paris a été vaincue moins par la 
force des armes que par la force de l'habitude’.516 In ‘Sur la Commune’ this statement 
is linked relatively explicitly to the problem of theory. The enemies of human 
emancipation actually have an ally in revolutionaries themselves due to the 
implantation of bourgeois ideology in them: ‘La véritable ‘cinquième colonne’ est 
dans l'esprit même des révolutionnaires’.517 Again we see here this emphasis on the 
importance of the development of a critique of ideology and the propagation of 
radical theory that was so central to the Situationist project particularly in this period 
after the exclusion of the artists. ‘Sur la Commune’ therefore marks a deepening of 
the Situationists attack on the left and the importance it places on the power of critical 
thought. 518 
 
Along with these collaborative efforts, the critical theory of Raoul Vaneigem began to 
develop within Internationale situationniste. It was in ‘Banalités de base’, published 
in two parts between 1962 and 1963, that, as the title implies, the most fundamental 
aspects of this critical theory were first clearly presented for a wider readership. 
‘Banalités’ was important in terms of establishing a clear critical ontology for 
                                                
514 Ibid., p. 110. 
515 Ibid. 
516 Ibid. 
517 Ibid. 
518 ‘Sur la Commune’ also became the artefact behind the rupture with Henri Lefebvre who was 
accused of plagiarising the text in an article for the journal Arguments. See ‘Aux poubelles de 
l’histoire’, Internationale situationniste, 12 (September 1969), p. 108-111. 
	   	  177 
Situationist activity. In this respect it can be easily imagined Raoul Vaneigem had an 
influence on the development of La Société du Spectacle by Guy Debord. Equally, it 
was through and within the SI’s journal that Raoul Vaneigem was able to incorporate 
and contribute to aspects of Situationist critique that were developed previous to 1961 
such as unitary urbanism. In the editorial notes, also, the influence of Raoul 
Vaneigem becomes extremely prominent and it is quite likely that he penned several 
sections alone.519 It was also in this period, from 1963 until early 1965, that Raoul 
Vaneigem was actually writing Traité de savoir-vivre à l’usage des jeunes 
générations, which must have greatly influenced the critical discussion with the SI. 
These texts, where the critical theory discussed in Chapter 1 was first 
presented, marked a change in the discussion that would in certain respects help to 
define the later periods of the SI. The critique becomes far more coherently totalising, 
the language more inspired by Marx and the focus is on the generalisation of 
alienation in capitalist society. The critique of the traditional workers’ movement, 
moreover, had taken centre stage. It could be argued that the essence of Situationist 
critique was developed long before 1961. However, this would be to overlook the fact 
that it was Raoul Vaneigem who did a great deal of the work to clarify these positions 
into a coherent critical theory in these texts. ‘Banalités’ and Traité, as was recognised 
by Guy Debord and other members of the Situationist International, marked a 
qualitative leap in Situationist critique towards the events of May ’68. 
 
 
                                                
519 The most obvious example is the editorial notes to issue 7 of the SI’s journal (the same edition that 
contained the first part of ‘Banalités de base’). Here, the arguments of Raoul Vaneigem around the 
ideology of survival are first developed. Also, there is much greater focus on actual working-class 
actions and the development of a critique of the history of the workers’ movement later outlined in ‘Sur 
la Commune’. According to Debord, see pages 28-29 of the current work, Vaneigem was, moreover, an 
important source of input in these editorial notes throughout the period 1961-1964. 
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1965-1968 
 
Raoul Vaneigem completed the manuscript of Traité early in 1965. Over the course of 
the next year the manuscript would be passed among the French-speaking members of 
the SI.520 There is not a great deal of documentary evidence on the details of how the 
book was received within the organisation. However, the letter by Debord, discussed 
in the Introduction to the current work, as well as the generally respected position 
Vaneigem had within the SI confirms that it was certainly held in great esteem by 
other members. Indeed, as Spectacle was still in the process of being written, Traité 
embodied the first major book to be completed by any member of the SI. It is not 
clear, however, if either of these texts would have gained the wide readership they 
came to enjoy had it not been for the so-called Strasbourg Scandal, an event that 
would make the Situationist International notorious in the years before May ’68. 
 The Strasbourg Scandal began in the spring of 1966 when several ‘éxtremiste’ 
members of the student body of the University of Strasbourg were elected to run the 
student union.521 These student representatives stood in opposition to the university 
bureaucracy but, according to the SI review, after the election many students were 
afraid that the negative desires of the base that were the impetus behind the election 
would find no real expression.522 Several members of the student body who were 
readers of its review wrote to the Situationist International asking for advice on how 
to realise these desires.523 In response, the SI suggested that a totalising social critique 
                                                
520 A copy of one of the original manuscripts of Traité circulated within the SI, with some material 
expunged from the published version, can be consulted in Amsterdam. See Raoul Vaneigem, ‘Traité de 
savoir-vivre à l’usage des jeunes générations’ (manuscript, The René Vienet Archive, International 
Institute of Social Hisory, Amsterdam, 1965). 
521 For the Situationist account of events in Strasbourg, see ‘Nos buts et nos méthodes dans le scandale 
de Strasbourg’, Internationale situationniste, 11 (October 1967), pp. 23-31, (p. 23). 
522 Ibid., p. 23. 
523 Ibid. 
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of the student movement needed to be created, first, because the problematic the 
movement sought to address needed to be clarified, and secondly, because the only 
really useful quality that election to the student union had given the student body were 
funds that could be used in a non-conformist way (that is to say, to pay for a 
publication of just such a critique).524 The students were in agreement and began to 
develop a critique with the SI, engaging for the most part with Mustapha Khayati, that 
later became the infamous De la misère en milieu étudiant.525 
 The text was a total attack on the student as an identity and social role. The 
Situationists argued that students were laughable, the most despised group after 
priests and policemen and the second social group, after old women, to profess a 
religious faith.526 Students believe they are autonomous from the dominant system but 
in fact they embody the mystification of the spectacle.527 Being a future young 
professional, the student turns his or her material poverty into a lifestyle that is 
equivalent, as it is temporary, to any other form of consumerism.528 Indeed, students 
also embody the values of consumer culture.529 Worse, they believe themselves to be 
avant-garde because they have seen the latest Godard movie or read the latest 
philosophical text.530 In other words, the Situationists stated that there was nothing 
inherently non-conformist about being a student. On the contrary, students embodied 
the passivity of Spectacular bourgeois social relations. 
 The Situationists then devoted their attention to a critique of various aspects of 
the contemporary student movement. The very notion of a student movement or 
                                                
524 Ibid., pp. 23-24. 
525 Situationist International, De la misère en milieu étudiant, Considérée sous ses aspects économique, 
politique, psychologique, sexuel et notamment intellectuel et de quelques moyens pour y remédier 
[1966] (Paris: Zanzara athée, 2011). 
526 Ibid., p. 10. 
527 Ibid., p. 5. 
528 Ibid., p. 7. 
529 Ibid., p. 8. 
530 Ibid., p. 9. 
	   	  180 
‘révolte des jeunes’ was, they argued, a Spectacular ideology that tried to fragment 
what was in fact a totalising movement against capitalist society.531 Within this 
movement the most reactionary element were those, such as the student unions, who 
wanted structural reforms to the university and student life.532 The SI went on to 
critique the blousons noirs, the Provos, the various Communist groups such as the 
JCR and the anarchists for placing ideological constraints on the movement and 
impeding its radical impetus, in particular the emphasis on anti-Vietnam 
demonstrations.533 Indeed, the SI argued that students were the most content group in 
society to be ‘politisé’, that is to say, to give over their radical potential to an 
ideology.534 In contrast, the Situationists argued, students had to reject their studies as 
the worker rejects their labour.535 Moreover, this could only be done if the student 
movement became a total movement against capital, connecting up with the 
proletariat and being part of the establishing of the organisation of workers’ councils 
whose primary aim would be to abolish work in favour of free human creativity.536 
 Those students who had been elected as representatives on the student union 
were encouraged by the SI to spend the entirety of its available funds to publish this 
text. In November 1966, 10,000 copies of De la misère were printed and distributed 
throughout the university; the elected students then resigned their posts. Throughout 
the University of Strasbourg, posters by the SI began to appear, while students were 
encouraged to break up lectures and occupy the buildings on campus. Eventually what 
was to become known as the Strasbourg Scandal came to an end once the five elected 
students became the subject of court proceedings. The court case was, however, a 
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532 Ibid., p. 7. 
533 Ibid., p. 14-16. 
534 Ibid., p. 9. 
535 Ibid., p. 11. 
536 Ibid., p. 23. 
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triumph for the SI, bringing them instant fame in the student milieu and notoriety in 
the French press. 
 How far Raoul Vaneigem was involved in these events is unclear. He did take 
part in the writing of De la misère and the manuscript of Traité was no doubt an 
important point of reference, certain phraseology and ideas reappearing in the text. 
Moreover, Raoul Vaneigem became the focus of a strange attempted coup by some of 
the students newly associated with the Situationists; this suggests that at the very least 
he was an important point of contact for them. Bourseiller states, based on an 
interview with Daniel Joubert, that several members of the SI and students tried to 
exclude Guy Debord and Attila Kotányi from the SI: ‘Ils comptaient sur Vaneigem et 
presque tous les autres’.537 These members were then excluded for this manoeuvre, 
Vaneigem and the rest of the SI being uninterested in any such move.538 Despite the 
lack of detailed information, however, it is clear that Vaneigem, along with Debord, 
was an important figure in the events of Strasbourg, both in discussions and, perhaps, 
on the ground. 
 
The Strasbourg Scandal could not have come at a better time for the publication of 
Traité and Spectacle. Michèle Bernstein had taken up the role of finding a publisher 
for Traité with little success. Debord had originally read the manuscript of Traité at 
the start of 1965 and it was now almost 1967. Traité was sent to thirteen publishers all 
of whom rejected the publication. Before Strasbourg Vaneigem was just an obscure 
member of a radical revolutionary group, after it he was considered one of the chief 
theorists of the infamous Situationist International who had captured the minds of 
                                                
537 Bourseiller, p. 310. 
538 The exclusion was announced in a tract entitled ‘Attention! Trois provocateurs’, 22 January 1967, 
signed by Raoul Vaneigem among many others members of the SI. Vaneigem would later write a text 
on how critical incoherence led to the emergence of this secret sect within the SI, see Raoul Vaneigem, 
‘Avoir pour vérité la pratique’, Internationale situationniste, 11 (October 1967). 
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French youth. The last publishing house to pronounce its verdict was Gallimard. On 
the same day Raoul Vaneigem received a rejection letter from Gallimard and then 
later that evening a telegram stating that the book had been accepted.539 What had 
made the difference, according to Vaneigem writing in the Preface to the second 
edition, was an article in Le Figaro littéraire the day he received these 
communications that incriminated the influence of the SI on the Provos in 
Amsterdam. Gallimard clearly believed that it could profit from the notoriety the 
Situationists had earned since Strasbourg. 
 Perhaps as a result of the funds gained from the book deal, Raoul Vaneigem 
decided to do a tour of the United States of America in the summer of 1967. The aim 
of the trip, apart from the experience itself, was to establish an American section of 
the Situationist International. Vaneigem spoke English and his ‘Banalités de base’ had 
already been translated as The Totality for Kids in the US. The Situationists had, 
moreover, been alerted to the possibility of bringing the members of the journal Black 
Mask into the organisation; a move that the English section of the SI had encouraged. 
When Raoul Vaneigem arrived in New York, however, this proved impossible. 
Vaneigem met with Hoffman, one of the chief contributors to Black Mask, who gave 
a mystical interpretation of ‘Banalités’.540 As a result Vaneigem refused to meet with 
Ben Morea, the main figure in Black Mask, on the grounds that the SI and the 
members of this journal disagreed on fundamental issues.541 The American section 
was still formed, however, with others Vaneigem met in the US. 
 On returning to Europe, it turned out that Ben Morea had written to the 
English section complaining that he had been misrepresented to Vaneigem. The 
English section were annoyed at these events and wrote to Paris asking that Morea be 
                                                
539 Traité, p. 10. 
540 Internationale situationniste, 11 (October 1967), p. 83. 
541 Ibid. 
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given the reasons Vaneigem had not met with him. Vaneigem travelled to London to 
explain what had happened in person and said that this would be agreed to if the 
English section then refused to communicate with Morea again. A collective letter 
was then sent to Morea from Paris. Morea, however, rejected the account Vaneigem 
had given and then attacked the members of the newly-formed American section. 
Despite agreeing not to, the English section then wrote to Morea again. As the 
English section refused to break contact with Morea they were finally excluded by the 
Central Council of the SI, which included Vaneigem.542 
 
The next important event in the history of the contribution of Raoul Vaneigem to the 
SI was the actual publication of Traité, a little over two weeks after Spectacle, by 
Gallimard on the 30th of November 1967. The publication of these two texts just a 
few months before the events of May ’68 is widely, albeit contentiously, considered 
in the extant literature and for many of those involved as an important correlation. 
Some consider these texts to have predicted May ’68. Others, that they simply 
expressed the spirit of the moment. Writing in the Preface to the second edition, 
Raoul Vaneigem sees Traité as a book that both described its epoch and, more 
importantly, changed it. 543  Indeed, in his later work, Vaneigem compares the 
influence of the Situationists to that of the encyclopaedists of the Enlightenment.544 In 
the context of his own critical theory it is certainly feasible to see Traité as a text that 
contributed to a transformation of society or, at the very least, the radicalisation of a 
social movement. 
                                                
542 For details of the exclusion, see ibid., pp. 83-84. 
543 ‘Un livre qui se veut la lecture d’une époque témoigne seulement d’une histoire au devenir 
imprécis; un livre qui change l’époque propage aussi dans le champ des mutations futures le germe du 
changement’, Traité, p. 9. 
544 ‘Bien que les idées situationnistes soient restées, pendant des décennies, sous la chape du silence, 
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Rousseau, de Voltaire, de Hegel, de Marx’, Entre le deuil, p. 35. 
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 Vaneigem assumes, based on lived experience, that everyone in a hierarchical 
social relationship is made unhappy by that situation. The human volonté de vivre, or 
the subjective dimension of human practice, is placed under constraints in this 
context. In the critical thought of Vaneigem every single human being struggles 
against this. The problem, however, is that human relationships are mystified by the 
fragmentary nature of hierarchy. As such it is difficult, though by no means 
impossible, for human beings to grasp experience as the product of the totality of 
social relationships. For this reason, while there have always been social movements 
of emancipation and individual resistance, these have always been mystified or 
fetishistic. That is to say, the emancipatory impulse is diverted by an illusion of 
emancipation embodied in one or several fetishes.  
 In a sense, therefore, capitalism thrives on its own negation. It offers illusory 
forms of emancipation in the form of fragments of itself that are played off against 
other fragments. Emancipation from suffering is offered in the form of the purchase 
of commodities, in religion, in voting for a political party, in being rich, or in being 
poor, in being a member of the working class as a positive identity or taking part in a 
union. Even ‘revolutionary’ illusions are offered in the form of ‘Communist’ states 
and Trotskyist parties. In a certain sense, even the most inhuman of practices, such as 
fascism, as discussed in Chapter 1 of the current work, can be understood as fetishised 
movements of emancipation. These social movements and individual forms of 
resistance are illusory because they actually reinforce the reproduction of hierarchical 
social relationships because they never contest them as a totality nor therefore contain 
a self-critique. In a bizarre sense hierarchy appears as an emancipation from itself. 
 Vaneigem and Guy Debord approach something close to this argument from 
slightly different directions. The role of both these texts, however, is to act as a source 
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of critique of the illusions that emancipatory movements and individuals labour 
under. The social movement is already there; the point is to radicalise it. In many 
ways, therefore, Traité and Spectacle are the later form of the arguments that were 
first developed with an engagement with Marx in the ‘Thèses de Hambourg’. They 
engage the creatively conscious dimension of human practice in a process of self-
critique that can be objectified in the form of new social relationships. At the same 
time, this is only possible if the Situationists engage with the lived experience, the 
real contemporary social praxis, which defines human life as it now stands. Those 
who wish to interpret Traité as expressing the ‘spirit of May ‘68’ ignore the fact that 
it is precisely this understanding of capitalist social relations, of illusory 
emancipation, and the transformation of social relationships that authentic liberation 
need take, that makes, at least in their own eyes, Vaneigem and Guy Debord such 
influential figures. Moreover, if anything, these were the lessons learned from Hiver 
’60, along with the whole history of the left as had been stated in ‘Sur la Commune’, 
and hardly from a moment that had yet to occur. The extent, however, to which these 
lessons came to radicalise the Movement of Occupations in May ’68 is, of course, 
highly debatable. 
 
The Movement of Occupations began on Friday the 3rd of March 1968 when fighting 
broke out between police and students in and around the Sorbonne University. The 
riot had begun in response to disciplinary action taken against students who had been 
involved in actions in Nanterre, including one René Riesel who was to become a 
member of the SI. The critical theory of the Situationists had been spreading in 
campuses throughout France after Strasbourg and De la misère was now a major 
source of reference. This had radicalised parts of the student movement that were now 
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engaged in a campaign against the university. In an attempt to crack down on the 
individuals involved, the government sent in the police to arrest militants. Over the 
next weeks there was to be bloody fighting between students and police. Buildings 
throughout the Latin Quarter were occupied. Members of the Situationists, Guy 
Debord and Vaneigem included, were physically present in Paris during these events 
and taking part in the organising and fighting. While there were many factions, the 
Situationists put forward the most radical ideas, arguing that the real impetus behind 
the movement was not a need for reform but for the total abolition of capitalism. 
 The fact that workers’ went on strike in support of the students against the 
wishes of union and party representatives began to make the latter desire a real 
possibility. Three quarters of the French workforce went on strike, while students and 
revolutionaries controlled a large part of central Paris. The SI took part in the 
formation of a Committee of Occupations that organised the occupation of the 
Sorbonne and called for the occupation of all factories. However, they were hampered 
by reformists in the student union and soon the Committee was over taken by leftist 
revolutionaries. The SI therefore decided to form a Committée pour la maintenance 
des occupations (CMDO) that was based on Situationist membership. Throughout 
these events Raoul Vaneigem was present in Paris and helped to organise actions. He 
also composed a revolutionary song, ‘La Vie s’écoule, la vie s’enfuit’.545 The actions 
of the SI seem to have consisted primarily in propagating radical theory to guide the 
movement. 
 It is obviously incredibly difficult to gauge exactly how influential Raoul 
Vaneigem or Guy Debord were during the events of May ’68. Many of the phrases 
and ideas of the Situationists found expression on banners and in graffiti on the walls 
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of the Latin Quarter. It is interesting to note that one of the most famous of these, ‘Je 
prends mes désirs pour des réalités car je crois à la réalité de mes désirs’, often 
attributed to the SI in the media seems to be inspired by Louis Scutenaire: ‘Désirs 
sont réalités’.546 At the Sorbonne, a banner was hung proclaiming Vaneigem’s famous 
phrase, ‘Ceux qui parlent de révolution et de lutte de classes sans se reférer 
explicitement à la vie quotidienne […] ceux-là ont dans la bouche un cadavre’.547 
Elsewhere Situationist slogans filled the streets. The graffiti, however, does not prove 
that Vaneigem nor Debord were that influential. At the same time, it is easy to gauge 
that the actual insights of Traité and Spectacle had not sufficiently implanted 
themselves in the student movement in order to provide it with enough radical theory 
to overcome the limitations of its reformist tendencies. The Situationists were 
influential but at the same time it was not the number of people who followed their 
ideas that mattered so much as providing the most radical ideas at the most opportune 
moment. 
 In the event the movement eventually collapsed due to a lack of direction and 
the inability to see that it brought the totality of capitalism into question. French 
workers went back to work after an agreement was reached with employers and the 
student movement collapsed.548 At the same time, the movement had changed the 
discourse in France and exploded any idea that a modern consumer society had 
overcome its inherently alienating way of life. In the streets of Paris human beings 
had been attempting to establish a total transformation of social relationships in a 
manner that had arguably not been seen since the Paris Commune of 1871. 
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The possibility that Traité was more widely read than Spectacle during May ’68 is 
one that invites consideration. In many respects both of the works were putting 
forward a fundamentally similar perspective on the role of fetishism in the 
recuperation of emancipatory movements and on the inhumanity of everyday life in 
capitalist society. The styles of these two works are, however, very different. 
Spectacle was clearly written as a work of high theory in a tone that is decidedly 
intellectual. In contrast Traité is a surprising pastiche of genres of writing driven by a 
poetic prose that actively seeks to avoid the language of high theory. Indeed, Traité is 
surprisingly difficult to pin down and categorise, which is part of its appeal.  
 In some respects Traité draws on the proletarian literature tradition. In 
particular the emphasis it places on the vécu, on hierarchical social relations as they 
are experienced concretely—that is with the rich complexity of subjective 
experience—, links Traité with authors such as Malva, who in turn is drawing on a 
tradition of honest examination of lived experience that goes as far back as Rousseau 
and even Montaigne. No doubt a huge part of the appeal of the book over Spectacle is 
that it speaks to our lived experiences, to the total being, and not just the intellect. In 
this sense Traité also attains a certain level of poetic immediacy in its discourse that 
connects up with the writing of Nietzsche, an important intellectual influence on the 
book, and transcends a purely theoretical grounding. Indeed, as was discussed in 
Chapter 1 of the current work, for Vaneigem radical poetry and theory are one and the 
same. 
 Another major element of Traité that is absent from La Société du Spectacle is 
the genre of encyclopaedia. Vaneigem has always been a collator of useful 
information. In the 1960s he began, with other Situationists, to contribute to the 
Encyclopédie du Monde Actuel, and more recently he has become an important 
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contributor to the Encyclopaedia universalis online. He has also written a collection 
of citations and his Les Controverses du christianisme is an A-Z of Christian theology 
from his radical perspective. Vaneigem is, moreover, a lifelong admirer of Diderot. 
As such, Traité also, it can be argued, is situated in the tradition of an encyclopaedia 
of the ‘liberal arts’, the arts that set one free in the mind and from manual labour, 
though with the radical edge that it is an encyclopaedia of the revolutionary arts, 
freeing the reader from all hierarchical separations. The text refers to radical 
moments, people, and ideas from throughout the course of human history, from the 
work of Schopenhauer and Marx to the mystical heresies of the Middle Ages and the 
Anarchists of the nineteenth century. The book is a total guide to art, politics, music, 
language, theory and the human imagination. Part of the appeal of this book is 
therefore its strongly didactic flavour that introduces the reader to an entire world of 
hidden history largely unknown outside the most radical circles. 
 This latter aspect also finds expression in what is perhaps the hidden secret of 
Traité, its basis in the collected works of Isidore Ducasse, le Comte de Lautréamont. 
The title of Traité de savoir-vivre à l’usage des jeunes générations is a pun on the 
idea of giving a guide on ‘how to live’ (savoir vivre) and a guide to ‘good manners’ 
(savoir-vivre). The book is therefore openly didactic but also in a tongue-in-cheek 
manner. Indeed, this is a guide on how not to have ‘good manners’ in the sense of 
reproducing social norms and relationships. It is quite possible, given the huge 
influence of Ducasse on him since his university mémoire, that Vaneigem is referring 
here to the moment in Les Chants de Maldoror when the eponymous anti-hero 
advises a child he finds crying in a park in Paris to become a thief and a murderer. 
Maldoror offers the child consolation in a cynical assessment of modern human 
affairs, arguing that he should embrace the inherent evil of bourgeois society and 
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embody its violence. In this context Raoul Vaneigem would be Maldoror advising 
young generations in a similarly lucid and negative manner. Such a reading is 
supported by the fact that the splitting of Traité into a negative and positive part 
reflects Vaneigem’s own reading of the work of Ducasse. For Vaneigem Maldoror 
embodies the work of a negative critique from the perspective of power. Poésies, on 
the other hand, is the corollary positive critique necessary for a liberated society that 
escapes the nihilism of pure destruction. The structure of Traité reflects this exact 
same schema, being divided into ‘La perspective du pouvoir’ and ‘Le renversement 
de perspective’. 
 
In the period 1965-1968 Raoul Vaneigem was therefore crucial to the history of the 
Situationist International in a number of ways. First, as a member of the SI he was a 
contributor to the organisation and radicalisation of the Student movement. Secondly, 
he continued to be an important member on the level of internal politics as the 
exclusion of the English section and the establishment of an American section 
demonstrates. Thirdly, he took part in the Situationist presence during the events of 
May ’68 and his major work, Traité, had a limited but radicalising influence on those 
who took part in the Movement of Occupations. Moreover, many of these 
developments had been made possible by his collaborative and individually achieved 
work in Internationale situationniste between 1961 and 1964. 
 
1969-1970 
 
Immediately after the events of May ’68 the Situationist International seemed far 
from approaching its dissolution. The group had been an important part of the most 
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radical moment of French history in over a hundred years and its ideas had begun to 
spread on an international scale. In exile in Belgium, the Situationists wrote up an 
account of events from their own perspective, entitled Enragés et Situationnistes dans 
le mouvement des occupations.549 Relations between Debord and Vaneigem were 
good and, as after Hiver ’60, there was a sense that the historical moment had 
changed. The SI now had to reorient itself in order to be at the avant-garde of the 
revolutionary movement. Over the next couple of years, however, the internal debate 
and practice of this new period was to prove extremely problematic. 
 Between the 25th of September and the 1st of October 1969, the Eighth 
Conference of the Situationist International took place in Venice.550 In many respects 
the conference could be seen as a repeat of the confusion, though over a different 
topic, that had reigned at the London conference in 1960. There was no clarity about 
exactly how the SI was to adapt to the new historical conditions that had been created 
by the events of May ’68. Moreover, there was also a movement back to an earlier 
form of organisation. The Central Council was dissolved and replaced with an 
organisational system not unlike what had existed in 1957. National sections were to 
be given much greater autonomy in terms of exclusions and delegations from national 
sections was to meet regularly between conferences. Debord was unimpressed by the 
arguments put forward by Vaneigem in Venice about the need for coherence and his 
insistence that there could be no disagreements within the group. 
  In the twelfth, and final, issue of Internationale situationniste published in 
September 1969 the consensus was that the events of the previous year were, like the 
Commune before it, a combination of success and failure. For those who had lived the 
event, in many ways theory had been realised. On the other hand, the movement had 
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ultimately been defeated, like the Commune, by old habits. The failure of the 
movement was in large part due to a failure to implement the directly democratic 
organisation of society. The twelfth issue of the SI’s journal therefore elaborated the 
position of establishing workers’ councils with a view to creating ‘autogestion 
généralisée’ or generalised self-management. In other words, the movement had 
failed because it had not taken on the reorganisation of everyday life and its resources. 
From now on the Situationists proposed to call for the creation of workers’ councils. 
 The contribution of Vaneigem in this respect was a series of twenty-one theses 
entitled ‘Avis aux civilisés relativement à l’autogestion généralisée’ published in this 
twelfth issue.551 Vaneigem argues that May ’68 had propagated the necessity of 
overcoming capitalism but only in a confused manner.552 He claims that everyone 
who took part in the events of May ’68 felt the possibility of a total transformation of 
everyday life.553 However, this instinct had not been realised in practice. Vaneigem 
therefore argues that the creation of workers’ councils is the crucial social form that 
would make such a transformation possible by generalising human autonomy.554 He 
notes that the most common objection to totalising change is the accusation that 
revolutionaries had nothing with which to replace the current system.555 Yet in 
revolutionary moments the proletariat rediscover the complete history of its 
struggle.556 Most important was the experience of a society of workers’ councils (by 
implication this included the most prominent examples of the Paris Commune and the 
Spanish Revolution).557 Vaneigem argues that during May ’68 many people had felt 
                                                
551 Raoul Vaneigem, ‘Avis aux civilisés relativement à l’autogestion généralisée’, Internationale 
situationniste, pp. 74-79. 
552 Ibid., p. 74. 
553 Ibid. 
554 Ibid. 
555 Ibid. 
556 Ibid. 
557 Ibid. 
	   	  193 
the necessity of rejecting any organisation that was not the direct emanation of the 
proletariat.558 Workers’ councils embody the most powerful social organisation that 
can meet this need.559 
 Vaneigem goes on to claim that May ’68 had been a crucial moment in the 
long history of revolution because it embodies a total rejection of all alienations and 
therefore a unitary rejection of hierarchy: ‘l’histoire individuelle de millions 
d’hommes, chaque jour à la recherche d’une vie authentique, rejoignant le 
mouvement historique du prolétariat en lutte contre l’ensemble des aliénations’.560 As 
such, Vaneigem argues that workers’ councils have to be the bearers of the subjective 
demands that arise in the total transformation of everyday life.561 This is to be the 
central goal of the council: to demand an immediate improvement in people’s lives 
and a rejection of any partial transformations or organisation along economic lines.562 
The latter would be a sign of the bureaucratisation of the organisations and their turn 
into class enemies.563 Vaneigem states that each individual action of the councils must 
contain within it a totalising rejection of the whole. For example, Vaneigem argues 
that shops should become distribution centres for stocks in an effort to provide goods 
people need but also as a mean of immediately abolishing money and any lingering 
attachment to it.564 The point is to demonstrate in practice that humanity has no need 
of hierarchy for organising everyday life. 
 Vaneigem defines the specifics of the councils, arguing that each should 
quickly incorporate the rest of the community in order to become a self-organising 
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group of around 10,000 people.565 The experience of liberation, Vaneigem argues, is 
itself the main tool that the revolutionary movement has to attract support.566 The 
councils should therefore organise an immediate improvement in the freedom and 
organisation of the construction of the everyday life of all.567 He concludes that the 
workers’ councils can even be thought of as ‘anti-législateurs’ establishing new 
Rights of Man that would free humanity from the constraints placed on it by the 
history of economic development.568 
 With the move towards an elaboration of workers’ councils, however, the 
Situationists had still not resolved the question of reorientation in response to the 
events of May ’68. The last contribution Raoul Vaneigem was to make on this point 
was in a text comprising seven theses entitled ‘Notes sur l’orientation de l’I.S.’ 
completed in March 1970.569 Vaneigem argues that the SI needs to differentiate itself 
qualitatively from the rest of the revolutionary movement by reasserting its specificity 
as Situationist.570 Vaneigem notes that in the past the Situationist critique of art had 
led to the exclusion of artists from the group and, perhaps, artists had even stopped 
reading the SI; this was a beneficial change.571 The SI had then begun the critique of 
ideology and in so doing attracted intellectuals and students.572 However, these groups 
were also content to simply study a critique of themselves and not act.573 The SI, 
Vaneigem continues, have nothing in common with these groups and it should reject a 
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readership that wants only to partially change society thereby ignoring the main thrust 
of Situationist theory.574 
 Vaneigem argues that it is now time for the SI to merge more closely with the 
proletariat as the abolition of the proletariat.575 The Situationists should not move 
towards a pure elaboration of councilism but rather a critique of the worker milieu 
itself.576 One important means of doing this is to prepare a Strasbourg-style coup in 
the factories.577 Such a position implies that the methods and tactics of the SI that 
were applied to the student movement and had met with such success there needed to 
be applied to the worker milieu where it would be most effective. Beyond the critique 
of ideology, Vaneigem suggests in this text that a critique that addressed the worker 
milieu would be linked more clearly with techniques of agitation.578 
  Despite the great deal of thought and discussion that went into the 
reorientation debate it was not clear how the SI was to move out of the impasse in 
which it had found itself. For his own part Guy Debord had become frustrated with 
what he saw as a lack of participation in the group on the part of most members, 
Vaneigem included. The thirteenth issue of Internationale situationniste was proving 
increasingly unlikely to appear and, Debord felt, members had become too content to 
rest on the laurels of May ’68. Vaneigem had, however, been contributing to the 
reorientation debate and he was working at that time on a critical history of the 
Surrealist movement from a Situationist perspective that would later appear as 
Histoire désinvolte du surréalisme.579 Perceptions were quite different, however, in 
Paris. Debord and the French section sent out a communiqué to all the sections of the 
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SI demanding an immediate self-critique on the grounds of non-participation. Raoul 
Vaneigem felt personally affronted by this move and saw it as a hierarchical 
manoeuvre on the part of Guy Debord. 
 On the 14th of November 1970, Raoul Vaneigem sent a letter of resignation to 
the French section of the Situationist International.580 Vaneigem states that the move 
by the French section was the most abstract move that could have been formulated in 
the group.581 Vaneigem says that, where before it had been a passionate project, the 
Situationist International had simply turned into a ‘malaise d’être ensemble’.582 
Exactly why this had happened, Vaneigem claims, is for historians to establish.583 He 
restricts his own analysis to the failure of Situationist theory to penetrate the working 
class: ‘l’analyse aisé du peu de pénétration de la théorie situationniste en milieu 
ouvrier et du peu de pénétration ouvrière en milieu situationniste’.584 This was, of 
course, an indirect reference to his own contribution to the reorientation debate. 
 Rather than list his grievances with the SI, Vaneigem choses to offer a self-
critique. He states that he had always believed other comrades to be as honest as 
himself but he is disillusioned both about himself and others.585 Moreover, this 
attitude led him to overlook the formation of ideological conditions within the SI that 
resulted from underhand tactical manoeuvring.586 Vaneigem says this is both his 
failure and that of the whole group. However, he continues vehemently to defend 
himself against anyone who accuses him of having an unrevealed mission of his 
own.587 The SI had not turned out to be what he wanted it to be despite his own 
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efforts. Moreover, he states that he would no longer speak to comrades who wished it. 
Vaneigem concludes by saying that if the French section continued to believe its own 
critique self-sufficient, without any proof, then he should be considered as having 
resigned and accepted the consequences of never seeing his Situationist comrades 
again.588 
 
The resignation of Raoul Vaneigem marked a turning point in the history of the 
Situationist International. No large works of theory, no further issue of the SI’s 
journal, nor a great deal of subversive actions were to occur after, at least not on the 
scale of what had come before. This is not to say that the Situationist International 
could not have continued without Vaneigem. Indeed, it did so until 1972. However, 
whoever was responsible for the rupture, it seems to have been quite a blow. It is not 
even entirely clear whether Debord originally wanted to push Vaneigem out or if he 
was just hoping to shake him into action. The SI itself excluded or received 
resignations from a number of other members, either in response to the resignation of 
Vaneigem or as a result of the previous position of the French section. From then on, 
Debord was his inveterate critic, though Vaneigem has been largely silent on the 
matter. Debord began to assess the history of the Situationist International, this 
implied that it was not to go on for much longer. In 1972 Guy Debord published La 
Véritable scission dans l’Internationale, effectively dissolving the SI. 589  For 
Vaneigem, his resignation marked the end of almost a decade of participation in 
arguably the most radical revolutionary organisation of the twentieth century. 
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Chapter 4. The Praxis of Pleasure: Capitalist Subjectivity and Emancipation in 
the Later Work of Raoul Vaneigem 
 
The aim of this chapter is to provide a theoretical exposition of the key developments 
in the later, or post-Situationist, work of Raoul Vaneigem. By far the majority of 
Vaneigem’s oeuvre, theoretical and otherwise, has been written in the decades after 
his resignation from the Situationist International. In this time Vaneigem has 
published a number of book-length essays in the manner of Traité. These include Le 
Livre des plaisirs (1979), by far the most widely read of these later texts, Adresse aux 
vivants (1990) and L’Ère des créateurs (2010), among many others. Vaneigem has 
equally produced a number of books in other genres such as the utopian novel Voyage 
à Oarystis (2005) and Déclaration des droits de l’être humain (2001), which, as its 
title suggests, is a complete bill of rights that one might expect to enjoy in an 
emancipated society. Our analysis in this chapter will examine these works as 
embodiments of the direction that the critical theory of Raoul Vaneigem has moved 
towards in the years after his time in the Situationist International. 
 The context for this discussion is that Vaneigem has received a great deal of 
criticism from his peers for these later works. The most powerful example is, as ever, 
Guy Debord who critiqued Le Livre des plaisirs in a letter to Paolo Salvadori not long 
after the publication of the book.590 Debord describes the text as laughable.591 He says 
that the critical position put forward in it amount to saying that revolution can be 
made simply by passing from pleasure to pleasure without having to consider 
anything else.592 Debord states that Vaneigem rejects both strategy and the realities of 
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refusing contemporary society.593 As such, Debord concludes, Vaneigem has simply 
become a parish priest that promises paradise, without, by implication, providing the 
tools for its construction.594 A similar critical appraisal of Le Livre des plaisirs is 
found in the work of Barnard who states that the arguments of Vaneigem in the text 
require an ‘intellectual and spiritual leap of faith’.595 Barnard notes that a lot of the 
concepts and issues in the text seem to be rather ‘woolly’ and ‘poorly qualified’; his 
criticism focuses on three particular issues.596 First, Barnard says that Vaneigem gives 
individual  agency but apparently excludes collective action.597 Secondly, he claims 
that it is unclear what Vaneigem means by autonomy and the process of its 
creation.598 Thirdly, Barnard is confused by the way Vaneigem discusses pleasure: 
‘Would a revolution gratify and satiate desire in an orgiastic state of eternal 
pleasure?’599 
 These are both important criticisms of Vaneigem that deserve addressing. It  
is, of course, problematical that Vaneigem tends to avoid a systematic exposition of 
his conceptual framework. Moreover, the fact that Vaneigem focuses so much on the 
‘subjective’ side of the problem of capitalism means he often avoids opportunities to 
provide insight into the more ‘objective’, or strategic, side of the structures of 
domination. Nonetheless, there seems to be clear confusion on the part of Debord and 
Barnard as to what Vaneigem is doing in Le Livre des plaisirs. Each of them thinks of 
‘pleasure’ in terms of a monad, a single unit of gratification. If this was in fact what 
Vaneigem meant by pleasure then they would be correct to critique him. However, as 
I hope to show in this chapter, these are in fact projections of a bourgeois notion of 
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pleasure onto Vaneigem that the author himself does not hold to. His conception of 
pleasure is very different. In order to understand just how different we have to 
describe the influence of Reichian theories of mental illness on his work. 
 
Alexander Lowen: A Reichian Theory of Pleasure 
 
The key to getting to grips with Le Livre des plaisirs are two books translated into 
French just a few years earlier, Le Plaisir (1976) and La Bio-énergie (1976) by 
Alexander Lowen.600 Although Vaneigem has never directly stated that Lowen is a 
major influence on his later work I believe that this is a reasonable supposition to 
make. Beyond the obvious similar titles of the works, as we will see, there are so 
many commonalities between the two authors, both on the level of language and 
theory, that there can be little doubt of a strong link. Moreover, throughout his time in 
the Situationist International, Raoul Vaneigem was an avid reader of Reich, even 
passing copies of his work around within the group.601 It seems reasonable to assume 
then that Vaneigem would have been very interested in a book that echoed aspects of 
Reich that he had himself already drawn upon in Traité. A comparison of the two 
works, as will be shown, proves extremely useful in clearing up some of the 
confusion demonstrated by Barnard and, arguably, Debord. 
 Alexander Lowen began his career as a student and patient of Wilhelm Reich, 
one of the intellectual fathers of psychoanalysis, in the 1940s. Lowen was particularly 
fascinated by the relationship between the mind and the body in Reichian theory.602 
He notes that a theory of the repression of traumatic experience had already been 
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developed by psychoanalysis in the early part of the twentieth century.603 However, 
he asserts that Reich wanted to understand the psychological mechanism by which 
repression resulted in problems in later life.604 Lowen states that, to answer this 
question, Reich proposed that the repression of traumatic experience expressed itself 
as a suppression of sexual feeling in the years following the original trauma.605 The 
patient develops a ‘cuirasse’ or armour used to shut out dangerous feelings which 
threaten to come to her conscious awareness.606 Reich therefore made the relationship 
of the patient to her feelings, her awareness of her body, a determining factor in the 
psychology of his patients. On this basis Reich began to develop a language with 
which to talk about awareness of feeling as a ‘sexual energy’.607 Lowen asserts that 
this referred to both sexual feeling and feeling of the body more generally.608  
Lowen broke with Reich in the early 1950s, as the latter began to move away 
from serious psychotherapy, and developed his own medical practice. He worked on 
the original idea established by Reich that neuroses result from the suppression of 
bodily feeling and developed his own distinct version of Reichian psychotherapeutic 
theory based on years of clinical work. In the 1970s and early 1980s Lowen went on 
to publish several works based on his theories, including as Le Plaisir (1976), La Bio-
énergie (1976) and Gagner à en mourir: Une civilisation narcissique (1987), that 
knew a great deal of success in the United States and were quickly translated into 
French.609 
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 Lowen argues that a person is her body: ‘chacun est son corps’.610 His 
ontology of human being is therefore rooted in an awareness of the corporeal reality 
of the self. The body, for Lowen, is in this sense a totalising concept. It is, at one and 
the same time, both who we are and the means by which we express who we are.611 It 
is through the mediation of the body alone that human beings experience and interact 
with the world: ‘Nul n’existe en dehors du corps vivant où se passe son existence et 
au moyen duquel il s’exprime et entre en relation avec le monde qui l’entoure’.612 The 
fact that Lowen states that nothing exists outside the body is not meant in a solipsistic 
sense but rather it is meant to stress the physicality and concreteness of being a human 
body. To be human, for Lowen, is not, as in Descartian or Kantian thought, to be an 
empty, almost disembodied consciousness. It is to be a sensual, conscious and 
biological organism with concrete experiences, needs and desires. Moreover, the 
notion of the body that Lowen defines is both the conscious mind and the unconscious 
body as part of a single conception of the self. Lowen stresses this point clearly by 
claiming that even the most abstract considerations of a human being can ultimately 
be traced back to concrete sentiments and experiences.613 A healthy consciousness in 
the eyes of Lowen is therefore one that is thoroughly rooted in an awareness of one’s 
body. Indeed, for Lowen, we can only know the world through the mediation of 
bodies: ‘Lorsque des événements du monde extérieur affectent le corps, on en fait 
l'expérience, mais ce qu'on ressent en réalité c'est leur effet sur le corps’.614 Lowen 
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therefore argues that any objective sense of reality has to be grounded in a subjective 
sensual awareness and understanding of the corporeal self.615 
 One of the essential aspects of any living organism, Lowen states, is that it 
seeks pleasure and flees pain. 616 The human organism, for Lowen, is no different in 
this respect from any other living thing and this axis of feeling determines our 
behaviour. Pleasure, however, has a very specific meaning in the work of Lowen. 
Lowen says that pleasure is a ‘manière d’être’ or mode of being that a person can feel 
in the most ordinary and everyday of activities.617 Whatever the process may be, even 
forms of production or chores such as carpentry or house cleaning, a person is capable 
of feeling pleasure in them when they are freely undertaken and if she defines the 
pace of the activity according to her own natural inclination and personal capacity.618 
For Lowen, pleasure is therefore a fluctuation of positive sensations that a person 
feels when she identifies with the activity in which she is engaging.619 As such, 
Lowen defines pleasure as a harmony between the human organism and its 
surroundings.620 That is to say, an environment, or society, conducive to this kind of 
spontaneity. Moreover, Lowen’s conception of pleasure is not a fixed state but rather 
very much defined as a process of creation that constantly transforms this 
environment, thereby developing always new and more intense pleasure.621 Indeed, 
for Lowen, creation itself is driven by the human search for pleasure. 622 Creative acts 
are those make life more pleasurable and that give it meaning.623 As such, there is a 
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dialectical relationship between pleasure and creativity.624 The more pleasurable life 
is, the more one is creative; the more creative one is, the more life is pleasurable.625 
For Lowen, the conscious creation of pleasure therefore forms the guide and prime 
motivator behind human life. The practice of pleasure is the essence of our humanity. 
 It should be noted that Lowen specifically contrasts his definition of pleasure 
with ‘fun’, which, he states, is an attempt to escape the reality of life rather than 
transform that reality for one’s enjoyment.626 Drugs, for example, only change one’s 
interior reality and leave the original situation that caused the need for escape 
intact.627 Pleasure, in contrast, demands a serious attitude to life and one’s concrete 
existence.628 Concretely, an extremely difficult task, such as learning a language or 
creating a work of theory, might prove ultimately far more meaningful and 
pleasurable than the instant gratification provided by a McDonald’s hamburger, 
watching television or the immense power immediately given to a person by a car. 
His conception of pleasure cannot therefore be conflated with the hedonism 
encouraged by consumer society. On the contrary, Lowen’s call for a practice of 
pleasure is an explicit rejection of the narcissistic ‘fun’ seeking of modern life. 
 Lowen argues that a person who feels pleasure is living well. Although Lowen 
provides no easy summary of what such a subject is like, it is possible to construct 
one from his scattered comments. She is in this sense a healthy human being.629 Such 
an individual, Lowen states, benefits from a range of positive human qualities that are 
reflected in the self. She is always in touch with her feelings.630 She breathes easily 
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and more deeply.631 She has great stores of creative energy.632 She is open, friendly, 
generous and warm. 633  She can express herself without repression in all 
circumstances. Life for such a person represents a creative adventure.634 The fact that 
she has confidence in her own feelings, a sense of rootedness, gives her the ability to 
assert herself against authority when necessary. 635  She also has great critical 
capacities based in this confidence in her own practice of pleasure and her knowledge 
of what this requires.636 For this reason she is also more capable of saying no to 
herself when necessary.637 Lowen states that our ability to empathise with others 
depends on our ability to feel our own emotions.638 As such, this individual would be 
extremely empathetic. It is important to Lowen that such healthy subjects represent a 
unity, not only of the mind and the body, but of all the different stages in human 
development.639 A mature and healthy human individual will have integrated the 
experience of love and pleasure discovered in infancy, creativity and imagination in 
childhood, romance and adventure in adolescence, reality and responsibility in 
adulthood.640 She is therefore a fully integrated personality.641 The spontaneity of her 
movements, her posture and even the timbre of her voice reflects this.642 Although it 
might seem rather utopian, Lowen is not saying that any of it this possible, at least in 
our own particularly narcissistic society, without a lot of hard work on the part of the 
subject. Moreover, it is an ideal, healthy state that he, as a psychotherapist, is helping 
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his patients to work towards. It is after all one of the main goals of psychotherapy to 
help patients overcome pathological cycles of guilt and anxiety, to help them to have 
full sexual enjoyment and enduring, meaningful relationships. None of this is 
therefore any more unrealistic that the normal aims of psychotherapy. 
 The question remains then as to why people are not like this. Lowen argues 
that the source of the problem is mass culture. Contemporary society is based on an 
incessant struggle for success and power.643 There are hierarchies in almost every 
aspect of our lives, which means we are constantly being judged as successes or 
failures.644 People are encouraged to identify with this hierarchical system. They 
internalise its values and pursue recognition within it rather than base their behaviour 
on how they actually feel.645 This is translated into family life where people judge 
their own children’s behaviour by these prevailing social standards.646 When children 
inevitably do not conform to these criteria they are humiliated by their parents.647 The 
social aim of this process is to turn each person into a submissive, obeisant adult and a 
good worker.648 
 Lowen argues that this socialisation is extremely traumatic and leads to a 
schism between the mind and the body. Faced with humiliation, the child learns to 
suppress her feelings and to construct an external mask of acceptable behaviour in 
order to avoid further punishment. 649  Eventually, however, the child becomes 
resigned to this division between the expressive façade and the inner reality.650 The 
schism begins to structure her personality. 651  Although the original trauma is 
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repressed, it continues to develop almost as a separate entity in the subconscious.652 
The self becomes conflated with the façade.653 At the same time, this artificial self 
becomes identified on a conscious level exclusively with the ‘esprit’ or mind.654 
Through this mechanism the self is disassociated from the body. As such, the 
relationship between consciousness and reality of the body is sundered. This pseudo-
disembodied self cannot, however, abolish the body. Feeling is still present.655 The 
self therefore constructs a series of rationalisations and justifications, as in Freudian 
theory, on the one hand, and, on the other, it constructs a ‘cuirasse’ a corporeal 
armour that represses feeling in the body, as in the theory of Reich. The body is 
thereby reduced to a kind of machine controlled by the mind rather than an integrated 
aspect of the self.656 The integrity of the personality is broken. The body becomes 
seen as something alien, even dangerous, that must be dominated. 
 Lowen argues that this mind-body schism creates what he calls a ‘peur de 
plaisir’ or fear of pleasure. The mind is unable to completely control, or abolish, the 
body, and it is afraid of those bodily processes that escape its control.657 If the subject 
were to feel pleasure fully, she would have to allow her body to express itself 
spontaneously and this would challenge the rigidity of the body.658 The subject, 
however, is afraid of the negative feelings that would result from breaking this 
rigidity.659 Lowen argues that the subject is therefore caught because in order to feel 
pleasure one has to be able to face this pain.660 It is the pain of the original repressed 
trauma that introduced the rigidity in the first place. As such, Lowen argues, the 
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subject would have to be honest with herself about the artificial self and the 
rationalisations she has constructed to defend it.661 Lowen suggests that this would 
require rejecting the guilt that she has accumulated as a result of identifying her self 
with the system of hierarchical images presented to her by our society. Most people, 
however, continue to suppress these feelings because they cannot face them. The 
strong emotions she has suppressed do not go away, they continue in the 
subconscious, but they find a negative outlet in desires for that which will support her 
façade of self. Moreover, she projects her own repressed parts of herself, her fears, 
onto others.662 Lowen argues that children in particular are subject to this kind of 
hostility from adults because they do not conform to the image parents expect of them 
(which is, in fact, the adult’s ideal image of themselves).663 
 This fear of pleasure, Lowen asserts, drives a desire for power on the part of 
the subject. Lowen defines power as the opposite of pleasure.664 Much like ‘fun’, 
Lowen argues that the struggle for power is the result of a need to compensate the self 
for interior distress.665 It is a form of compensation, in fact, for a lack of pleasure in 
one’s life.666 It gives a person a means of self-expression that is safely contained 
within the hierarchy with which she identifies.667 All of her acts are made in order to 
reinforce this perfect identification of her self with the image presented to society.668 
This lust for power is based on the illusion that power and success within the social 
hierarchy actually contributes to real pleasure in anyway.669 This is, of course, an idea 
encouraged by advertising and other aspects of contemporary society. Lowen argues 
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that those subjects who are defined by this search for power, over pleasure, are just an 
empty representation of the role that they have adopted in society.670 They have no 
real identity or personality specific to themselves. As such, Lowen argues that they 
also have no real power because that which is given to them is based on the fact that 
they have stopped being a real person.671 Lowen therefore states that while these 
people may find success in terms of the social role they have taken on, they are 
actually failures as human beings.672 
 Lowen contends that those people who are defined by their fear of pleasure are 
in some sense literally more dead than an integrated personality. He defines death in 
this sense as a cessation of breath and a loss of feeling.673 It is a situation of stasis or 
lack of movement.674 The ‘dead’ person breathes less or less easily.675 She has a 
diminished capacity for pleasure.676 This includes difficulties experiencing full, sexual 
pleasure.677 She is afraid of her emotions.678 Her body seems alien to her, an 
encumberment.679 Indeed, she fears her own body.680 She is overly conscious of her 
self and she lacks spontaneity in her movements.681 Because she is unable to feel her 
own emotions, she lacks the ability to empathise.682 She projects her inner distress on 
to others and is aggressive.683 Her body is rigid because she has suppressed her 
feelings.684 Moreover, she is controlled by images of success presented to her by 
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society.685 She is in this sense not a real person.686 She is terrified of failure, success is 
absolute for her.687 Her body is like a machine that is used to accomplish the task of 
supporting her artificial self.688 For this reason she is cut off from reality.689 She 
cannot say no to authority figures and the social pressure to conform.690 Lowen argues 
that her will to pleasure is therefore broken.691 She has repressed the child in her.692 
She is wracked by feelings of guilt and shame.693 Because she lacks the necessary 
spontaneity for pleasure, her life is empty and boring.694 For Lowen, this is the 
tragedy of the modern, narcissistic individual. 
 Lowen is not for his own part a radical by any stretch of the imagination. He 
is, for example, very hostile to struggles between workers and employers. In many 
ways he romanticises the capitalist society of his childhood in the early twentieth 
century. Further, the liberation he imagines for the narcissistic subject of modern 
society from ‘la peur de plaisir’ is couched almost exclusively within the context of 
psychotherapy and self-help. However, his theories about the causes behind 
inhumanity and the problems faced by capitalist subjects in contemporary society are 
quite powerful. As we shall now see, these aspects are incorporated by Vaneigem into 
his earlier critical theory in order to provide the new developments we see in his later 
work. 
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Lowen’s Theory of Pleasure in the Work of Vaneigem 
 
In Chapter 1 of the current work it was argued that Vaneigem posits praxis as the 
essence of human being. Vaneigem argues that mankind engages in a constant process 
of world and self creation through a conscious practice rooted in a volonté de vivre, an 
inherent drive to realise the concrete needs and desires that arise out of everyday lived 
experience. When this process is engaged in freely it allows the possibility of a 
passionate existence that forms the basis for an authentic human life. All of this still 
holds true in the later work of Raoul Vaneigem. However, in these post-Situationist 
texts, Vaneigem merges his own take on the ontology of human being with the 
arguments and language of Lowen that have been outlined above. As has already been 
noted, Vaneigem makes no direct statement to this effect anywhere in his work, so 
this assertion is one that has to be deduced from the way in which he develops and 
employs his critical theory in these later texts. Nonetheless, it will hopefully become 
clear that the similarities are evident and that a knowledge of the theories of Lowen 
help to better qualify the language and contextualise the arguments that many readers 
of Vaneigem’s later works have found confusing. 
 Like Lowen, Vaneigem states that a human being is her body. 695  For 
Vaneigem the body is in this sense just as totalising a concept as it is for Lowen. He 
states clearly that the body is the locus of all human experience.696 In this later work 
la vie quotidienne therefore becomes ‘la vie quotidienne du corps’.697 The body has 
thus become the site of the vécu or lived experience described in Traité. Further, in 
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line with Lowen, the notion of the body that Vaneigem employs in his work is equally 
meant as a term that imagines the mind and the body as two aspects of a unified 
biological conception of self. Throughout his later writing, for example, Vaneigem 
asserts that authentic consciousness is sensual consciousness or consciousness rooted 
in an awareness of the body.698 Vaneigem even goes so far as to say that it is this 
sensual intelligence that will abolish hierarchical society.699 As we shall see below, 
Vaneigem therefore rejects la pensée séparée as abstract thought that is separated 
from this tangible reality. These later developments tell us that, in his later work, 
Vaneigem moves away from a more abstract conception of subjectivity to root it in 
the definition of the body that Lowen develops. Praxis now takes place as a natural 
function of the human organism rooted in the organic processes of the body. In a 
sense the notion of la volonté de vivre already implied such a position but this merger 
with a Lowenian conception of the body allows an even more concrete picture of the 
subject in conscious mediation with the world and itself. 
 In accordance with the theories of Lowen, Raoul Vaneigem argues that the life 
of the human body is essentially defined by a conscious practice of pleasure. It is 
important to keep in mind that the definition of pleasure that Vaneigem employs in 
his later work is evidently taken straight from Lowen. For example, like Lowen, 
Vaneigem argues that pleasure is something one can feel in the most ordinary of 
activities.700 He stresses that pleasure is not a fixed moment of gratification but a 
process that results in a proliferation of new and more intense pleasures.701 Further, in 
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line with Lowen, Vaneigem defines creativity as that which makes life pleasurable.702 
Creativity in this sense cannot take place in the context of external constraints but 
must define its own conditions for action.703 Moreover, as for Lowen, Vaneigem sees 
this relationship between pleasure and creativity as a dialectical one. Creation realises 
pleasure but it is pleasure that stimulates creation: ‘seule la recherche du plaisir 
nourrit et stimule la création du soi et du monde’.704 In the work of Vaneigem, as in 
the work of Lowen, it is this practice of pleasure that is the essence of life: ‘Le plaisir 
crée la vie’.705 The adoption of these arguments by Vaneigem allows him to refer to 
the entire process of a free creative praxis simply as le vivant, a term that will be 
explored in more detail below, and that which engages in this practice as la matière 
vivante or living matter.706 A ‘human’ society, for Vaneigem, would therefore be one 
founded upon this practice of pleasure and a ‘living’ person would be someone who 
engages in this practice. As we shall see, Vaneigem believes that commodity society 
embodies the opposite of this logic. 
 
It is crucial to note that the definition of pleasure that Vaneigem employs in his work 
is neither orgiastic gratification nor consumerist hedonism. Vaneigem specifically 
critiques Reich for reducing pleasure—which he refers to here as ‘la sexualité 
globale’, by which he means creativity in general—to genital satisfaction.707 Although 
it is an aspect of pleasure, the reduction of pleasure to the orgasm, cut off from a more 
totalising notion of human realisation, has simply turned the genitals into a social 
                                                
702 Vaneigem states that the true nature of creativity is ‘la jouissance de soi s’affirmant dans la 
jouissance du monde’, Adresse aux vivants, p. 232. 
703 ‘La création ne tolère ni espace ni temps déterminés, elle les détermine à volonté’, L’Ère des 
créateurs, p. 83. 
704 Adresse aux vivants, p. 205. 
705 Le Livre des plaisirs, p. 185. 
706 L’Ère des créateurs, p. 93, 95. 
707 Le Livre des plaisirs, p. 26-27, 51. 
	   	  214 
fragment and, most crucially, a source of profit.708 Indeed, throughout his work 
Vaneigem consistently contrasts his notion of pleasure with the ‘pleasures’ offered by 
consumer society. In his critical theory the consumption of commodities is a type of 
pseudo-pleasure, which he calls les plaisirs de survie, that occupies the same place in 
his writing as the idea of ‘fun’ does in the work of Lowen.709 Vaneigem argues that 
capitalist society only appears to emancipate pleasure from hierarchical social 
constraints. He asserts that, because it was unable to abolish them, commodity society 
simply turned pleasures into a source of profit.710 This has made pleasure subject to an 
even more abstract force of human domination than in pre-capitalist societies in the 
sense that there are now economic forces and ideologies driving people to 
performative acts of ‘pleasure’. Where in early modes of social reproduction pleasure 
was often banned outright, in contemporary commodity society this has been replaced 
by forced ‘pleasure’.711 In a later work Vaneigem gives a good concrete example by 
stating that where once a young woman would feel ashamed for not being a virgin, 
she is now made to feel ashamed for being one.712 Significantly, this example appears 
to be lifted straight from Lowen.713 Vaneigem argues that in modern consumer society 
people perform acts of pleasure not freely but in order to conform to the performative 
roles required by the commodity form and earn the recognition of their equally 
alienated peers.714 Vaneigem likens this process to castration.715 This is because the 
‘pleasures’ of commodity society denote the impossibility to engage in the ‘sexualité 
globale’, the practice of pleasure, as defined by Lowen and himself. Vaneigem asserts 
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that the commodification of pleasure has thereby turned pleasure into its opposite: 
pain.716 Vaneigem therefore argues that ‘pleasure’, as capitalist society offers it, is a 
kind of work. Indeed, he terms this process the ‘prolétarisation’ of pleasure.717 It 
should be clear from this analysis that Le Livre des plaisirs, and the direction of the 
later work in its entirety, is explicitly driven by a critique of the appropriation of 
pleasure by capital. It is therefore difficult to understand how Barnard and, arguably, 
Debord could have believed the argument of the book to be a call for simple orgiastic 
gratification or support for consumerist hedonism, as these very stances are the object 
of Vaneigem’s critique. 
 
The appropriation of pleasure by capital is an aspect of the later work of Raoul 
Vaneigem that is tied to his earlier arguments about alienated praxis first put forward 
in ‘Banalités de base’ and Traité. Chapter 1 of the current work described how first 
order mediation, praxis, becomes second order mediation, praxis aliénée, when the 
conscious dimension of creative practice is separated from the subject by social 
constraints. Praxis becomes a fetishistic process where the subject’s own actions 
become alien to them as they transform into the simple agents of abstract social 
forms. This suppresses the volonté de vivre, which re-emerges in its repressed form as 
a volonté de puissance, a desire to dominate oneself and others that leads to inhuman 
actions. As one might now expect, Vaneigem merges these arguments in his later 
work with Lowen’s theories on the origins of insanity and how it manifests itself in 
his patients. Vaneigem goes further than Lowen, however, in developing these ideas 
into a much more all-encompassing social theory of alienation and how it is expressed 
in the subject. 
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 Throughout the later work of Raoul Vaneigem there is the sense that capitalist 
society, the economy itself, is founded upon a very real appropriation of the human 
body, of living matter, as described above. He argues that the economy functions 
through the seizure of our very desires, which it then turns against us to its own 
ends.718 It is an ‘abstraction monstrueuse’ that takes hold of our gestures, our muscles 
and behaviour to the point that our own selves, in a concrete and corporeal sense, are 
perversely at odds with us.719 Vaneigem describes this in highly Rabelaisian style as 
an economisation of every aspect of the body, from the genitals and the eyes to the 
stomach and intestines, which makes the body no longer a human body but one 
structured, down to its very reflexes, around the needs of commodity society.720 The 
economy therefore destroys the very thing that produces it: human beings. 721 
Vaneigem even describes the economy as a kind of cancer.722 For Vaneigem the 
abstract necessities of the economy therefore essentially act to dehumanise us by 
extracting what is ‘living’ in the Lowenian sense, that is to say, our spontaneity based 
on a practice of pleasure. It empties us of, what Vaneigem calls, our ‘substance 
humaine’.723 
 Vaneigem argues that the concrete effect of this process of economisation of 
the body is to introduce a schism between the mind and the body. Vaneigem asserts 
that this schism is an internalisation of the division of labour between intellectual and 
manual labour.724 In this schema the head takes on the role of the master and the body 
                                                
718 Ibid., p. 11. 
719 Ibid., p. 35. 
720 ‘Poussant de plus en plus loin ses implants dans un corps de plus en plus morcelé, elle invente une 
économie gastro-intestinale, génitale, oculaire, cervicale, une économie des organes, des fonctions, des 
réflexes qui, modelée sur le monde dominant, impose ses normes de rendement, de profit, d'épargne, de 
dépense, de volonté de puissance, d'échange’, ibid., p. 35. 
721 Ibid., p. 11, 60. 
722 ‘Dépouillée de ses mythes et dénoncée par la misère de son spectacle, l'économie n'est plus que la 
maladie du vouloir-vivre, le cancer du vivant’, ibid. 
723 Ibid., p. 93. 
724 Ibid., p. 92. 
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that of the slave.725 Vaneigem suggests that this division could equally be understood 
as reflecting the way that abstract social forms dominate the concrete world.726 The 
head is the part of the body through which abstraction is made concrete in the 
personality as it bends the body to its fetishistic needs: ‘La tête devient ainsi le lieu où 
le corps se rend étranger à lui-même’.727 Vaneigem therefore argues that commodity 
society literally makes our bodies into something that seems alien to us. The mind or 
‘esprit’, which in French, it is important to remember for our following chapter on 
religion, also means spirit, is this consciousness of the body separated from the whole 
and identified only with the head. Vaneigem describes the mind in this sense as a trap 
that suppresses any unity within the body by punishing its own desires.728 He argues 
that the self has retreated, as it were, into the head but, in typically strong literary 
imagery, it reigns only over the ‘appearance’ of a body, like a shadow of power over a 
tower of skulls.729 In contrast to the notion of a sensual intelligence then, the mind 
embodies what Vaneigem refers to as la pensée séparée, as described in Chapter 1 of 
the current work.730 Vaneigem sees this separated thought of the mind dominating the 
body as characteristic of intellectualism.731 However, Vaneigem also critiques anti-
intellectualism as the intellectualism of favouring the schismed body over the mind 
that was characteristic of much of the old workers’ movement. Like Lowen, in 
opposition to both of these forms of intellectualism, Vaneigem argues that thought 
should reflect a sensual intelligence rooted in self-awareness of the body and its 
                                                
725 Ibid. 
726 ‘Le système cervical s'est modelé sur le système marchand. Il traduit en mécanismes de pouvoir 
l'organisation abstraite qui est celle de l'économie, il catalyse la réaction d'échange où la vie se 
transforme en travail’, ibid., pp. 93. The suggestion here is obviously that there is some kind of break 
or suppresion of information about the body to the brain through the spine. 
727 Ibid., p. 94. 
728 Adresse aux vivants, p. 73. 
729 Le Livre des plaisirs, p. 12. 
730 Adresse aux vivants, p. 73. 
731 Le Livre des plaisirs., p. 14, 91, 92, 96. 
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concrete needs and desires.732 For Vaneigem, commodity society is not therefore 
something that is simply external to the subject, it has become written into our very 
personalities: ‘La lutte des classes est inséparablement dans la rue et en moi’.733 
 Vaneigem, following Lowen, argues that the mind-body schism that defines 
capitalist subjects results in a fear of pleasure: ‘la seule peur qui nous ait jamais 
hantés apparaît en dernière analyse comme une peur fondamentale de jouir’.734 The 
terminology is slightly different here in that Vaneigem refers more commonly in his 
work to a ‘peur de jouir’, whereas Lowen terms it a ‘peur de plaisir’. However, the 
meaning is essentially the same. It may be that Vaneigem chose to refer to jouissance 
because it has a more varied meaning in French. It can refer to pleasure, enjoyment, 
sexual delight, the use of something and in verb form it also refers to sexual orgasm. 
One of the more famous pieces of May ’68 graffiti was, of course, ‘Jouissez sans 
entraves’. Nonetheless, all of these different aspects are also implied in Lowen’s 
definition of the fear of pleasure. It is this Lowenian fear of pleasure that Vaneigem 
uses to describe the form that subjectivity takes in capitalist society. (It should be 
noted in what follows that Vaneigem does not argue that this fear of pleasure is 
limited to bourgeois subjects alone, it encompasses the experience of all subjects in 
capitalist society and, to a greater or lesser extent, defines their personalities). 
 Like Lowen, Vaneigem argues that childhood is key to understanding the 
origins of the fear of pleasure in adults. He claims that, before their socialisation, 
children embody a unity of the self, a praxis of pleasure, that is lost in adults.735 
Children therefore symbolise a repressed aspect of the self that poses a threat to the 
economy and its adult agents. In this sense the child becomes an object of hatred for 
                                                
732 Ibid., p. 107. 
733 Ibid., p. 35. 
734 Ibid., p. 130. 
735 Ibid., p. 77. 
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capitalist subjects who feel the need to shape it into the same subject form as they 
themselves.736 Vaneigem argues that in capitalist society childrearing and education 
therefore amounts to teaching children to be resigned to alienation and to fear 
pleasure.737 Vaneigem explicitly defines education in this sense as making the child 
internalise the schism between the mind and the body.738 As with Lowen, Vaneigem 
says this is done through punishment and humiliation by which the child is taught to 
adapt itself and, in so doing, to submit to all forms of alienation.739 Vaneigem states 
that the child learns that it must dominate its body and its desires.740 Like Lowen, 
Vaneigem does not suggest that we should simply let a child do what it wants in every 
circumstance, but giving children choice and as much autonomy as possible would aid 
their development into full human beings.741 Instead of this, people learn that they 
must make themselves appear to conform to certain roles and images in order to avoid 
punishment.742 Concretely, for Vaneigem, this means that children are taught to reject 
a practice of pleasure, as defined by Lowen, in order to submit to work and to resign 
themselves to pseudo-self-realisation through consumerism. They learn effectively 
that pleasure is limited to what can be paid for through labour. 
 Vaneigem, in line with Lowen and Reich, proposes that the capitalist subject 
constructs a muscular cuirasse or carapace, literally body armour or shell 
respectively, that it uses to suppress repressed desires and sensual feelings at odds 
with the role it has adopted. 743  Exactly like Lowen, Vaneigem associates the 
development of this armouring with a suppression of breathe in order to suppress 
                                                
736 ‘Ils ont haï l'enfant en se haïssant, ils l'ont battu pour son bien, ils l'ont éduqué dans l'impuissance, 
où ils se trouvaient, d'aimer la vie’, Adresse aux vivants, p. 20. 
737 Le Livre des plaisirs, p. 116. 
738 Ibid., p. 148. 
739 Ibid., p. 153. 
740 Ibid., p. 149. 
741 Adresse aux vivants, p. 48. 
742 Le Livre des plaisirs, p. 170. 
743 Le Livre des plaisirs: ‘carapace’, p. 94, 102, 135, 142-143, 148, 187; ‘cuirasse’, p., 76, 77, 161, 173, 
201, 204. 
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feeling.744 Moreover, Vaneigem states, with Lowen, that the whole body of the 
subject becomes more rigid and lifeless.745 In this way the capitalist subject rejects its 
essential spontaneity and inclination towards pleasure that characterised its childhood. 
Vaneigem therefore describes the adult of capitalist society in the strongest terms as 
an ‘enfant avorté’.746 At the same time, Vaneigem states that the adult condemns itself 
to permanent guilt because the body can never be abolished nor conform perfectly to 
all of the differing roles with which it is expected to identify.747 He says this in one of 
the most powerful passages of Le Livre des plaisirs where he states that guilt is 
essentially based on the complete lack of respect that exchange has for human life.748 
Vaneigem tells us here that from the abstract perspective of economic society a 
person can never renounce themselves enough. One is always guilty of something no 
matter what one does. Indeed, Vaneigem is essentially arguing, as in all of his later 
work, that the absolute crime in the eyes of commodity society is the fact of being a 
human being at all, at least as far as he defines humanity. As in the work of Lowen, 
the overall impression of this later work by Vaneigem is to suggest that people fear 
pleasure in the sense that they cannot face up to this unpleasant fact. They have 
suppressed it just as they have repressed all spontaneous desire after a lifetime of 
humiliation and being made to feel guilty for any thought, emotion or desire that 
enters into a unified praxis of pleasure. The escape into the mind was in some sense 
originally a refuge from this trauma but in the long run it only serves to make the self 
identify with the roles offered by society rather than the reality of the concrete, living 
                                                
744 Ibid., p. 173. 
745 Ibid., p. 127. 
746 Ibid., p. 40. 
747 ‘La culpabilité tient au non-respect fondamental de l’échange: tu ne renonces jamais assez à toi. 
C'est pourquoi, partout et toujours, tu es coupable. Coupable de ne pas travailler, de travailler, d'être 
riche, d'être pauvre, de jouir, de ne pas jouir, de ne pas faire jouir, de réussir, de rater, de vivre et de 
mourir’, ibid., p. 120. 
748 Ibid. 
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self. Debord may critique Vaneigem for ignoring the realities of refusal in Le Livre 
des plaisirs, but arguably Vaneigem is attempting to address the refusal of reality, that 
is to say, the insanity of fearing the reality of one’s own concrete needs and desires, 
that defines the everyday existence of capitalist subjects. 
 In the work of Vaneigem the fear of pleasure may suppress desires and 
emotions but they do not go away. Instead they find expression in what he terms la 
volonté de puissance. Vaneigem is explicit in his work that la volonté de puissance is 
the product of a repressed volonté de vivre.749 Vaneigem argues that every negative 
aspect of our experience—from stress and anguish to shame and guilt—results, on a 
subjective level, from this mechanism of repression.750 Vaneigem even goes so far as 
to say that every illness imaginable is a sign of a volonté de vivre that is in 
difficulty.751 More importantly, however, Vaneigem contends that this process results 
from a fear of life that ultimately drives the aggressiveness of capitalist subjects. For 
example, he compares the behaviour of the modern capitalist subject to an animal 
held in captivity.752 As such, he argues that cruelty and aggression feed on the 
frustrations that arise in the body due to the fear of pleasure that stops the original 
impulse finding expression.753 Following Lowen, Vaneigem argues that in such cases 
people look for power over others and success within society in order to compensate 
and control repressed desires.754 For Vaneigem, inhumanity is therefore the alienated 
presence of a human desire for pleasure and self-realisation that has been suppressed 
and, within capitalist society, found negative channels for expression in what can only 
                                                
749 Ibid., p. 69. 
750 Ibid. 
751 Ibid., p. 43. 
752 Ibid., pp. 69-70. 
753 ‘Ce qui rend cruel, c'est la transformation de la volonté de vivre en volonté de puissance. Le rapport 
de force s'alimente à l'incessante frustration des plaisirs inversés, au lieu que l'art de jouir se nourrit du 
plaisir pris sans contrepartie. C'est pourquoi la cruauté est devenue la mesquinerie ordinaire de 
l'homme sans qualité’, ibid., p. 193. 
754 Ibid., p. 191. 
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be called barbarism. Indeed, Vaneigem argues that contemporary capitalist society is 
just as barbaric, if not more so, than the barbarism of the past.755 Commodity society, 
Vaneigem says, is different only in that its barbarism is more bureaucratic, more 
equally shared out and it is something to which we ourselves consent. One might say 
that, for Vaneigem, the fear of pleasure means that this barbaric cruelty is not only 
something that we inflict on others, it is also something we aim at ourselves. Just as 
praxis is the free creation of the self and the world, so praxis alienée is the fetishistic 
destruction of the self and the world. 
 The other side of the language of life that Vaneigem employs in his work is 
the language of death. Death is a major theme of the later work of Raoul Vaneigem. 
He describes the economy as a process of turning living matter into dead matter.756 
Vaneigem does literally mean death as in the more obvious examples of war and 
suicide. However, he also means the kind of death that Lowen describes in his work. 
Lowen’s notion of death, as we saw above, is a kind of diminished or complete lack 
of a capacity for pleasure in a subject. The body is rigid and mechanical. In thought 
and action the subject lacks spontaneity and seeks recognition of its façade through 
situating itself in relation to social power and success. Such a person is submissive 
and also imposes its own ‘death’ in this sense, or even literally, on others due to a lack 
of empathy. In the work of Vaneigem ‘death’, la mort, means all of these things and 
more. For example, Vaneigem sees work as the opposite of creativity; if pleasure 
creates life, then for Vaneigem, work creates death.757 It separates human being from 
the praxis of pleasure that is the foundation of all life. Further, just as Vaneigem refers 
                                                
755  ‘Notre barbarie n'est pas moindre que celle des hordes mongoles, elle est seulement plus 
bureaucratisée, mieux répartie démocratiquement, plus proche de la mort consentie comme un 
laborieux défoulement’, ibid., p. 68. 
756 ‘notre propre substance vivante se transforme en matière morte, au prix—comble d'ironie—des plus 
grands efforts’, ibid., p. 245. 
757 ‘Le travail sépare l'homme de la jouissance de soi. Telle est la séparation d'où procèdent toutes les 
autres’, Adresse aux vivants, p. 94 
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in his later work to la vie quotidienne as la vie quotidienne du corps, he also speaks of 
la mort quotidienne. What he means by this is that capitalist society diminishes our 
humanity, it destroys our spontaneity, our love of life, or others, our search for 
pleasure and our ability to create it. It turns us into dead things in a process of 
abstraction. For this reason, he often calls capitalist society la civilisation mortifière, 
la civilisation de mort or la civilisation moribonde in his later work.758 The capitalist 
subject he describes as a corpse that has replaced a living human being.759 This is why 
Vaneigem refers to those in whom capitalist subjectivity is particularly strong as les 
morts, the dead.760 
 
The language and therefore the arguments of Vaneigem in his later work are often 
difficult to follow. Vaneigem provides no clear, systematic exposition of his ideas that 
would allow one to easily get to grips with what he is saying. The definitions are, 
however, evidently present in his work, though it requires more than a superficial 
reading to pick up on them. It also becomes much easier to make sense of exactly 
what Vaneigem says once we read his work alongside that of Lowen. In some 
respects this is a weakness in that it is extremely difficult for readers not very familiar 
with his work to make sense of his arguments. In other respects, however, it is also 
something of a strength in that, although one feels there is some lucidity lacking that 
one can find, for example, in the work of Debord, there is also a visceral and 
pleasantly meandering quality to his work that reminds us that for him radical poetry 
and theory intermingle. There is a certain power behind the notion that the struggle 
against capitalism can simply be described as a battle between life and death. But 
                                                
758 Le Livre des plaisirs. p. 7, 17, 23. 
759 ‘L'obligation, pour assurer un travail de survie, de renoncer à ses désirs nourrit quotidiennement un 
cadavre qui n'a guère de peine à prendre prématurément la place du vivant. L'acte de décès est le plus 
souvent un constat d'usure qui a force d'assassinat légal’, Adresse aux vivants, p. 225. 
760 Le Livre des plaisirs, p. 13; Adresse aux vivants, p. 157. 
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such language is meaningless without a knowledge of the rich arguments and 
associations these terms have for Vaneigem. No doubt this is the reason why many 
contemporary readers unfamiliar with these arguments have been put off by or simply 
misunderstood his later work. 
 
Patriarchy and Pollution as a peur de jouir 
 
The emancipation of women is not a subject that the Situationist International dealt 
with in any great depth or detail. This is not to say that it was not an explicit concern 
of the Situationists. For example, in the early 1960s, Asger Jorn wrote a small work 
on gender, La Genèse naturelle, which was edited in French by Guy Debord (though 
by this point Jörn was a clandestine member of the group).761 The twelfth issue of 
Internationale situationniste states that the importance of the participation of women 
during May ’68 is proof of the profoundly revolutionary character of these events.762 
Debord and Sanguinetti also refer directly to the significance of the struggle against 
alienation by women and gays, albeit somewhat belatedly, in 1972.763 Moreover, it 
should be stressed that the Situationists’ critique of alienation was always totalising 
and implicitly involved the liberation of women even if this is not always directly 
stated. There were also several prominent female figures in the group, in particular 
Michèle Bernstein, who, in a recent talk in London, vigorously defended the 
Situationists against accusations of sexism.764 Nonetheless, it cannot be denied that 
the SI never placed the specific role of women in capitalist society and the particular 
challenges this poses for radical change at the forefront of their discussion. Vaneigem 
                                                
761 Le Genèse naturelle, op. cit. 
762 Internationale situationniste, 12 (September 1969), p. 4. 
763 Debord, Œuvres, p. 1094. 
764 ‘The Revenge of the Situationists’, talk for the launch of The Spectacle of Disintegration by 
McKenzie Wark, South Bank Centre, 26 May 2013. 
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does not directly deal with the problem at all in Traité. When he does speak of 
patriarchy in the book, he is clearly referring to the subservient role of children more 
than that of women in the family structure.765 In his later work, however, the question 
of female emancipation is an important theme. Indeed, Vaneigem argues that the 
failure of the workers’ movement to make the abolition of patriarchy an integral part 
of its revolutionary project explains a large part of its failure.766 
 It is important to consider this transformation in the context of the rise of 
Second Wave Feminism in the 1970s. It could be argued that this new current of 
feminism was directly influenced by the Situationist concern with politicising the 
everyday. The ex-Situationist Timothy Clark, for example, has said as much at a 
recent appearance.767 Certainly, the Second Wave Feminists were reacting to both the 
successes and failures of May ’68 as a movement of emancipation. They sought to 
raise awareness about the social character of gender norms and the specific challenges 
that women face in contemporary society. These included, of course, the rights of 
women to control their own bodies and to have access to an existence beyond the 
domestic sphere. As we shall see, Vaneigem is critical of certain expressions of 
feminism that define ‘emancipation’ as having equal access to capitalist categories but 
he is also clearly heavily impacted in the 1970s by this radical reappraisal of the role 
of women in capitalist society as part of a project of universal liberation. Moreover, 
from the 1990s onwards he is evidently influenced by the American philosopher John 
Zerzan, who examines hunter-gatherer societies, including the place of women within 
                                                
765 Traité, pp. 276-277. 
766 ‘Nous avons sous-estimé à quel point le mouvement ouvrier, porteur du projet de libération 
universelle s’était amputé de sa radicalité en négligeant l’émancipation de la femme; à quel point il 
s’est ainsi condamné à régresser dans un passé patriarcal et avait résigné sa puissance au profit d’une 
bourgeoisie parasitaire’, Raoul Vaneigem, ‘Que le cri du peuple soit celui de la vie’ in Hôtel Oasis, 
Pour Louise Michel (Paris: La Passe du Vent, 2005), no page. 
767 This was in response to a question at a talk given by Donald-Nicholson Smith that Timothy Clark 
was leading. London Review of Books Bookshop, London, 26 March 2013. 
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them.768 Vaneigem also seems to have developed ties with Alain Mamou-Mani, a 
French thinker who argues that contemporary society is defined by the dominance of 
‘masculine’ qualities.769 
Vaneigem places the origins of patriarchy in the agricultural revolution when 
mankind established a society based on production rather than hunter-gathering. 
Vaneigem states that the role of women in this society was essentially reduced to the 
production of workers, both in the sense of giving birth to them and as childrearers.770 
Given what has been stated above, it is easy to see that for Vaneigem such a reduction 
of a human being’s creativity to a single role is a kind of death. It is no longer a 
practice of pleasure, of which the production of new human beings is one part, that 
defines the lives of women but rather their creativity is now constricted by a particular 
social role to which they are expected to conform. In a certain sense this death is 
literal. Vaneigem notes, for example, that with the advent of agrarian society and 
patriarchy the life expectancy of a woman dropped dramatically, from 40 to 25 years 
of age, due to premature deaths caused by the frequency of pregnancies.771 In this 
sense Vaneigem suggests that the unified creativity of women is both fragmented to a 
single aspect and it also escapes their own control as it serves abstract productivist 
needs that are placed above their own concrete ones. 
 Vaneigem develops these arguments by proposing that pregnancy and 
childbirth symbolise the natural unity of human creativity.772 It is perhaps for this 
reason that Vaneigem states women embody the vivant in a way that ‘men’ do not.773 
It is clear that Vaneigem is not making an essentialist biological statement here. The 
                                                
768 See L’Ère des créateurs, pp. 31-32. 
769 See Raoul Vaneigem, ‘Postface’ in Alain Mamou-Mani, Au-delà du profit, Comment réconcilier 
Woodstock et Wall Street (Paris: Albin Michel, 1995). 
770 L’Ère des créateurs, p. 32. 
771 Ibid. 
772 Adresse aux vivants, p. 35. 
773 Ibid., p. 66. 
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notion of a creativity, a praxis of pleasure, that escapes the productivist logic of these 
societies poses a threat. Men are in this sense forced to become men. They have to 
repress their own femininity, the woman in them.774 Although he is not entirely clear 
as to the mechanism, Vaneigem suggests that it is through projection that women 
became identified with that which was socially dangerous and disdainful because their 
association with a form of creativity that does not enter directly into the economy 
retains the hint of a life beyond it. On the one hand, this has meant that women were 
traditionally forgiven aspects of expression that were gradually denied to men, such as 
crying.775 On the other hand, it has meant that, not only were women reduced to the 
domestic sphere, but the feminine has historically been associated with evil.776 For 
Vaneigem the feminine therefore represents that which is repressed by societies based 
on the exploitation of human beings.777 It is for this reason that one gets the 
impression in his later work that the feminine embodies a kind of subversion: ‘la 
femme est au centre du monde à créer’.778 For Vaneigem a radical change of this kind 
requires men and women to embody a unity of qualities that are currently identified 
only with the masculine or feminine.779 Creativity, Vaneigem argues, has to be 
liberated from these fragmentations of being that have only ever served economic, not 
human, needs. 
 In terms of the concrete implications of this theory, Vaneigem aims his 
critique at the primary role offered to women by capitalist society: the ‘mother’. 
Vaneigem defines the mother as a person who approaches the birth and raising of 
                                                
774 L’Ère des créateurs, p. 67, 105. 
775 Le Livre des plaisirs, p. 99. 
776 Ibid., p. 143-144. 
777 Ibid. 
778 Adresse aux vivants, p. 65. 
779 ‘Ce qui n’appartient pas à la lumière du jour—c’est-à-dire à la raison économique et au temps de 
travail—, son comportement économiste le refoule dans la nuit du sexe, dans les profondeurs du moi 
où les monstres du défoulement achèvent de dissocier en éléments séparés l’enfant, l’homme et la 
femme, trois réalités qui ne sont en fait que trois moments de l’individu accédant à l’unité de la 
jouissance’, Le Livre des plaisirs, p. 144. 
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children in the manner required by commodity society.780 As we have seen above, this 
means a capitalist subject who introduces the mind-body schism into the child in 
order to create an obeisant worker. Although this role is, of course, mainly associated 
with women, Vaneigem is once again clear that the mother is not limited to women in 
the biological sense, rather it is a role that everyone in capitalist society adopts at 
some point or another.781 Moreover, it is clear that this role is something that capitalist 
subjects engage in with each other even past the point of childhood as the attempt of 
any person at a renaissance, in the sense of the metaphorical rebirth of a human being 
trying to accede to a praxis of pleasure, is socially suppressed by those around them. 
Capitalist subjectivity is not something that is only formed in childhood but it keeps 
being reformed throughout our lives. Vaneigem is asking us to be aware of how we 
are all at some point implicated in the role of mother in this repressive sense both with 
regards to ourselves and others. The mother, Vaneigem argues, kills the lover in the 
woman (again not necessarily in the biological sense), the person who can create 
pleasure.782 
Vaneigem is critical of forms of feminism that treat the emancipation of 
women as a goal that can be achieved through winning equal rights.783 The realm of 
work, the public sphere, is not a realm of freedom, rather it is that from which 
mankind must be freed. For Vaneigem, the search for equality in the workplace is a 
form of pseudo-emancipation as it serves to simply further integrate women more 
directly into the capitalist mode of reproduction. The ultimate result of these capitalist 
forms of feminism, Vaneigem argues, is simply to win women the right to be bosses, 
                                                
780 Ibid., p. 142. 
781 ‘chacun de nous, qu'il soit homme ou femme, est déterminé à se comporter tôt ou tard en mère, en 
mère d'enfants réels ou imaginaires, mère de chienneries compensatoires, mère de rachat, mère de 
régiments et de partis’, ibid., p. 153. 
782 Ibid., p. 142. 
783 Ibid., 155-156. 
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cops, political militants and soldiers.784 In other words, equality of oppression. This is 
not the liberation of women, for Vaneigem, but rather the further development of 
commodity society. The real choice is not one between gender equality and a lack of 
it but between two completely different civilisations: one that bars women access to a 
unified praxis of pleasure and another that makes such liberating praxis the basis of 
all social life. 
 
Another subject that was rather under-examined by the Situationist International was 
the issue of ecology. The great exception to this rule was La Planète malade by Guy 
Debord that was meant to appear in the final issue of Internationale situationniste but 
was only published posthumously.785 Much more recently, another ex-Situationist, 
René Riesel was imprisoned in France for engaging in the destruction of genetically 
modified crops.786 As with the issue of female emancipation, the problem of the effect 
of human exploitation on the natural world is one that has developed into a major 
theme of the later work of Raoul Vaneigem. It is clear that the Situationists, and 
Vaneigem in particular, had some influence on at least one of the major thinkers of 
the ecological movement, Murray Bookchin. Bookchin makes explicit reference to 
Vaneigem in Post-Scarcity Anarchism, one of his first important works on the 
subject.787 Indeed, Vaneigem and Bookchin apparently met in person on the former’s 
ill-fated trip to New York in 1967.788 Although he could not be termed a ‘green 
anarchist’, in his approach to this subject Vaneigem is clearly interested in the 
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negative effects of industrial technology and issues such as the size of human 
communities that Bookchin raises in his work. As with gender, however, Vaneigem 
also develops his own interpretation of the ecological question based on the Lowenian 
theories described above. 
 Vaneigem argues that the agricultural revolution completely transformed the 
relationship of human kind with the natural world. In hunter-gatherer societies, he 
argues, human beings lived in a symbiotic relationship with nature.789 Vaneigem 
likens this relationship to that between a child and its mother in the womb.790 Just as 
women or femininity embody something that is exploited and repressed in 
productivist societies, so too nature represents our own nature.791 For Vaneigem, the 
exploitation of nature and human nature are therefore predicated upon one another. 
Just like the human body, or femininity, nature poses a threat to the productivist form 
of social organisation because it has its own essence that escapes the logic of 
exploitation. Vaneigem argues that this is why it has historically been feared and 
dominated.792 The heavens rule over corrupt earthly nature, just as the head over the 
body, the man over the woman. Vaneigem compares the exploitation of nature to 
patriarchy. The origins of both are in agrarian society and in many respects they 
embody a similar projection of a repressed desire and suppression of a repressed 
aspect of a unified self and praxis of pleasure. For this reason, Vaneigem states that 
the Agricultural Revolution, and the history of humanity since then, represents a 
break in our evolution as human beings.793  
                                                
789 Adresse aux vivants, p. 55. 
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admirable de loin. Brise-t-elle dans la fureur de ses éléments déchaînés le joug qui la contraint? C'est 
une force hostile, meurtrière, monstrueuse, un péril pour la civilisation’, ibid., p. 81. 
793 Ibid., p. 103. 
	   	  231 
  For Vaneigem, the human relationship with nature before agrarian society 
was founded upon abundance, whereas contemporary society is based on scarcity.794 
The ability of nature to provide us with shelter and nourishment should represent a 
kind of gift to human beings that does not need to pass through exchange. In this 
Vaneigem is clearly heavily influenced by the work of the American anthropologist 
Marshall Sahlins on hunter-gatherer societies. It was Sahlins who first suggested this 
notion of a society that is based on abundance.795 Hunter-gatherers have a completely 
different relationship to the production of the necessities of life because their 
environment provides them with everything they need. They produce only what is 
necessary for their immediate existence and do not have any market pressures to 
produce anymore than that. There is therefore a kind of equilibrium between the 
groups and the natural world. They only ‘work’ when necessary and have little 
concept of ownership. Western society, in contrast, imposes scarcity through 
ownership of the means of subsistence. Vaneigem argues that mankind needs to return 
to this kind of relationship with nature that does not pass through exchange and, 
therefore, labour. 
 In the work of Vaneigem history has been the story of the domination and 
exploitation of human nature and the natural world towards the development of the 
economy. In a certain sense then we can see the argument that Vaneigem develops 
about nature as once again entering into this notion of a process of death. 
Environmental disaster is a kind of reflection in nature of what human beings are 
doing to human nature, to the human body. Just as a person needs to be dead to 
themselves in order to demand the death of another, they must also be dead to 
themselves in order to enact the death of the natural world. Fundamentally, the 
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ecological crisis is the product of a society based on productivity and scarcity that is 
not driven by human or natural needs but by the entire history and logic of the 
economy. Vaneigem sees hope, however, in the final crisis that capitalist civilisation 
is currently facing. What is perhaps most surprising about the later work of 
Vaneigem, given that he does not seem to evoke the possibility in his earlier work, is 
that he believes in a final economic crisis of capitalism. He argues that the tendency 
of the rate of profit to fall has led to a massive devaluation of capital as technological 
innovation is making profits unrealisable.796 Right now capitalism is in its last gasp. 
In its final stages, Vaneigem argues, capitalism will invest the last of its resources in a 
green capitalism that will mark its death throws.797 These final moments will provide 
green technologies that will help us to re-establish a more human relationship with 
nature.798 In other words, the collapse of capitalism will create the possibility of 
creating a new symbiotic relationship with nature based on its inherent abundance. 
This reconciliation with nature will also be a reconciliation with our own natures.799 
As I will note in the conclusion, it is a pity that Vaneigem does not really develop this 
notion of an economic collapse further as this is one of the key aspects of 
contemporary radical theory as represented by the critique of value. 
 
Le Vivant: The Emancipation of Pleasure 
 
Although Vaneigem holds to the theory of a final crisis of the economic categories of 
capitalism, this does not mean that he thinks a liberated society is necessarily the 
inevitable result. On the contrary, Vaneigem argues that the collapse of capitalist 
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civilisation also presents mankind with the terrifying possibility of its total 
annihilation.800 Presumably the environmental disaster and simple barbarism prepared 
by the logic of commodity society could bring about an end to all human life in the 
most literal sense. That Vaneigem suggests this is often lost to most readers because 
he is usually quite positive in his rhetoric about the chance that human beings can 
respond to these conditions. However, it raises the question of what the purpose of his 
discussion of ‘death’ or a fear of life is in the context of the coming crisis. In the 
exposition above it is clear that Vaneigem is above all concerned in his later work 
with constantly stating what it means to be a human being. As bizarre as it might 
sound, commodity society has created a world of individuals who are cut off from this 
most basic information about themselves. They identify not with their own concrete 
needs and desires but with the abstract categories of capitalist society: work, 
competition, money etc. If a crisis is in fact coming, how will these people respond to 
the collapse of this society? It would appear that Vaneigem is trying to create, or at 
least speak to, a consciousness that is capable of responding to the collapse of 
capitalism because it understands that it will require a completely new civilisation 
founded on a new notion of human being. If the logic of contemporary subjectivity, 
‘les morts’, wins out then the results could be a decent into complete barbarism and 
even the end of mankind. It is therefore paramount, for Vaneigem, to have a theory of 
liberated subjectivity—its character, means and goals—in order to set the groundwork 
for a new world when the old one comes to an end. 
The term that Vaneigem gives to his notion of a liberated and liberating 
subjectivity is le vivant: the living or living being. In French the word vivant denotes a 
qualitative sense of creative energy, movement, brilliance, pleasure and passion. It 
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also evokes the suggestion of ‘good living’, as in the bon vivant, a person who enjoys 
the pleasures of life. Vaneigem employs the term vivant both as a noun and an 
adjective in his work. As was noted above, in the form of a noun it primarily refers to 
the essential substance of human being in the sense that Vaneigem defines it: the 
inherent drive towards the creation of pleasure through world and self-creation, i.e. 
the body and its volonté de vivre. In adjective form it refers to something that has this 
quality of being based in the body’s drive to realise its concrete needs and desires. 
The vivant is something that always exists as a biological function of human being, 
but it is suppressed in societies dominated by fetishistic social forms. In the context of 
capitalist society it therefore exists as that which has not yet been completely 
alienated from the subject, such as love, a subject to which Vaneigem devoted a 
whole book, De l’Amour (2010).801 It is also that which must be encouraged and 
created in order to encompass the whole self and the whole of society in a radical 
change of civilisation. The vivant in this sense is the emancipation and realisation of 
authentic human being. 
This latter conception of the vivant that Vaneigem puts across in his work has 
a number of corollary influences in literature. First, there is Henri Lefebvre’s Marxian 
homme total: the subject that has abolished alienation and who is directly in control of 
her mediation with the world. The second is Nietzsche’s Übermensch: the subject that 
realises her will in opposition to those social norms that stand in her way. The third is, 
of course, Lowen’s idea of the creative individual that engages in a practice of 
pleasure. All of these different influences mix together in the idea of the vivant that 
Vaneigem develops in tandem with his own conception of radical subjectivity that 
was defined in Chapter 1 of the current work: the subject that understands her own 
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individual realisation can only happen through a collective struggle for individual 
realisation. The vivant is therefore that substance of human life which is alien to the 
logic of capitalist society (though it may be caught in it) because it is based in an 
incessant practice of pleasure through world and self creation; which, in turn, is 
founded on the concrete needs and desires of the human body as a totality and thereby 
stands against all abstract economic necessity. It is therefore the opposite of the 
‘death’ that, Vaneigem argues, defines capitalist subjectivity. The vivant breathes, it is 
spontaneous, of great quality, creative, empathetic, confident, open, warm and all of 
the other attributes that Lowen assigns to the creative individual. It is to this that 
Vaneigem is speaking in the title of Adresse aux vivants sur la mort qui les gouverne 
et l’opportunité de s’en défaire.802 
 The most important basis for encouraging the creation of the vivant, Vaneigem 
argues, is to place the foundation of human social life in the ‘gratuit’ or ‘gratuité’. The 
gratuit in French is a term which, like vivant, has a rich cluster of associations. 
Primarily it refers to something being ‘free’ in the sense of an object or service for 
which one does not have to pay. In this definition it essentially refers to a gift that 
escapes the usual dominance of exchange. It can also refer, however, to the notion of 
an ‘acte gratuit’, a disinterested action or one motivated by empathy for which one 
expects no reward. Conversely, the ‘acte gratuit’, can also refer to the notion of an 
action that is done outside any reasoning, a wanton act, which sets a person apart from 
social norms. This has a particular history in French literature, especially the work of 
Gide, who in Les Caves du Vatican (1914) describes a man who commits the 
completely unmotivated murder of a stranger on a train.803 Other examples would be 
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the murder of an anonymous Arab man in Albert Camus’ L’Étranger (1942), which 
results in the character facing a murder trial in which society seems more enraged by 
his refusal to even pretend to be apologetic than the murder itself. Another instance, 
that Vaneigem himself evokes in his earlier work, is the claim by André Breton that 
‘L’acte surréaliste le plus simple consiste, revolvers aux poings, à descendre dans la 
rue et à tirer au hasard, tant qu’on peut, sur la foule’.804 Vaneigem, of course, argues 
against any such action. He says that these desires in modern subjects reveal the need 
for the immediate abolition of capitalist society because they are the product of the 
systematic destruction of human life that it creates.805 However, the notion that the 
gratuit is an action that unveils and overcomes social constraints is an important one 
in his conception of it. 
 For Vaneigem, the notion of gratuité serves to denote a practice that does not 
enter into exchange and the reproduction of capitalist social categories.806 In capitalist 
society everything is expected to serve some economic purpose. This is why our 
socialisation is so brutal. Human beings do not naturally enter into economic 
relationships. They do so only under duress. In contrast, gratuité is that which serves 
no economic purpose whatsoever. It is just that which arises concretely from a 
genuine practice of pleasure: ‘J’aspire seulement à la gratuité, à cette inutilité de mes 
jouissances sans contrepartie’.807 In this sense gratuité could be thought of as an act or 
mode of being that, in the current context, struggles against or simple exists in 
opposition to the economy. At the same time, gratuité is also the possible basis for an 
entire society. Vaneigem asserts that any genuinely human society after capitalism 
would have to be grounded in concrete human needs and desires, not obeisance to 
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fetishistic social forms. As we have seen, for this to happen people have to recognise 
that the only good reason for any action is that it arises from a genuine human 
impulse for making life more pleasurable in the complex sense defined above. By 
encouraging and pursuing gratuité, Vaneigem argues, we stand against the essence of 
capitalist society.808 Presumably this is because we denaturalise ourselves from the 
notion that we must compare ourselves to the standards of a society based in the 
economy. Vaneigem suggests that to do this is to create a nouvelle innocence, that is 
to say, the perspective of gratuité breaks us away from the guilt and shame that comes 
from measuring ourselves against the social roles with which we are supposed to 
identify.809 Above all, however, gratuité implies a collective, or social, practice of 
breaking away from the notion that everything must enter into exchange and 
economic production in some way.810  
 In his later work, Vaneigem provides a number of concrete proposals for 
exactly how this could be done and what the realisation of such gratuité might look 
like. In Modestes propositions aux grévistes (2004), for example, Vaneigem suggests 
that, instead of destroying infrastructure or bringing it to a halt, during strikes workers 
could take it over in order to run it.811 Transport workers, for example, could provide 
transport but refuse payment from the public, hospital workers could overlook 
payments from patients and culture could be given out freely.812 In this way the 
provision of services becomes a form of gratuité that denaturalises people to the 
necessity of exchange. The strike, even when limited to a single sector, thereby 
becomes a moment of rejecting capitalist categories on a symbolic level rather than 
                                                
808 Ibid., p. 84. 
809 Ibid., p. 133. 
810 Ibid., pp. 53-54. 
811 Raoul Vaneigem, Modestes propositions aux grévistes pour en finir avec ceux qui nous empêchent 
de vivre en escroquant le bien public (Paris: Verticales, 2004). 
812 Ibid., 146. 
	   	  238 
reinforcing them. Strikes are just one part, however, of a larger movement towards 
self-management that, as was discussed in the previous chapter of the current work, 
has been a core aspect of the theory of Vaneigem since his time in the Situationist 
International. Indeed, his first major publication after leaving the SI was De la grève 
sauvage à l’autogestion généralisée (1974).813 Here Vaneigem argues that through the 
seizure of infrastructure and organising its use through direct democracy, as happened 
in Spain in the 1930s, workers establish the basis for a non-hierarchical social 
relationship based on the organisation of an individual and social practice of pleasure. 
Moreover, although he moves away from what he sees as the intellectually driven 
violence of his time in the SI, Vaneigem does not shirk from the fact that the creation 
of such a society will inevitably involve some degree of violence as reactionary forces 
stop people acceding to a world where they no longer have to sacrifice their lives to 
the economy.814  
Vaneigem is clear, however, that the take over of infrastructure must have a 
conscious aim in mind that escapes capitalist categories. Otherwise, workers could 
simply end up reproducing economic relationships. Vaneigem mentions, for example, 
the workers of the LIP factory in the early 1970s who took over their workplace after 
a dispute with management but continued to work within an economic framework. 
The most detailed description of what these aims should be that Vaneigem gives is to 
be found in his Déclaration des droits de l’être humain (2001), which could be 
thought of as a text to help orient workers’ councils and, eventually, fully 
autonomous, self-managed communities. 815  Although Vaneigem frames this 
orientation in terms of ‘rights’ it is clear that he means something quite different from 
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the formal rights of modern societies. Vaneigem argues in his preamble, for example, 
that the Rights of Man are nothing more than freedoms that have been given by men 
to the economy.816 They are based on an abstract notion of human being, an economic 
actor rather than the creative individual in charge of its own destiny.817 Vaneigem 
contrasts this with his idea of ‘droits de l’être humain’, or rights of the human being, 
which are the liberties and modes of being that a person should expect to enjoy once 
the vivant is establish as the primary motor of life. As this implies, these are not rights 
that can be granted by a state, rather they are ones that must be conquered by a social 
movement and a society that has abolished the conditions for their violation.818 
The Déclaration contains 58 articles of right each with subsections and 
commentary in the manner of a piece of legislation. The rights cover a diverse range 
of subjects that effectively encompass almost every major aspect of a society. Some 
of them are quite abstract. For example, Vaneigem states that every person has the 
right to become a human being and to be treated as one (article 1). He also states that 
everyone has the right to the ‘poésie d’existence’ (article 57) and to authenticity 
(article 10 a 3). However, although these are quite abstract assertions, our exposition 
of the theory of Vaneigem in the current work should show that these are not ‘woolly’ 
concepts but grounded in a Marxian theory of praxis and a concrete notion of what is 
necessary to human fulfilment. If Vaneigem is not overly prescriptive this is rather to 
his credit as it leaves it open to each individual to ascertain what this means for them, 
while establishing the general prevalence of these ‘rights’ as a social goal. Autonomy 
is, indeed, a major focus of the ‘rights’, and specifically the freedom to express one’s 
true self in the Lowenian sense. Vaneigem states, for example, that every human 
being has the right to express or silence their emotions, their desires and their 
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thoughts (article 47). It is significant that this is precisely what Lowen argues modern 
subjects are not allowed to do as part of their social life. Vaneigem also makes a 
number of concrete proposals about the more practical aspects of everyday life. He 
states, for example, that everyone has the right to use their time as they please (article 
6) and that they also have the right to health (article 8 c). In a more psychogeographic 
vein, Vaneigem also asserts that every human being has the right to the use of a home 
that reflects their desires (article 8 a). In many respects this is an incredibly ambitious 
work. It attempts to do nothing less than create a complete transformation of how 
humanity conceives of itself and what the goals of human society should be. In many 
respects, it is clear that Vaneigem is aiming at something as world changing as the 
social contract laid down by Rousseau. For Vaneigem, the concepts developed in 
Déclaration and throughout the later work could form the basis for a reorientation of 
social relationships around a new world where ‘le plaisir aille de soi’.819 
 In his 2005 novel Voyage à Oarystis (illustrated by the artist Giampiero Caiti) 
Vaneigem gives us an incredibly detailed picture of what a society based on the 
principles laid out in this chapter would look like.820 The book follows an unnamed 
narrator and his lover Euryménée who live in contemporary Venice. The narrator 
speaks of a utopian city, a ‘Venise plus parfaite’, named Oarystis that was founded 
many years ago by people simply described as ‘amoureux de la vraie vie’.821 The two 
protagonists write to the people of Oarystis in order to ask to visit as guests. After 
being accepted, they travel to the city where they engage in a veritable dérive through 
what is perhaps the most fully realised image of unitary urbanism and 
psychogeography that exists in Situationist writing. More importantly, Oarystis is a 
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community, a social relationship, founded on the principles of the vivant that 
Vaneigem has developed in his later work. 
 The city, or country, of Oarystis comprises around 7000 inhabitations.822 This 
is near the size of Lessines, the hometown of Raoul Vaneigem in its heyday. Further, 
it establishes a community that is small enough to have personal, direct relationships, 
and with smaller impact on the local environment but also large enough to retain a 
certain diversity and dynamism. The city itself is fantastic, though realisable, 
embodying the most imaginative reaches of unitary urbanism as first imagined by 
Gilles Ivan. A mountain lake sits above the city providing it with rivers, canals and 
mechanical energy as well as visual pleasure. The planning and architecture of the 
town draws on Venice, Amsterdam, Renaissance Italy and all manner of different 
abodes from tree houses to more recognisable homes. Indeed, the city contains a 
diversity of environments: a jungle, a forest, and a ‘Dôme de climats’, which recreates 
every season of the year so that people can enjoy whatever atmosphere suits the 
moment. In every wall, alley, nook and cranny of Oarystis strange devices, statues, 
murals, paintings, bits of poetry and interesting spaces are to be found, all in a state of 
constant flux and change, leading the main protagonist to comment, ‘Les Oaristyens 
ont vraiment horreur du vide. Horror vacuis’.823 The values of the city are further 
reflected in the naming of every area and street after the likes of Montaigne, Blake, 
Kafka, Ducasse, Kleist … 
 The richness of the space is established by an everyday life based on a praxis 
of pleasure that is realised, individually, through the free disposition of time and, 
collectively, as an extension of the latter through direct democracy. Work does not 
exist in Oarystis, rather each individual spends their time in whatever activity for 
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which they have an affinity in that moment of their lives. As such, there is what could 
be called a loose ‘division of labour’ but it is based purely on inclination. What ‘civic’ 
tasks there are to perform are dealt out according to inclination also, and where this is 
not possible, rare apparently, as fairly as can be. The result is an exuberance of 
quality, creativity, diversity and pleasure in the everyday activities and products of the 
Oarystians. Indeed, such is the lack of division between art, labour and life that 
Vaneigem’s fictional Venetian visitors are slightly embarrassed by the fascination, 
passion and enjoyment Oarystians seem to discover in every activity with which they 
task themselves. 
 The city appears to be run on the principles of direct democracy, with a 
General Assembly of directly recallable delegates with specific mandates. Matters 
that involve the whole city are voted on in the Place des Assemblées, also called Place 
Charles Fourier and Place de la Communauté, split in two by the city’s largest canal. 
The voting system is similar to Ancient Athens as citizens walk to either side of the 
square to mark their vote or stand on the bridge if they are undecided. The city, it is 
remarked, therefore retains the original meaning of ‘politics’, limited to the practical 
management of the city alone. One rather Swiftian example of this political system in 
action is started by Euryménée.824 The narrator tells us that the public toilets of 
Oarystis are organised so that citizens defecate onto statues of famous dictators such 
as Stalin, Napoleon and Mao. Euryménée is put out by this, believing that toilets 
should instead create a feeling of calm and comfort. The debate is taken up with much 
interest by the whole of the city and, after a vote in the affirmative, is acted upon. In 
this way democracy functions as the direct expression of the needs and desires of the 
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population, the people taking part in the vote are deciding on how they want to spend 
their own creative energies. 
 Perhaps the most important aspect of the book, however, is the Oarystians 
themselves. Vaneigem gives us an image of these individuals as human beings in 
harmony with themselves and their community. Everything about the people of 
Oarystis is vivant, from what they wear, to what they say, to how they act and what 
they create. Without the intrusion of abstract social categories or hierarchical 
constraints, the people of Oarystis are able to objectify themselves in nature according 
only to what they concretely need and desire. Time, relationships, expressions, every 
aspect of life takes on a very different meaning. The kindness and sensitivity of the 
Oarystians is a simple extension of the healthy relationship they have with 
themselves. In other words, what Vaneigem offers in Voyage à Oarystis is a vision of 
a unified subjectivity rooted in the body and its practice of pleasure. Just as there is no 
state, no money, no police and no priests in Oarystis, so too there is no governing 
mind or ‘esprit’ in the individual subjects to suppress feeling and dominate the body. 
The fear of pleasure is completely alien to them. It is this vision of an entirely new 
and human civilisation founded on la volonté de vivre that is the essence of the later 
work of Raoul Vaneigem. 
 
The exposition of the theories of Raoul Vaneigem in this chapter has hopefully 
clarified the most essential developments in his later work. Once they are placed in 
the context of the Reichian theory of pleasure that Vaneigem takes from Lowen, the 
language and certain of the arguments can be more easily qualified. Though it is no 
doubt true that he often assumes rather too much familiarity with his terminology 
from his readers, there can be little doubt also that a lot of the hostility exhibited 
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towards Vaneigem’s later works is often rooted in a superficial reading of his texts. 
With this confusion resolved, however, a rich and compelling oeuvre is opened up to 
us that presents a vision of human life totally at odds with prevailing attitudes and 
everyday norms. It should be remembered that these are additions and improvements 
to the earlier theory, not repudiations. In this sense, although the language and 
argument has been added to since our exposition in Chapter 1, Vaneigem has 
certainly lost none of his radical fervour in these later works. 
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Chapter 5. Ni dieu, ni maître: The Religious Criticism of Raoul Vaneigem 
 
En vérité, la bourgeoisie ne nous a pas 
débarrassés de Dieu, elle a seulement 
climatisé son cadavre.825 
 
 
The aim of the current chapter is to provide an exposition of the religious criticism of 
Raoul Vaneigem. Despite the fact that the topic features throughout the work of Guy 
Debord and Raoul Vaneigem, in the extant literature there has to date been no 
extensive examination of the critique of religion in the work of any Situationist. This 
is a particularly major gap in our understanding of the later writing of Raoul 
Vaneigem because he has made the critique of religion the subject of several large 
literary projects. Between 1986 and 2000, Raoul Vaneigem produced no less than five 
books on religion: Le Mouvement du Libre-Esprit (1986), Les Controverses du 
Christianisme (1992), La Résistance au Christianisme (1993), Les Hérésies (1994) 
and De l’inhumanité de la religion (2000).826 Indeed, Raoul Vaneigem has developed 
something of a reputation as a medievalist thanks to the extensive and original 
research several of these works demanded. La Résistance au Christianisme, for 
example, is nothing less than a complete historical account of the development of 
Christianity; and Les Controverses provides an A to Z of Christian thought from 
Vaneigem’s perspective. The current chapter will demonstrate that the definition and 
critique Vaneigem develops of religion in his later work is rooted in the arguments 
about the praxis of pleasure and its alienation that were described in the previous 
chapter. It will be argued that in the work of Raoul Vaneigem religion forms an 
important perspective from which to understand the origins of contemporary social 
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life. It will be shown that Vaneigem argues capitalist society does not escape religious 
attitudes but continues them in new abstract social forms and hierarchical separations. 
The chapter will also explore how Raoul Vaneigem has consistently looked back to 
certain heretical movements of the Middle Ages, to mysticism and to alchemy, both 
as sites of historical interest and as a metaphorical language for alienation and its 
abolition. 
 
A Definition of Religion 
 
The definition of religion that Raoul Vaneigem uses in his critique is based on the 
idea of human praxis that we have explored in Chapters 1 and 4 of the current work. 
In Chapter 1 it was shown that Vaneigem sees the creatively conscious dimension of 
human practice as the essential aspect of human being. It was demonstrated that for 
Vaneigem alienation occurs as a second order mediation in which human beings 
objectify themselves through abstract social categories. In Chapter 4 we saw how 
Vaneigem develops this notion of praxis in his later work by situating it in the body as 
the locus, or primary motor, of pleasure. In this context alienation is conceived as a 
mediated abstraction but one thought of as internalised in the subject through a schism 
between consciousness and the body. For Vaneigem hierarchical social relations 
function as a suppression of the body through this schism from the mind. It will be 
argued here that Vaneigem sees religion as the original social form that this rupture 
took when economic social relationships were first established. 
 Vaneigem dates the birth of religion in its institutional forms to the beginnings 
of agrarian society, in around 7000 BC, a moment which he also associates with the 
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birth of the economy and the state.827 Vaneigem contrasts pre-agrarian, hunter-
gatherer societies with post-agrarian ones. He argues that earlier societies enjoyed a 
symbiotic relationship with nature and the self.828 Agricultural society, however, 
inaugurated an exploitative hierarchical relationship with nature.829 As we saw in the 
previous chapter, this economic relationship in the work of Raoul Vaneigem divides 
humanity into intellectual and manual labourers. He suggests that this process 
excludes the practice of thought from those who perform manual labour and, in the 
same dialectical movement, excludes manual labour from those who direct that labour 
through practicing thought. That is to say, society became divided into those who 
organised production and those who produced. Vaneigem therefore implies that a 
double alienation takes places: thought is alienated from a group of humanity who 
previously interacted directly with nature, while this direct interaction is alienated 
from another group who have come to control this interaction. What Vaneigem is 
presenting here is the origins of a division of praxis into thought and practice. It is a 
separation that he sees mirrored in the division of spirit and body in religion. 
Vaneigem argues that these divisions form the foundation of the hierarchical 
principle: the separation of humanity into order-givers and order-takers. For 
Vaneigem such separation is an attack not only on the unity of human society but also 
on the very essence of each individual human being and his or her own nature: ‘Parce 
que les dirigeants ne sont rien d’autre que les produits de la pensée séparée—des 
travailleurs intellectuels —, leur pouvoir est en soi une mutilation’.830 
 Throughout his later work Raoul Vaneigem consistently defines religion as the 
alienated consciousness—the collection of institutions, social roles, ideas and 
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attitudes—that arose out of and legitimated the hierarchical principal of a society 
based on work and alienated praxis rather than free creativity or the praxis of 
pleasure. As such, Vaneigem places the origins of God in the series of hierarchical 
separations that the division of intellectual and manual labour brought about: 
‘L’institution du principe hiérarchique est le germe morbide d’où s’engendre l’idée de 
Dieu, inanité tonitruante qui s’enfle à chaque fois qu’un homme donne des ordres et 
que l’un de ses semblables obtempère’.831 For Vaneigem the very idea of a God is 
therefore a fundamentally inhuman and hierarchical concept that has no other origin 
than the historical development of pre-capitalist societies. This is a point of view that 
is quite invariable throughout his oeuvre. In Traité, for example, Vaneigem defines 
God as both the idea of hierarchy and its self-justification: ‘Qu’est ce que Dieu? Le 
garant et la quintessence du mythe où se justifie la domination de l’homme par 
l’homme. La dégoûtante invention n’a pas d’autre excuse’.832 It is important to note 
the palpable disgust of Vaneigem here towards the concept of God. For him it is tied 
to the notion of a narcissistic or life denying consciousness. It is a notion of being no 
longer connected to any real existing body. God in this sense mirrors the schism 
between the mind and the body in alienated subjects. 
 Indeed, for Raoul Vaneigem the economic relationship, as we have seen, 
implies not only a separation between thought and practice but it also brings about a 
fragmentation of the entirety of human being. It is the alienation and suppression of 
emotion, desire, feeling and gratuity in general. Vaneigem sees religion as an integral 
part of the reproduction of this separation and as such it amounts to a denial of 
humanity: ‘La religion est la forme plus achevée du mépris dont les hommes 
s’accablent. Partout où les Dieux sont honorés, les peuples n’ont d’humain que le 
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nom’.833 As this suggests, human beings and gods cannot live in harmony together. 
The very idea of honouring a god implies a disdain for the concrete needs and desires 
of human beings. Vaneigem states that religion achieves the reproduction of this 
alienation of human being through a number of economic attitudes that, he implies, 
are essential to all denominations. These include: 
 
le sacrifice, la résignation, la culpabilité, la haine de soi, la peur de la 
jouissance, le péché, le rachat, la dénaturation et ces illusoires dépassements 
où se perpétuent en fait l’impuissance de l’homme à devenir humain, la 
croyance en son incurable imbécilité, le blanc-seing accordé à une Banque 
céleste et à ses actionnaires.834 
 
 
The association of religion here with a celestial banking house is obviously meant to 
evoke the point that religion is essentially an abstract way of thinking that arises from 
the practice of exchange. Moreover, this long list of negative attributes is by no means 
exhaustive. Vaneigem also insists that misogyny is inherent to all religions.835 It is not 
by chance either that nearly all of these qualities are also those that Vaneigem 
associates with capitalist social life. As we saw in the previous chapters, Vaneigem 
closely links alienated praxis to guilt, a fear of pleasure and false forms of 
emancipation. The implication is that these attitudes are essential to the reproduction 
of economic social relationships, first in agrarian societies and now in modern 
commodity society. This latter idea, that capitalism has its origins in religion, is a 
point that will be explored below. For now it is enough to note that the definition of 
religion Vaneigem develops is thoroughly coloured by his engagement with Lowen 
and his rejection of the fear of pleasure. In a certain sense, for Vaneigem, religion is 
the fear of pleasure, or at least its earliest form. 
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 Vaneigem argues that these economic and pleasure fearing attitudes penetrated 
human consciousness through the internalisation of the hierarchical separations that 
an economic approach to nature created. In hunter-gatherer societies, Vaneigem 
states, the world and the self were understood in terms of a ‘jeu des analogies’ where 
consciousness of the self encompassed both the body and the earth; Vaneigem states 
that in the context of such societies it makes no sense to project backwards our own 
binary categories, such as rationality and irrationality, cause and effect, interior and 
exterior, mind and body, material and immaterial.836 It is only with the advent of 
religion, for Vaneigem, that humanity is faced with these kinds of dualisms that are a 
barrier to self-realisation. One might reasonably argue therefore that Vaneigem 
suggests that there is an innocence to these pre-agrarian, pre-religious societies that is 
similar to the gratuité and nouvelle innocence, mentioned in the previous chapter, that 
might be possible on the other side of capitalist relationships. This is why he is 
fascinated by pre-religious, pre-agrarian societies. They were based on a natural 
impulse to pleasure. 
 Vaneigem argues that the fundamental difference between these societies and 
our own, on a subjective level, is the schism embodied in religion between the mind 
and the body. As was noted in the previous chapter, in French the term ‘esprit’ can 
mean both mind and body. The continuation of the religious notion of a soul and the 
philosophical category of mind is therefore much more obvious in modern French 
than in English. Vaneigem plays on this dual meaning in his work. In his later writing 
the ‘esprit’ is associated with the concept from Lowen of a consciousness that 
oppresses the body and with la pensée séparée. Vaneigem terms it the ‘forme aliénée 
                                                
836 Ibid., p. 39-40. 
	   	  251 
de la conscience du corps’.837 He argues that the spirit is a form of consciousness that 
disdains the senses.838 Although it is in fact a product of a real physical being it denies 
earthly desires and punishes the body in the name of religious authority.839 Indeed, 
Vaneigem defines the ‘esprit’ as the primary separation at the heart of all other forms 
of alienation: ‘il est l’abstraction essentielle, la barbarie originelle qui arrache sa part 
vivante à chaque individu et le métamorphose en une machine dont la fonction est de 
produire pour survivre’.840 The esprit, Vaneigem argues here, dominates the body just 
as the intellectual the manual labourer, the master the slave, the sky the earth, the man 
the woman and so on to every other hierarchy in human experience. These arguments 
are of course intimately related to his theory of praxis as the human body in its 
creatively conscious pursuit of pleasure. The religious mode of being, Vaneigem 
suggests, creates a fragmented subjectivity capable of self-mutilation, domination and 
submission. The religious notion of a spirit, as Vaneigem describes it, is therefore part 
of the same logic of suppression and repression discussed in the previous chapter. The 
‘esprit’ is the abstract consciousness produced by the fear of pleasure in the religious, 
and later the capitalist, subject. Indeed, Vaneigem describes this in exactly the same 
language as Lowen employs: ‘l’esprit est le crime perpétré contre l’intelligence 
sensible, contre la seule intelligence créatrice, celle grâce à laquelle l’enfant 
découvre, à travers le labyrinthe de ses sensations agréables, son véritable devenir 
humain’.841 
 Vaneigem relates the existence of the ‘esprit’ in this sense to one of the 
defining aspects of religion: sacrifice. For Vaneigem, sacrifice is the notion that one 
must submit to suffering in the name of some kind of abstract necessity or authority, 
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religious or otherwise. In other words, sacrifice is the idea that there is such a thing as 
useful suffering. Vaneigem argues that this notion developed in tandem with work as 
an economic necessity. 842  The gods repay the curse of labour with spiritual 
rewards.843 As such, Vaneigem says, religion makes sacrosanct ‘l’exil de soi’, i.e. the 
fear of pleasure, that was created by the transition to a form of production based on 
abstract necessities.844 Vaneigem therefore argues that religion makes the suffering 
embodied in alienated praxis a sacred duty by situating it within a transcendental 
order or metaphysics of survival. Vaneigem suggests that the notion of sacrifice is 
therefore essential in making subjects complicit in their own exploitation and the 
exploitation of others. Indeed, in Traité Vaneigem explicitly states that it is this 
mechanism on which all hierarchical power is fundamentally based: ‘c’est toujours le 
principe de souffrance utile et du sacrifice consenti qui constitue la base la plus solide 
du pouvoir hiérarchisé’.845 As such, sacrifice reflects the fundamental fear of pleasure 
that is at the heart of religion and hierarchical social life. It amounts to an absolute 
denial of the praxis of pleasure that Vaneigem argues is the essence of who we are. 
This is the essential inhumanity of religion. 
  
Capitalism as Religion 
 
As Timothy Clark and Donald Nicholson-Smith note, one of the defining 
characteristics of Situationist critique was ‘to think world-historically in the teeth of 
specialists from Left and Right’.846 The relationship between feudalism and modern 
society was one that was constantly examined by the Situationists. This was, of 
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course, an element of critique that was central also to the work of Marx. In many 
respects Marx sees the criticism of religion as fundamental to the criticism of 
capitalism. Indeed, he famously states that ‘the critique of religion is the prerequisite 
of every critique’.847 Marx originally emerged out of the Young Hegelian school of 
thought that critiqued religion as a form of fetishism, a product of the human 
imagination that is invested with human powers and comes in turn to dominate 
mankind. What was so original about Marx was to apply the critique of fetishism, a 
religious form, to capitalism. As we saw in Chapter 1 of the current work, Vaneigem, 
drawing on Marx, sees capitalist social life as dominated by concrete-abstractions, in 
particular the Marxian idea of a commodity fetishism. It is the production of 
commodities for the realisation of an exchange value, an abstraction, that drives 
modern life, not the realisation of concrete human needs and desires. In this sense 
capitalism was, for Marx, the continuation of a fundamental religiosity, albeit in a 
more concrete form.  
The writing of the Situationists often evoked this notion that capitalism was in 
some sense religion made concrete. For example, Debord begins La Société du 
Spectacle with a quote from The Essence of Christianity (1841) by the Young 
Hegelian author Ludwig Feuerbach.848 The Spectacle, for Debord, is the logic of 
religion spread throughout all aspects of everyday life. Rather than directly living our 
lives, our experiences and actions are mediated by representations that have escaped 
our control. The Spectacle therefore continues the religious form but in the sense of 
an almost infinite number of fragmentary abstract mediations in our lives, whereas in 
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feudal society, where religion dominated, it was all united in the single fetishism of 
God. Raoul Vaneigem expresses exactly the same idea in Traité, albeit in a slightly 
different manner. Vaneigem argues that on the level of ideas fetishism in feudal 
society was founded upon myth, a story that united all of humanity in worship of a 
God who sanctified the terrestrial power of feudal lords and the suffering this 
hierarchical social make up imposed.849 The lord mythically sacrifices himself in 
service to God, while the serfs really sacrifice themselves for mythical power (such as 
eternal life).850 This myth created an illusory unity, albeit fully realised in the society,  
between all aspects of life. Although this mythical society was a form of alienation, it 
was still one that was founded to a great extent on qualitative notions of human being. 
Vaneigem states, for example, that religious sacrifice was an archaic form of 
exchange that was based in a non-quantifiable and non-rational magical transfer.851 
Power was therefore limited to a specific relationship of direct exploitation of the 
producers that did not enter into a dynamic process of abstraction, only a static, 
though effective, one dominated by God and feudal lords. Vaneigem argues that the 
bourgeois revolutions that finally brought capitalism fully into being broke this myth, 
and human society, into fragments.852 God in this sense died but continued as 
fragments of divine power, i.e. abstract necessities or justifications of suffering, that 
became more spread out and shared among modern capitalist subjects.853 Where 
feudal society rested on a unity established by a single myth, bourgeois society 
desperately attempts to re-establish such unity but can only do so in fragmentary form 
through ideology, which being only a fragmentary perspective, ultimately makes this 
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task impossible.854 The different aspects of life, which were united by God in the past, 
developed in capitalism into separate spheres of activity, that is to say, the economy, 
which comes to dominate mankind in a more fragmentary and dynamic way than any 
previous form of fetishism. Exchange becomes more abstract; it is quantified and 
rationalised in the money form.855 Thus, for Vaneigem, the mystical sacrifice of 
religion in feudal society becomes in commodity society an ever more abstract and 
fragmentary one, less singular and more widespread. 
 In the later work of Raoul Vaneigem the notion of a continuation of religion in 
capitalist society becomes tied to the notion of a fear of pleasure. Vaneigem claims, 
for example, that even in his critique of capitalist society, Marx ignored the extent to 
which his own critical approach was marred by economic reflexes.856 Vaneigem 
specifically has in mind the notion of a pensée séparée or, as he puts it here, a ‘Dieu 
résiduel sur la matière du travail’.857 Presumably, Vaneigem is referring here to the 
fact that Marx oscillated between the dialectical refusal of capitalist society based on 
the theory of commodity fetishism and the more empiricist approach that led him at 
times to see the development of productive forces as a positive. In this sense, for 
Vaneigem, the least radical aspects of Marx still reproduce the religious intellectual 
function of the mind dominating the body in aspects of his work: the justification of 
suffering. As we saw above, it is this domination of the mind over the body, the denial 
of self, that Vaneigem feels is most characteristic of religion. Vaneigem states that 
although we may consider ourselves, in the words of Prévert, ‘intacts de Dieu’, 
religious attitudes are just as prevalent today.858 Religion, for Vaneigem, is defined 
not just by the objective form that the fetishism takes on the level of social 
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organisation but also by its subjective form: the internalisation of fetishistic attitudes 
that abstract us from ourselves and reality. In this sense Vaneigem sees capitalist 
society as in many respects that which preserves religion: ‘L’esprit religieux 
ressuscite partout où se perpétuent le sacrifice, la résignation, la culpabilité, la haine 
de soi, le peur de la jouissance, le péché, le rachat, la dénaturation et l’impuissance de 
l’homme a devenir humain’.859 For Vaneigem, religion was only the earlier form of 
what he sees as the fear of pleasure. Capitalist society still embodies all of the 
attitudes of this fear and, arguably, at a more banal level than at any other point in 
history. The feudal and the capitalist subject are both defined by their fear of pleasure 
though this may be expressed differently. It is for this reason that feudal society, and 
religious societies generally, provide an important historical site of interest for 
Vaneigem in understanding the origins of the barbarism of capitalist society and 
possible ways to escape it. 
 
Heresy, Mysticism and the Language of Alchemy 
 
The Situationist interest in religion went much further than the critique of its form and 
expression in feudal and capitalist societies. Even one of the earliest reviewers of 
Traité, Robert Kanters, notes the interest of Vaneigem in the millenarian heresies of 
the middle ages (and somewhat facetiously likened the SI to them).860 In their 1967 
texts, for example, both Vaneigem and Debord make reference to the Pursuit of the 
Millennium (1957) by Norman Cohn, a study that examines the history of these 
movements.861 The thesis of Cohn is that these heretical movements mark the origins 
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of the totalitarian ideologies of the twentieth century. However, the Situationists put a 
more interesting spin on the history revealed by Cohn. Debord argues that the aim of 
these millenarian sects to realise a paradise on Earth that abolished work and 
hierarchy embodies the first expression of the totalising goal of modern revolutionary 
movements.862 Their failure was to have looked to God and external leaders to make 
this a reality rather than to have made history themselves.863 Equally, in Traité 
Vaneigem states that today humanity has the means to realise the state of freedom 
desired by the heretics of Souabe, Germany, in 1270. In this instance Vaneigem 
quotes Cohn directly: ‘S’étant élevé au-dessus de Dieu et ayant atteint le degré de la 
perfection divine, ils avaient abandonné Dieu’.864 While Debord never went on to 
develop these ideas in his later writing, Raoul Vaneigem certainly has in astounding 
depth. Previous to Cohn there were a number of Marxists, Engels included, who have 
seen certain heretical movements such as the Anabaptists of Munster as proto-
versions of the modern proletarian revolution. Cohn argues that the barbarity of this 
period and its heresies is realised in modern totalitarianism. However, Vaneigem 
differs from both the Marxists and Cohn in his definition of religion. As we have 
seen, for Vaneigem, religion is a social relationship that schisms the human 
personality, it oppresses the body in the name of the ‘esprit’ and therefore embodies a 
fear of pleasure. Vaneigem is therefore interested in Christian heresies of the past to 
the extent that they do or do not represent a resistance to this essence of the religious 
form. 
 The most important work in this respect is La Résistance au Christianisme 
published in 1993. In this text Raoul Vaneigem amalgamated earlier research from his 
first book on religion, Le Mouvement du Libre-Esprit, with an expanded account of 
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the history of Christianity that extends right back to Ancient Judaism and all the way 
forward to the emergence of the Enlightenment in the eighteenth century. The 
exposition that Vaneigem gives of the development of Christianity in this work is 
highly Marxian. The arrival of each new religious orthodoxy is presented as a process 
whereby theological doctrine adapts to concrete historical changes in the organisation 
of the society and period in question. Just one example is the appearance of a 
‘syncrétisme monothéiste’ in Judaism that Vaneigem assigns to the historical 
development of a centralised monarchical state, which brought together a number of 
previously independent Jewish tribes in around 1000 B.C.865 Another example is the 
later Hellenisation of Christianity, which, Vaneigem argues, reflects at the level of 
abstract thought the transition from a more agrarian society to one based on the 
dynamic mercantile landscape of Greco-Roman imperialism.866 As such, Vaneigem 
suggests that each new stage in the development of Christianity can be understood as 
a response to the transformation of concrete social relationships rather than a purely 
ideal innovation. 
 In contrast to traditional Marxist approaches, however, Vaneigem does not 
believe in escapable stages or a teleological development of history. In La Résistance 
au christianisme, and his other works on this subject, Vaneigem attempts to uncover 
precisely those real historical individuals who resisted the dominance of religion in 
their own times. He does not mean this necessarily in the rationalist or atheistic sense 
but rather he thinks of this resistance more in terms of a battle against religion, where 
the religion is defined as the contemporary expression of la peur de jouissance or fear 
of pleasure. Vaneigem states explicitly that he tasks himself in these works with 
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tracing the existence of the ‘vivant’ in the pre-Modern past.867 He tells us that he 
wants to do this in order to break with our pious image of the Christian Middle 
Ages.868 In a certain sense then, these works of history could be seen as an extension 
of what Vaneigem attempts to do in his essays: to reveal the hidden impulse to 
pleasure that he believes is the foundation of any real movement of human 
emancipation. It should be clear then that Vaneigem is not just interested in heresy 
haphazardly. Indeed, for the most part Vaneigem defines heresy simply as the 
negative reflection of the orthodox rather in its overcoming.869 The majority of what 
is termed heresy has historically been little more than a new religion in the making.870 
He defines Protestantism, for example as a heresy that became an orthodoxy.871 In 
other words, most ‘heresy’ is still religious in the sense that it embodies the same life-
denying fear of pleasure and imprecation to suffering that, for Vaneigem at least, 
defines religion. In contrast, what Vaneigem is above all fascinated by are those so-
called ‘heresies’ which embodied an outright rejection of the essentially life denying 
character of religion by refusing all of its attitudes in favour of the vivant. 
 In this vein Vaneigem proposes a number of figures throughout the history of 
Western civilisation that he believes entered into this current of resistance and were 
thereby branded heretics. The earliest example that he gives is a gnostic named Simon 
of Samaria, a Hellenised Samaritan who appeared around the end of the first century 
B.C. Vaneigem, evoking the famous phrase by Marx referred to earlier in the current 
work, states that the writing of Simon represents the product of a ‘volonté radicale’, in 
the sense that it gets at the ‘roots’ (racines) of human being.872 He tells us that Simon 
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spoke of a ‘Grand Puissance’ or Great Power that could be understood as the visible 
and invisible ‘Feu’ or Fire at the heart of life and the cosmos.873 Vaneigem interprets 
this to mean that Simon is talking about the nature of the energy of life, which he says 
is both conscious and unconscious.874 In order to make sense of this we have to 
consider what Vaneigem says here in the context of his arguments about the nature of 
‘life’ discussed in the previous chapter. For Vaneigem, Simon is talking in his own 
way about the necessity of conceiving of the self as an integral personality, a mind 
and a body as one. Vaneigem shows us how Simon reads Ancient Jewish texts from 
Genesis to Deuteronomy as a metaphor for the individual in the process of coming to 
consciousness of this source of life.875 The subject learns through perfecting her 
senses that the Great Power is present in her. In turn she realises that she is able to 
encourage and recreate this power through her the creation of her own destiny.876 
Again, the similarities between this discourse and the sensual intelligence that 
Vaneigem calls for in his later work are patently clear. Indeed, for Vaneigem, Simon 
is really expressing the notion of a praxis of pleasure very similar to what he himself 
imagines, albeit in religious language. The Great Power is made manifest in the 
human ability both to create new life through desire and also through the ability of our 
desire to constantly recreate the natural potentiality of human life.877 Vaneigem 
argues that the Great Power that Simon speaks of is essentially the consciousness of 
the permanent movement of sexual energy that places a person in charge of their own 
destiny.878 As such, Vaneigem argues that Simon is rejecting religion because he is 
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asking us to become God.879 Simon is so important to Vaneigem because he was the 
most vociferous writer of the past to reject the mind-body schism, the fear of pleasure, 
that is reflected in the dominance of the heavens over the earth, of God and authority 
over man.880 In fact, Vaneigem focuses in particular on the attempt of Simon to 
translate the myths of the Old Testament not into an abstract otherworldly symbolism 
but into a language of self-realisation rooted in the blood, sperm, placenta, the spine, 
the bladder, the arteries and the foetus: the living matter of humanity. As far as 
Vaneigem is concerned, such closeness to the concreteness of the body as part of a 
conception of human being is an affront to the essence of religion, which prefers to 
spiritualise mankind and disdains the powers of the terrestrial self. 
  Within the context of Medieval Europe the main focus for Raoul Vaneigem is 
the heresy of the ‘Libre-Esprit’ or Free Spirit that was the subject of his 1986 
publication. Vaneigem argues that the members of the Free Spirit were not defined by 
adherence to a particular doctrine. Rather, he states that the Free Spirit embodies a  
collection of different ideas or attitudes by which a number of different groups and 
individuals can be brought together between the thirteenth and seventeenth 
centuries.881 Vaneigem asserts that, in contrast to other brands of ‘heresy’ such as 
Protestantism, the Free Spirit was a movement that was not only hostile towards the 
Church but also, and most crucially, against religious forms themselves.882 That is to 
say, for Vaneigem, the Free Spirit was a far more radical phenomenon than a mere 
heresy. It was an outright rejection of religion as he defines it. 
 The essential idea behind the Free Spirit movement was that mankind is God. 
This position was put forward in several different ways. The first was that the death of 
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Christ on the cross had freed mankind of sin. Vaneigem notes that the members of the 
Free Spirit believed that this sacrifice effectively meant no person ever had to pay for 
their sins again through suffering, guilt, penitence and submission to the Church.883 
The second, perhaps even more radical position (though it does not appear the two 
were by any means mutually exclusive), was that God was everywhere present in the 
world and in the individual body. As such, they argued, a person acting in accordance 
with their nature represents nothing more than ‘God’ creating himself in each 
moment.884 A similar argument was that poverty dispensed a person from guilt 
because it imbued the poor with divine grace.885 Effectively, Vaneigem states, this 
meant that, for those of the Free Spirit, if a person became conscious of the divine 
presence in them they could realise themselves as an ‘homme-Dieu’, literally man-
God.886 It is significant that Vaneigem does not use the term ‘demi-dieu’ here because 
it shows he means that human beings completely abolish the idea of any heavenly 
power beyond themselves. As such the Free Spirit, despite its religious language, 
effectively embodies a kind of atheism. 
Vaneigem demonstrates that the rejection of guilt and sin by the members of 
the Free Spirit went hand-in-hand with a condemnation of suffering and sacrifice. 
Perhaps most crucial in this respect is the fact that they rejected work and, most 
subversively in their historical context, stated that prayers have no value when they 
are undertaken under the ‘yoke’ (joug) of manual labour.887 The Free Spirit also 
condemned fasting, flagellation and observing the Sabbath as actions that prevent 
human beings from perfecting themselves and their qualities.888 Moreover, it was said 
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that a person should not preoccupy themselves with bitterness or faults that they had 
once committed in the past because the focus on suffering would prevent their ability 
to realise themselves more completely.889 Vaneigem also notes that sexual liberation 
was a key aspect of the Free Spirit. Contemporaries described its followers as giving 
themselves over to ‘stupor’ (stupre), adultery and other pleasures of the body 
(jouissance du corps) in the name of charity.890 Further, in contrast to religion, 
Vaneigem argues that the Free Spirit saw in women the basis of a doctrine which held 
that the experience of love negates the then dominant institutions: God, the Church 
and the State.891 For the Free Spirit, Vaneigem asserts, ‘la femme n’est ni objet de 
viol ni sujet spiritualisé’.892 That the emancipation of women was a significant aspect 
of the Free Spirit is underlined, for Vaneigem, by the important place they had as its 
advocates. The key figure in this respect is Marguèrite Porète who, like Vaneigem, 
was a native of Hainaut.893 Porète promoted a doctrine of pure love that identified 
amorous delight (jouissance amoureuse) with a unity of the body and the spirit.894 
According to Vaneigem, Porète stated that this jouissance could recreate the state of 
man before the fall, a state of innocence without sin or guilt.895 Through the pleasures 
of love, Porète argues, human beings awake to the God in them and, in so doing, they 
attain a state of perfection that releases them from all of the suffering and constraints 
of contemporary society.896 Crucially, this new Eden was not to be put off until the 
afterlife but it was to be realised in the present. Porète was later burned as a heretic by 
the Church in 1310.897 
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Thus, where religion orients human practice around an inherent guilt that must 
be paid for through suffering and a rejection of earthly pleasures, the Free Spirit, 
Vaneigem argues, essentially called for a practice of pleasure based on a unified self 
that privileged the human relationship with the body, the earth, desire and, what he 
calls, ‘ce flux de vie’ that is incessantly being created in everyday life.898 For 
Vaneigem, this refusal of sacrifice in favour of self-realisation that characterised the 
movement of the Free Spirit makes it the very opposite of a religion. The Free Spirit, 
for Vaneigem, is not therefore a ‘heresy’ in the usual sense. He asserts that its notion 
of a unity between man and nature that could be perfected on earth through the 
enjoyment (jouissance) of the self and others is completely at odds with the usual 
logic of orthodoxy and heterodoxy.899 Both of the latter simply reproduce the ascetic 
and self-denying rejection of this unity and sanctify suffering.900 While contemporary 
inquisitors may have classified it as a heresy, today, Vaneigem argues, it is clear that 
the Free Spirit enters into the project of the ‘homme total’, the vivant, in its rejection 
of the economy.901 It is proof, for Vaneigem, that human beings have always resisted 
the morbid and fetishistic societies into which they have been born. That Barnard 
terms this interest of Vaneigem in the Free Spirit ‘reactionary’ is bizarre given that 
what Vaneigem values so much about this movement is precisely its respect for the 
freedom of women, its rejection of work and its refusal of religion.902 As Vaneigem 
himself suggests above, to imply that the people of the Middle Ages were not just as 
capable of a radical subjectivity as ourselves is to condemn humankind to a teleology 
of suffering that has always been the best argument of power. Indeed, in certain 
respects, such as the primacy it accorded to women and to pleasure, the Free Spirit 
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was far more radical than much of the extreme left of the revolutionary workers’ 
movement in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Perhaps only Fourier came as 
close. 
It is in this context also that we should seek to understand the appropriation of 
the language of alchemy and mysticism in the work of Raoul Vaneigem. Although 
these phenomena of the past may have expressed ideas in a non-rationalist and even 
religious language, for Raoul Vaneigem they still reflect a conscious attempt to 
convey the idea of a liberating human practice of pleasure. For example, in Traité, 
Vaneigem says that he wants to make concrete (concrétiser) the mystical language of 
Sister Katrei: ‘Tout ce qui est en moi est en moi, tout ce qui est en moi est en dehors 
de moi, tout ce qui est en moi est partout autour de moi, tout ce qui est en moi est à 
moi et je ne vois partout que ce qui est en moi’.903 Here Vaneigem is saying that the 
language of mysticism expresses the desire for a world wherein human beings can 
freely objectify themselves in nature so that there is a unity between us and our 
environment. The quality of our environment will reflect the quality of our own lives. 
Although Anselm Jappe claims that Vaneigem strays into an immediate identity of the 
self and the world in his interest in mysticism, it is clear that this is not the case. In 
another example Vaneigem specifically states that he wants to realise in ‘praxis’ 
another mystical quotation: ‘Dieu ne peut rien savoir, désirer ou faire sans moi. Avec 
Dieu, je me suis crée et j'ai créé toutes les choses, et c'est ma main qui soutient le ciel, 
la terre et toutes les créatures. Sans moi, rien n'existe’.904 For Vaneigem this is not a 
solipsistic or narcissistic statement. Rather it is the expression of a person who wishes 
to accede to a world wherein their concrete needs and desires, and those of their 
fellows, come before abstract necessity. It is not an immediate unity but one that is in 
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a constant state of transformation through the mediation of what is explicitly thought 
of as social and revolutionary praxis. Vaneigem does not advocate mysticism here. 
On the contrary, he is doing a détournement of its language, an implicit critique that 
directs and improves the original meaning towards something real and concrete. 
The same is equally true of the language of alchemy that Raoul Vaneigem 
employs in his later work. There can be little doubt that Vaneigem was influenced in 
this respect by the work of Carl Jung who proposes that the alchemical process 
embodies archetypal symbols of the subconscious and the psyche in their 
development towards realisation.905 As one might expect, in the language of the later 
work of Raoul Vaneigem this process is identified with the praxis of pleasure. The 
Grand-Œuvre of alchemy, originally the turning of base metals into gold or the 
creation of the Philosopher’s Stone that gives eternal life and riches, is associated by 
Vaneigem with the goals of the creative individual of an emancipated praxis.906 
Equally, the materia prima, the base metal that is transmuted into the new, more 
perfect substance, Vaneigem ties to the Lowenian conception of the human body that 
he develops in his work.907 The materia prima is thus the vivant, the living substance 
of human being. Vaneigem therefore conceives of liberated praxis as an ‘alchimie du 
moi’.908 Just as the alchemist sought to bring back life and transform dead matter, so 
the modern capitalist subject is faced with the task of bringing its own substance, its 
body, back to life through a liberating desire-driven process of creation.909 If there is 
to be a transformation of our society, Vaneigem argues, it will be based in our ability 
to communicate with that part of us that is still living despite the self-denial into 
which we have been conducted. For Vaneigem, the language of alchemy serves as a 
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metaphor, or a symbol, for that revolutionary praxis based in this search for pleasure 
that will realise our humanity and bring us back to life as human beings: ‘Dans le 
sentiment que seule la recherche du plaisir nourrit et stimule la création de soi et du 
monde réside le Grand-Œuvre, la poésie orphique qui a percé le secret des êtres et des 
choses et amadoue, parce qu'ils gardent de vivant, les plus redoutables furies de la vie 
refoulée’.910 
 
The religious criticism of Raoul Vaneigem, in particular his interest in heresy, is 
perhaps one of the most original aspects of his later work. That Vaneigem at times 
employs the lexicon of mysticism and alchemy should not detract from the fact that 
there is a serious theoretical point behind the use of this poetic language. It is 
tempting to think of many of these texts as purely historical works that have no 
bearing on how we should think of the contemporary struggle against capital. 
However, this is clearly not how Vaneigem himself conceives of them. They are 
explicitly not ‘objective’ approaches to the historical material but rather an attempt to 
uncover both the history of inhumanity and the resistance to it that, for Vaneigem, has 
defined human life to a greater or lesser extent since the agricultural revolution. They 
provide evidence that the volonté de vivre, this desire on the part of human beings to 
make their own concrete needs and desires the prime motor of life, is an inherent 
aspect of human experience that, from the Movement of the Free Spirit to the Paris 
Commune of 1871, is forever asserting itself against the barbarism of the fear of 
pleasure and the self denial it demands. Vaneigem is clear that the struggle against 
‘religion’, in this sense, is just as important today as ever it was in the feudal societies 
of the past. 
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Conclusion. The Revolution of Everyday Life Today 
 
The central aim of this thesis was to provide an analysis and exposition of the theory 
of Raoul Vaneigem and his contribution to the SI in order to revise our understanding 
of his life and work and the position he should occupy in the critical field. The 
findings that have been made in the course of this thesis should therefore form the 
basis for just such a radical reappraisal of who Vaneigem is and the critical interest 
that he warrants in any study of the Situationists and modern revolutionary theory. As 
was noted in the Introduction to the current work, Vaneigem has up to this point 
occupied a largely anecdotal presence in histories of the SI. Over the years, the actual 
content of his arguments and language has been subject to myriad misinterpretations 
and, at times, simply ignored. The result is that Vaneigem has often been dismissed 
by critics and compared in a negative light against the figure of Guy Debord who, in 
contrast, has recently come to be seen as one of the greatest French thinkers of the 
twentieth century. 
 As we saw in the Introduction, however, Debord himself never rejected the 
contribution of Raoul Vaneigem to the Situationist International. He did not claim that 
he and Vaneigem disagreed on fundamental issues in the 1960s. Rather, Debord saw 
Traité and La Société du Spectacle as works of theory that mutually supported each 
other precisely because of the fact that they came at the same arguments from two 
very different directions. It should be remembered, moreover, that these arguments 
were explicitly put forward as those of the Situationist International and cannot be 
said to belong exclusively to either figure alone. Further, even in his most vociferous 
and detailed critique, Debord maintained that Raoul Vaneigem marked the 
Situationist International more than any other member in the period of 1961-1964, 
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which, he himself states, laid the basis for the direction that led to the group’s 
influence on May ’68. When, in later life, Debord critiques Vaneigem it is for the 
direction that the latter took in his post-Situationist writing. Debord appears to have 
always argued that Traité was an important and influential text on modern 
revolutionary theory and that it deserved this position. His problems with Vaneigem 
are due to later disagreements. One cannot therefore look to Debord for justification 
of the marginalisation of Raoul Vaneigem in the history of the Situationist 
International. Moreover, as our critical survey demonstrated, during the original 
reception of the SI in the late-1960s Raoul Vaneigem and Guy Debord were read side 
by side as equal partners in the propagation of Situationist ideas. It is even possible 
that Vaneigem was more widely read among the May ’68 generation than Debord. 
The historical record suggests therefore that Vaneigem’s theory should occupy a place 
that is, at the very least, on a par with Guy Debord in any discussion of the 
Situationist influence on this period. It is only gradually, in the years since the 
dissolution of the SI in 1972, that Vaneigem and his expression of Situationist theory 
have been pushed to one side in critical discourse on the group. 
  That the critical theory of Raoul Vaneigem has been misunderstood was 
another issue that was highlighted by the critical survey. In part these 
misunderstandings can be seen as a reflection of the fact that Vaneigem has been 
marginalised but it is also a product of incorrect approaches to the Situationists as a 
whole. The vast majority of studies on the SI, Guy Debord included, have analysed 
the group from a cultural perspective. This is despite the fact that the Situationists 
sought the abolition of culture and that their primary activity was the creation of 
revolutionary ideas. Moreover, when there have been more ideas-based studies of the 
SI, these have often been from perspectives, such as postmodernism, that are entirely 
	   	  270 
anathema to Situationist discourse. Jappe and Barnard buck the trend in this respect 
and are by far the most interesting and accurate major studies of the SI. Even so, both 
in their assessment of Debord and the Situationists as a whole, they too tend to either 
pass over Vaneigem or offer superficial readings of his theory. The result is that ideas 
such as radical subjectivity, the will to live and survival sickness currently exist in the 
critical field as mostly empty words with no real meaning behind them.  
In Chapter 1 therefore the thesis tasked itself with developing an exposition of 
the critical theory of Raoul Vaneigem from the bottom up. It was shown that 
Vaneigem puts forward a coherent Marxian critique of capitalist society based on the 
theory of praxis and its alienation. Indeed, in Traité Vaneigem is far more explicit in 
his development of these theories than Debord is in La Société du Spectacle. The 
theory of praxis forms the essential bedrock on which Vaneigem constructs a complex 
picture of human being and how it is systematically turned into its opposite through 
economic abstraction. He rejects all the basic fetishistic categories of capitalist 
society, from the spheres of production and circulation (work, money, the market, 
exchange, etc.) to the public and private spheres (the state, the family, leisure, art, 
culture, politics, consumption, etc.). Moreover, he exposes the traditional left as being 
as complicit as the right in the reproduction of these categories. Vaneigem argues that 
capitalist society can be overcome because it is not essential to human being. 
Humanity has a volonté de vivre, concrete needs and desires, that will always assert 
themselves against abstract necessity. ‘Radical subjectivity’ is the recognition, or a 
state of knowledge, that every human being shares this need for individual realisation 
and it is therefore the collective realisation of this need that forms the basis of human 
emancipation. Vaneigem asserts that the suppression of the volonté de vivre by 
capitalist society drives a volonté de puissance, its alienation, that pushes mankind to 
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inhumanity. Fetishistic social relations reduce human beings to a pseudo-animal state 
of mere survival where they can no longer consciously transform their world but must 
adapt to it. These are the conditions that define the modern revolutionary movement. 
It is clear therefore that Vaneigem does, indeed, have a clear and coherent Marxian-
inspired critical theory. These theories need to be read as an integral part of the 
Situationist International and in relation to the work of Guy Debord who appreciated 
their critical power at the time. It is my hope that the definition of key terms and the 
exposition of core arguments that I have given in the current work will provide the 
basis for a better understanding of Raoul Vaneigem as a critical theorist in future 
research on the SI. 
In revising our understanding of the theory of Raoul Vaneigem and his 
contribution to the SI, I felt that it was important to establish the specificity of his own 
historical context. As I noted in the critical survey, studies of the SI tend to focus 
exclusively on the French context to the exclusion of other regions, even though the 
group was quite explicitly international in its outlook and membership. The 
importance of the working-class background of Raoul Vaneigem, in Belgium’s Pays 
Noirs, and the events of Hiver ’60, which preceded his entrance into the SI, serve as 
an excellent example of why this should not be the case. As I demonstrated in Chapter 
2 of the current work, Raoul Vaneigem’s experience of working-class life in Hainaut 
was very much a driving force behind his original radicalisation. It was the context in 
which his critical theory first developed and it was recognised as such by the other 
members of the SI who gave him the tongue-in-cheek nickname ‘Le Vampire du 
Borinage’, after the local mining district. Although Henri Lefebvre was an original 
mediator, Vaneigem first made direct contact with Guy Debord during Hiver ’60, a 
wildcat general strike that marked the zenith of the region’s radical history of class 
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struggle. The events of Hiver ’60 were foundational for the collaboration between 
Raoul Vaneigem and Guy Debord. Moreover, the experience of the strike served as a 
lesson about the complicity of the official left in capitalism that would come to the 
forefront of Situationist writing, particularly through the work of Raoul Vaneigem, in 
the coming years. Belgium’s Hiver ’60 is therefore a crucial perspective from which 
to understand the contribution of Vaneigem to the SI and also the eventual influence 
of the group on May ’68 in France. This is a highly original addition to the history of 
the SI that complexifies our understanding of the group’s development in this 
important period of transition.  
In tandem with the new context of Hiver ’60, this chapter also showed that the 
artistic avant-garde and counter-cultural movements of Hainaut have always served as 
an important point of reference for Raoul Vaneigem. Vaneigem argues that the 
Surrealists of Hainaut for the most part embodied a far more radical critique of 
capitalist society than the more artistic concerns offered by the Parisian Surrealists 
under the iron grip of André Breton. For Vaneigem, these hennuyer Surrealists 
developed a radical poetry that in many respects could be understood to have 
foreshadowed and paved the way for the Situationist International in the years to 
come. Of course, Vaneigem is ultimately one of Surrealism’s most inveterate critics 
but he equally realises what is positive in the Surrealist revolt at its most lucid 
moments, such as the rejection of work, nationalism and other capitalist social forms. 
The fact that the Belgian Surrealists were a significant influence, and even a direct 
point of contact, for Raoul Vaneigem and Guy Debord suggests once again that, in all 
future studies, the Situationist International needs to be considered within a truly 
international context. Raoul Vaneigem, and perhaps the Situationist International in 
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general, can be situated within this broader tradition of ‘Belgian modernity’, which is  
characterised by distance, doubleness and negation. 
 The final part of establishing the intellectual background of Raoul Vaneigem 
was to explore the state of his critical thinking before he joined the SI. This was done 
mainly through an examination of his university mémoire on the work Isidore 
Ducasse, le Comte de Lautréamont, which was written in the mid-1950s. It was 
demonstrated that Vaneigem had already developed many aspects of his critical 
thinking in this period. Vaneigem shows a familiarity with important aspects of 
Western Marxist thought, from praxis to totality, and an ability to employ them in a 
highly original interpretation of an author who was not only important to the 
Surrealists but also to the Situationist International. Although there are many elements 
of traditional Marxism present in this work, it is clear that Vaneigem not only had a 
well-developed critique of culture in this period but he was also moving away from 
more traditional Marxist notions in order to develop his own critical framework. As 
such, it is evident that when, he joined the group, Vaneigem was already thinking on 
similar lines to the SI and had a relatively clear Marxian critical framework to bring to 
his engagement with it. This analysis of the university mémoire will therefore provide 
the field with a more complex picture of who Raoul Vaneigem was when he first 
became a member of SI in 1961. 
 Chapter 3 of the current work continued this historical reassessment of Raoul 
Vaneigem by providing the first detailed account of his active participation in the 
Situationist International as a member between 1961 and 1970. It was demonstrated 
that Vaneigem joined the SI in a period when the organisation was faced with an 
internal crisis. The previous year a left-right split had emerged within the SI between 
a minority of so-called ‘artists’ and the majority who were committed to the 
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development of the group as a revolutionary organisation. At the Gothenburg 
conference of August 1961, and in collaboration with Attila Kotányi and Guy Debord, 
Raoul Vaneigem was central to putting down an attempted coup by the right of the SI. 
Vaneigem argued for a reorientation of the organisation around the development of a 
coherent theory of revolutionary praxis as its central goal. In the months and years 
that followed Vaneigem played a crucial part in the development of this theory. He 
participated in internal debates within the SI, contributed to collaborative texts, and 
also made important additions through anonymous and named texts within 
Internationale situationniste, in particular ‘Banalités de base’, which provided the 
first clear definition of the importance of praxis for the SI. As a member of the 
group’s Central Council, Vaneigem also had an active hand in many of the key 
decisions that shaped the later character of the group, including voting on the 
exclusion of the ‘artists’ of the SI for their failure to respond to this more resolute 
orientation around the development of revolutionary theory. From 1965 to the events 
of May ’68, Vaneigem remained an important figure within the SI. He took part in the 
events of the Strasbourg Scandal of 1966 that earned the group international notoriety 
and led to the public interest that would later give Traité and La Société du Spectacle 
a wide readership upon their publication in the winter of 1967. Vaneigem also 
travelled to the United States in 1967 where he helped to set up an American section 
of the SI. During the events of May ’68, Vaneigem was possibly the most widely read 
of the Situationists and he was on the ground in Paris as an active participant in the 
Movement of Occupations. In the post-’68 period, the relationship between Raoul 
Vaneigem and Guy Debord soured. Debord accused Vaneigem, among others, of 
resting on the laurels of early successes and for failing to contribute both qualitatively 
and quantitatively to the group. After a fraught discussion on the reorientation of the 
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SI, Raoul Vaneigem resigned from the group in November 1970. Vaneigem was 
therefore an important figure in the collective project that the SI embodied. Although 
he arrived after many Situationist positions had already been established in the late 
1950s, Vaneigem, in partnership with Debord and others, came to define much of 
what was characteristic of the SI in the 1960s. 
 In Chapter 4 of the current work the thesis turned to a reassessment of the 
later, or post-Situationist, work of Raoul Vaneigem. These later works have been 
subject to a great deal of criticism both from Guy Debord and other critics such as 
Barnard. Debord argues that the later work of Vaneigem is laughable and that his 
ideas surrounding pleasure amount to a celebration of commodity society. Barnard, in 
turn, states that these later works seem to propose revolution as a permanent state of 
orgiastic gratification and that Vaneigem avoids totalising and collective action 
against capitalism. These criticisms, however, are ill-founded. Through a series of 
theoretical expositions, it was demonstrated that the arguments concerning pleasure 
that Vaneigem develops in these later works are based in a critical appropriation of 
the Reichian theory of pleasure develop by the American psychotherapist Alexander 
Lowen. Vaneigem, like Lowen, argues that to be human is to be a body. In his later 
work, Vaneigem argues that the body is the site of praxis and praxis itself is a natural 
function of the body. Praxis is characterised by a practice of pleasure wherein human 
beings consciously realise their concrete needs and desires. As such, pleasure is a 
quality of being that can be felt in every aspect of life. It is the sign of a person freely 
and consciously creating themselves and the world in everyday life. Vaneigem 
explicitly states that pleasure cannot be reduced to a pure state of orgiastic 
gratification. Equally, his notion of pleasure is a critique of what he sees as the false 
emancipation of pleasure in modern commodity society. The specific criticisms levied 
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against him by Debord and Barnard are therefore unfounded. For Vaneigem, the 
modern capitalist subject is defined not by the search for pleasure, or free creative 
praxis, as he defines it but rather by a fear of pleasure, alienated praxis. The capitalist 
subject is a schismatic personality that is cut off from the concrete needs and desires 
of its body. Instead it identifies exclusively with the social roles and commodified 
pseudo-pleasures offered to its as compensatory mechanisms for its denial of self. The 
emotions repressed as a result re-emerge in the form of the aggressive attitudes and 
inhumanity that characterise the barbarism of capitalist subjects: the will to power. 
Both Vaneigem and Lowen characterise this axis of being between the practice of 
pleasure and the fear of pleasure as a struggle between life and death. 
 In this later work Vaneigem also tries to address issues such as patriarchy and 
ecology that he rarely, if ever, treated as a member of the Situationist International. 
Vaneigem argues that patriarchy results from the move to a society founded upon 
abstract production where the creativity of women is reduced to childbearing alone. 
Society represses the feminine qualities in favour of masculine ones. Such a schism 
enters into the fear of pleasure and the fragmentation of self that drives it. Although 
he welcomes the fact that feminism has brought the issue of female emancipation to 
the centre of the discussion of human liberation, Vaneigem is also highly critical of 
forms of feminism that limit the emancipation of women to the winning of equal 
access to capitalist spheres of activity. The authentic liberation of women, for Raoul 
Vaneigem, requires the liberation of all of mankind from the economy. Vaneigem 
also sees the exploitation of the natural world as the product of submitting it to 
abstract necessities. The exploitation of human nature and nature itself go hand in 
hand. Vaneigem argues that mankind needs to re-establish a symbiotic relationship 
with nature based on its inherent abundance. Moreover, he asserts that capitalism is 
	   	  277 
currently collapsing due to the tendency of the rate of profit to fall finally pushing 
capital to an ultimate crisis. In its terminal phase capital will invest its last remaining 
resources in a green economy before ultimately disappearing from the face of the 
earth. Mankind is either faced at this point with its own destruction or the possible 
creation of an entirely new society. 
The chapter concluded with an overview of the notion of an emancipated 
human subjectivity and civilisation that Vaneigem puts forward in his later work. 
Vaneigem terms his conception of liberating and liberated subjectivity, le vivant, the 
living or living being. The vivant has a great capacity for creation and empathy 
because it establishes and develops in a society that places the practice of pleasure, 
the individual and collective realisation of concrete human needs and desires, at the 
very centre of all social life. In his later work Vaneigem describes in great detail just 
how different a civilisation founded upon the vivant would be from our own. The 
quality of life and of the human beings who enjoy it would be defined by a richness 
and creativity that is completely foreign to contemporary society. In his utopian 
novel, Voyage à Oarystsis, and his Déclaration des droits de l’être humain, Vaneigem 
offers the most complete picture given by any member of the Situationist 
International of a genuinely communist society. 
Chapter 5 completed our re-assessment of the later work of Raoul Vaneigem 
by providing an exposition and analysis of his religious criticism. It was demonstrated 
that Vaneigem believes religion was brought into being by the transition to an 
agrarian society where intellectual and manual labour were separated. Religion, 
Vaneigem argues, arose as the justification of this division, introducing the mind-
body schism into human society and the human body, which reflects the hierarchical 
organisation of society. As such, Vaneigem defines religion as the ensemble of 
	   	  278 
inhuman attitudes that impose and reflect this denial of self or fear of pleasure: from 
guilt and fear to misogyny and sacrifice. Because these attitudes are still fundamental 
to the functioning of capitalist society, Vaneigem sees the contemporary world as in 
many ways the realisation or materialisation of religion but in a more fragmentary 
form. Capitalism does not abolish the essential character of religion, the domination 
of abstract necessity over concrete human needs and desires, it only makes this 
abstraction a more concrete reality than ever. In this vein, Vaneigem looks back to the 
Christian heresies of the past both to break with our pious vision of the Medieval 
world and to discover the vivant as a continual historical source of subversive power. 
Vaneigem focuses in particular on the Free Spirit heresy that in its denial of religious 
attitudes is, for him, a rejection of religion. With this established, the chapter 
concluded by proposing that the mystical and alchemical language employed by 
Vaneigem in his later work should not be taken as a celebration of mysticism but 
rather as a metaphorical language for the free praxis of pleasure, or first order 
mediation, that he sees as key to human emancipation. 
Vaneigem is a prolific author. The vast majority of his work having been 
written and published after his time in the SI. As I noted in the Introduction to the 
current work, while it has become relatively standard to treat the later writing of Guy 
Debord as a legitimate continuation of Situationist argumentation, this has not been 
the case for Raoul Vaneigem up to this point. I hope that the exposition and analysis 
of the later work of Raoul Vaneigem that I have presented in this thesis will open up 
his post-Situationist writing to the critical field and a wider readership. It is time that 
this rich and exciting body of work be made an integral part of our understanding of 
the SI and its afterlives. However, it is also important that Vaneigem should not be 
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seen only through the lens of the history of the Situationist International. His critical 
theory still has important implications for us today. 
The 2008 financial crisis appears to have marked a period of world-historical 
social transformation for humanity. In recent years riot and occupation have reared 
their heads in the centres of the richest nations. A series of democratic revolutions 
toppled one regime after another in the Near East in what became known as the ‘Arab 
Spring’. Greece has seen street fighting between anarchists and fascists in scenes 
reminiscent of the 1930s. While in Brazil there are currently huge street protests and 
waves of general strike action that speaks of profound fissures in society. It seems that 
new social movements are on the march almost everywhere a contemporary observer 
cares to look. Indeed, as many people noted even before the current crisis, the ‘end of 
history’ narrative that dominated the 1990s was short-lived. Is it the case then that the 
machine of socialisation is once again breaking down as it did in the 1960s? It is clear 
that an immense ocean of resentment, anger and frustration is at the root of this 
explosion of spontaneous activity. Unemployment is rife, real wages have plummeted 
since the 1970s and the intensity of work has only increased. At the same time, 
industrial expansion and global warming have not only destroyed much of the natural 
environment but are threatening the very existence of humanity in a way that the 
nuclear bomb threatened to do at the height of the Cold War.  
But fear and resentment in themselves can only take a person so far. Indeed, 
they are more likely to lead one to a nostalgic view of the past and to cling more 
desperately to what one knows. It is perhaps for this reason that so much confusion 
seems to reign among our contemporary ‘anti-capitalists’. The idea that has the 
broadest support among the Occupy generation is of placing controls on capitalism. 
For them it is not capitalism itself that is at fault but its somehow ‘unfettered’ form. 
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The financial crisis is blamed on ‘greedy’ bankers, while poverty and injustice is 
largely seen as the product of a conspiracy of avaricious, privately-educated, elites. At 
best, the result has been the desire to return to a Keynesian model of capitalist 
accumulation, impossible, and, at worst, there has been a recorded upsurge of anti-
Semitism. It would appear that the terms ‘revolutionary’, ‘radical’ and ‘anti-capitalist’ 
have simply become words used to distinguish oneself from support for the policies of 
the Labour Party or Obama. The machine of capitalist socialisation therefore appears 
as strong as ever. In such a situation it seems prescient to return to what was best in 
the radical movements of the 1960s. The anti-capitalists of this generation were 
revolting precisely at the time of the height of the Keynesian model and Fordism. 
Wages had never been higher and the cost of living never lower. In contrast to our 
own times, however, what characterised these movements, above all, was a critique 
aimed squarely at capitalist society as a totality. At its best, May ’68 was a revolution 
driven by a desire to break absolutely with the basic categories of capitalist 
socialisation and, in so doing, to transform completely every aspect of everyday life 
for the better. There is much that contemporary generations can learn from this 
totalising perspective and how it framed the question of emancipation. It is in this 
context that the work of Raoul Vaneigem should be read today. 
This is not to say, however, that the writing of Raoul Vaneigem is not without 
its problems. On the level of style, Vaneigem rarely provides a clear and systematic 
presentation of his critical language and ideas. This makes it very difficult at times to 
follow his line of argument. I think this explains much of the confusion and 
misunderstanding that surrounds his later writing. The Marxian language of Traité 
was familiar to enough people in the 1960s that it merged well with his visceral and 
poetic prose style. Although he retains these arguments in his later work, he drops this 
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more familiar Marxian language in favour of a lexicon that is all his own. However, 
he never goes out of his way to explain this. It requires a very detailed textual analysis 
just to find these definitions and to piece together the argument. Obviously, it is up to 
the reader to meet the demands of the writer, but there is no doubt that even a simple 
glossary of terms would make his writing far more accessible. It is in large part the 
fact that books such as Le Livre des plaisirs seem hermeneutically sealed to many 
people that I felt that the theoretical exposition provided in the current work was so 
necessary. 
On the level of theory, the focus of Raoul Vaneigem on the subjective side of 
the critique of capitalism means that he often avoids developing his insights into its 
objective structure. Obviously, the subjective is objective in the sense that it reflects a 
real internalisation of capitalist social forms. However, Vaneigem rarely 
contextualises this with a critique of the external structures of capitalist civilisation. 
That is to say, Vaneigem never develops the critique of political economy. Although 
Vaneigem no doubt has a critique of political economy, it never comes to the 
forefront of his writing, and, where it does appear, it feels more like assertion than 
argument. This is a problem because these assumptions are in fact fundamental and 
have major implications for his critical theory as a whole. They therefore raise a 
number of important questions. 
First, is capitalism essentially defined by class struggle: the battle between the 
bourgeoisie and the proletariat? The critique of value, as represented by Kurz and 
Jappe, says that this is not the case. Class struggle exists but it is not the essential or 
defining characteristic of capitalism. Rather, capitalism is the incessant valorisation of 
value. The endless turning of 100 pounds into 110 pounds. Both the capitalist and the 
worker are mere agents of value, what Marx terms, the ‘automatic subject’. Within 
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the capitalist framework, the agency of the worker and the bourgeois is entirely 
limited by the needs and forms of value. At the same time, capitalism can still 
function without an owning, exploiting class, by employing managers. Equally, the 
working class is itself being replaced by technology. Today the mass unemployment 
that has resulted means that many workers’ struggles are actually defined by a battle 
for the right to be exploited at all. Vaneigem, like Debord and, indeed, Marx, 
oscillates on this question. On the one hand, he focuses a lot of his critique on the 
notion of hierarchical domination of one group of subjects over another. On the other 
hand, he stresses that capitalist society is a form of fetishism in which we all, worker 
and capitalist alike, sacrifice our concrete needs and desires to the abstract demands 
of the economy, which essentially escapes our control. This oscillation, as the 
following question demonstrates, effects how Vaneigem thinks about the problem of 
human emancipation. 
Secondly, does the working class have a special interest in the abolition of 
capitalism and therefore a privileged position in the development of a radical 
consciousness to overcome it? The critique of value says not. The working class is 
just as much an agent of value as the capitalist class. There is nothing about its place 
as the seller of the labour-power commodity in the cycle of valorisation that gives it 
any privileged position in the development of a radical consciousness. Most of what 
has been called ‘class struggle’, the winning of better wages and conditions for 
workers, has simply served to further condition human beings into accepting 
capitalism. Moreover, every human being, as a human being, has a real concrete 
interest in the abolition of capitalism. The cycle of valorisation obeys an abstract 
fetishistic logic that cares nothing for the concrete realities of human life. The decent 
into barbarism it has enacted effects everyone, as does the possibility of a final 
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ecological disaster that could end all human life on the planet. Although, just as the 
critique of value, he recognises ‘class struggle’ in this sense for what it is, Vaneigem 
does seem to think that the working class has both a special interest in abolishing 
capitalism and a privileged position in the development of a radical consciousness. To 
some extent, however, he, like the rest of the SI, gets around this problem by simply 
extending the proletarian position to almost everyone. Further, Vaneigem tends in his 
later work to talk more in terms of a kind of ontological battle between, what he 
terms, the living and the dead. Yet there is still a tendency in his work towards an 
attachment to the notion of the industrial working class, in the traditional Marxist 
sense, as the bearer of a special project of emancipation. 
Thirdly, how will capitalism end? The position of Jappe and Kurz is that 
capitalism will end by meeting an objective and internal limit.911 The technological 
revolution of the 1970s, micro processing and cybernetics, meant that the amount of 
labour needed to create the vast majority of commodities was greatly diminished. The 
total mass of value in capitalist society therefore fell dramatically. It is now 
increasingly impossible for the economy as a totality to realise new value, which can 
only be created through the exploitation of labour-power (the same labour-power that 
is still incessantly being reduced by technological innovation driven by competition). 
The financialisation of the economy since the 1970s, which is often identified with 
‘neo-liberalism’, was the only way of keeping the whole system from collapsing. This 
is because it keeps the cycle of valorisation occurring on a virtual level by betting on 
future profits (which can never be realised). As the 2008 financial crisis showed, 
however, financialisation is only a temporary reprieve. Capitalism is destroying its 
own categories through an objective process over which no one has any control. It has 
                                                
911 See, Jappe, Crédit à mort, in particular the chapter ‘Crédit à mort’, pp. 95-124. 
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already reached its internal limits and we are currently living through its slow decline 
into disaster. 
As a member of the SI, Raoul Vaneigem does not put across the idea that 
capitalism could reach an objective limit. Instead, he banks on the moment wherein 
the working class will overcome the bourgeoisie in a revolutionary act of conscious 
will. However, from around the 1990s onwards, Vaneigem states that he does believe 
in a theory of collapse based on the tendency of the rate of profit to fall.912 He, like 
Kurz and Jappe, sees the financialisation of the economy in the 1970s not as a move 
by greedy bankers but as the only way that capitalist civilisation could have continued 
at all. The problem, however, is that Vaneigem does not, like Jappe and Kurz, present 
a reasoned argument for this claim and it therefore appears as a mere assertion. 
Indeed, despite its importance, the small amount of space that he gives to this position 
in his work, a few lines here and there, makes it easy to miss that he states it at all. 
Moreover, although Vaneigem does say that neo-liberalism was the only way to save 
capital, he also occasionally employs a rhetoric of greed that would enter into a rather 
different kind of discourse. Once again, this seems to be the result of his oscillation 
over whether capitalism is fundamentally defined by its fetishistic logic or by 
domination by actual capitalist subjects. 
Fourthly, and finally, when capitalism collapses does the current alienation of 
capitalist subjects make it more or less likely that we can found a new, more human 
civilisation, or will we descend into barbarism? According to the critique of value, the 
current state of capitalist subjects makes barbarism and, indeed, the end of humanity 
through environmental disaster a real possibility. The ability of human beings to 
empathise and to respond to reality has been completely undermined by the cult of 
                                                
912 See, ‘Observations sur le Manifeste’, op. cit. 
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competition, immediate gratification and individualism encouraged by the market. 
When revolutions such as the Paris Commune of 1871 or the Spanish Revolution of 
the 1930s occurred, these were still based in communities that had some sense of pre-
capitalist solidarity. The critique of value is therefore pessimistic but hopeful. It’s 
pessimism, however, allows it to stress the extreme and real danger that humanity is 
currently facing. In contrast, Raoul Vaneigem appears to be overly optimistic about 
the state of the human psyche in the face of this collapse. While he does briefly refer 
to the end of humanity as a possibility, his rhetorical emphasis is on an almost entirely 
positive and inevitable outcome. This means that, unlike theorists such as Jappe, 
Vaneigem fails to stress the seriousness of the situation. At the same time, however, 
both theorists realise that the important thing to do before the collapse is to encourage 
human ideas, a critique of barbarism, that will denaturalise us to the categories of 
capitalist social life. Despite his failure to engage properly with the critique of 
political economy, I think Vaneigem perhaps goes further in some respects than the 
critique of value in identifying and struggling against the interiorisation of this 
inhumanity promoted by capitalist society. When capitalism does collapse, which it 
will, we could do much worse than look to Vaneigem’s vision of a new civilisation 
founded on a practice of pleasure to replace it. 
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